

AA File, Series A1838, Item 140108, Australia. General Policy towards NEI [Netherlands East Indies]. 1947-1949.

An Australian wife married to an Indo (Dutch) man begging the Australia Government (under Chiefly) to reconsider the government's boycott on Netherlands East Indies in favour of the Indonesian freedom fighters.

COPY

TJC:ES

P.M's File No. Y.41/1/9.

The Hague

van Neckstraat 11

Holland.

To Minister President Chifley.

23rd August, 1947.

Dear Sir,

up Forgive me the liberty I take in addressing you and taking/your very valuable time, but kindly lend me your ear for I wish to whisper an urgent message into it. I am Australian born but married Dutch and have fine sons who have all fought in this war for the freedom of the Netherlands and her colonies, one, I unfortunately have lost in a camp in Japan, another is repatriated half blind from a concentration camp in N.I. and my third son is still doing his job there at the present moment. Has it ever occurred to you, how very unfair you and your party are being to the Dutch by all this boycotting and siding with the Indonesian Republic against us and how you are paralysing economical commerce between that beautiful land of Australia and our wonderful island of the East-Indies knowing in your heart that both these countries need each other so badly.

Have you forgotten what our Dutch boys did in the Indian Ocean and how they saved Australia from a Japanese invasion?

Look here Mr. Chifley, I have lived in Java and Sumatra for 20 years, so I am not talking through my hat when I tell you, a more happy and prosperous Indonesian community I never met and believe me I have travelled far, but you must realise that after the Japanese invasion sedition is rife with the present day result. Now what I can't understand is that in Australia you refuse admittance to the brown brother but now you take up the cudgels for him against us. Why? Are you so badly informed that you don't know what is going on over there? That white people are still interned, that white women are the concubines by force of their Indonesian gaolers, that over 2000 Indonesians are starving to death and that the big hero Soekarno does not lift a finger to release them, that they reckon upon us, the Dutch, to help them and you put all in our way to prevent us by boycotting our ships etc. Why did you send a representative here, a short time ago to speak to us of immigration and that there was a great chance for Dutch farmers etc. and on the other side you are simply throttling us. Why?

Of course I am only a woman and love both, Australia and Netherland and plead with you to try and lift this boycott, that at least we can help our poor people in N.I. with medicament, food and clothing.

Before I close, I should like to mention that I am the daughter of Brigadier General R.E. Roth who was one of the finest men that ever lived and did so much for the public welfare of N.S.W. If you care to look up his record, you will see that I am not lying.

In the meantime I thank you for reading this letter. I have an idea, that you won't put it in the waste paper basket before reading it, because I am proud to say, that one never appeals in vain to an Australian they being the most chivalrous men in the world.

Sincerely yours,

(sgd) Maltia Marie v. Riemsdyk
Roth

COPY: E.A. (OBSNS.)
S. & S. "
IMMIG. (INFN.)

KK
WP.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

HE/HE.

DECYPHER FROM:

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION
UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY
NEW YORK.

I. 18798.
XB00126.
Dated 18th September, 1947.
2133.
Received 19th September, 1947.
7.5 pm.

MOST IMMEDIATE

UN. 878.

INDONESIA.

Marshall has accepted joint Australian-Belgian invitation to the United States to act as third member of the Indonesian Commission. Public statement to this effect has been issued here today.

External Affairs.

19th September, 1947.

D.H.S./116.

About the Committee of Three and the Cheribon Agreement - here Australia outrightly is against the treatment of Indonesian independence in the past. They suggest that complete Independence be given to Indonesia. The Committee of Three is made up of Australia, Belgium and the United States and was appointed by the UN Security Council to help "make peace" between the Dutch and the Republicans in Indonesia (this was taken from the newspaper clippings below).

The Cheribon Agreement: Signed in 25th March 1947, the Linggadjati Agreement (also known as the Cheribon Agreement) was a treaty signed by the Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch:

- The main content of the agreement was that the Netherlands recognized the republic as the de facto authority in Java (including Madura) and Sumatra. Both governments were to cooperate in the formation of a sovereign, democratic, and federal United States of Indonesia, comprising the entire territories of the Dutch East Indies, including the Republic of Indonesia, Kalimantan (Borneo), and the Great East. Both governments were to cooperate in establishing a Netherlands–Indonesian Union with the Dutch queen as its head. Both the United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands–Indonesian Union were to be formed not later than Jan. 1, 1949. The two governments agreed to settle by arbitration any dispute that might arise and that they could not settle by themselves. The agreement was intended to lay down broad principles, leaving the details to be worked out later. Each party interpreted the agreement to suit its interests, however, and eventually open conflict developed between the Dutch and Indonesian governments.
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CABLEGRAM.

SECRET.

PRC/MB

Sent: 23rd September 1947
0.1613Z
6.40 p.m.

DECYPHER TO -

The Australian Legation,
THE HAGUE.

127.

TOP SECRET.

Personal for Officer from Burton.

Your 164.

1. Our guess had been, from the attitude of Dutch here, Dutch at Batavia, and reports from New York, that, for the time being, the decision had been taken there could be no further military moves.
2. Eaton has reported fully and conditions in Djokjakarta are encouraging and the whole question of alleged breaches of "cease fire" has been observed by other representatives who are now inclined to believe that the so-called mopping up operations of the Dutch is the chief cause.
3. We are at present giving thought to the line the Australian representative on the Committee of Three should take. We are fairly confident that we can sell any solution we think is just to the Indonesians, and recent Dutch attitude to us makes us believe that they too wish to find a solution through the Committee of Three.
4. The Cheribon Agreement approached independence of Indonesia in a roundabout way, first of all giving independence to a United States of Indonesia, and then forming a Netherlands-Indonesian union. In our view, this procedure toward independence is now outmoded. There must be independence for the Republic, that is, Java, Sumatra, and Madura, as a first initial step, association with other parts of Indonesia being left to subsequent arrangements.
5. Our second observation at this stage is that the Cheribon Agreement leaves unsolved all the major questions, for example, the economic arrangements, and that the Committee of Three must attempt to solve these questions if a solution is to be found.
6. For these reasons, it would seem futile to return to the Cheribon Agreement, and we had in mind a combination of the Cheribon Agreement and the Philippines-United States Agreement. Under this letter, if you can obtain a text, you will see that complete independence is granted, subject to agreements between the Philippines and the United States contemplated in a protocol to the main agreement. In our view, if the Dutch can be persuaded to offer independence along the lines offered by the United States to the Philippines, and by the United Kingdom to India, Burma, and Ceylon, and if Indonesians, on the other hand, can be persuaded to offer subsequent agreements satisfactorily governing economic and administrative arrangements, there is every prospect of final agreement.

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and only

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CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

O.16132

- 2 -

7. The location of the meetings of the Committee of Three is not yet decided. New York has been suggested, but we think this unrealistic and would prefer Singapore. We are convinced also that our representative must go with concrete proposals generally acceptable to both parties.

8. I will be speaking informally and on a personal basis to Teppema along these lines and therefore there is no objection to you taking similar action at The Hague. Our impression is that the Dutch are now willing to believe that we are sincerely desirous of a satisfactory settlement and that, in arriving at this settlement, do not wish to prejudice their fundamental interests. Proposals along the lines outlined above would satisfy the objective interests of both parties. It would be interesting to us if you could think aloud along these lines to whatever Dutch authorities are available to you and to report their reactions.

9. As regards procedure of the Committee, we had contemplated that, while the Committee was considering an overall draft agreement based on Cheribon and perhaps also on Philippines, members of their staff would discuss with Dutch and Indonesian representatives further agreements dealing with detailed economic and other relationships. We envisage also that the Committee of Three, after its first meeting, should meet subsequently from time to time until all agreements had not only been completed but carried into effect, thus maintaining the supervision of the Security Council over all negotiations and ensuring that both parties carry out the terms of the agreement.

10. The granting of immediate independence to the Republic will come to the Dutch as a new suggestion, as Cheribon contemplated, as indicated above, a more roundabout procedure. There can be little doubt, however, that the British technique, which has met with such success, can, with our influence, meet with equal success in respect of Indonesia, and that, in place of the Cheribon Agreement, there should be the immediate offer of independence, subject to certain subsequent agreements. We can sell this to the Indonesians and, from the Dutch point of view, there would be tremendous beneficial effects throughout the whole world.

11. You will realize this is the important stage of all the negotiations we have initiated in this matter and therefore wish you to do everything possible to have accepted this general approach, maintaining always that events have proved the course we adopted to be the correct one and that, with Dutch co-operation, we can see the whole matter through to a successful and satisfactory conclusion.

E.A. (draft of 23/9/47).

24th September, 1947.

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Newspaper clipping exploring how oppositional member Menzies disagreed with Australia's stance towards the Indonesian Republics independence

Aussie Leader Attacks Govt. Action Over NEI

Batavia, Sept. 24.—Reuter-AAP.—Mr. Robert Menzies, Australian Opposition Leader, bitterly attacked the government in the Canberra House of Representatives today for referring the Indonesian dispute to the United Nations Security Council when he said it was a domestic affair.

Australia's action might rebound in the future, he declared, if some ingenious theorist could refer to the White Australia policy or to her treatment of New Guinea natives, ignoring the fact that these were domestic affairs "like the Indonesia case."

Mr. Menzies was speaking during a foreign affairs debate and he charged the Australian Government with yielding to Communist policy in Indonesia, adding: "That policy is to drive white men from Southeast Asia in fact from the whole of the Pacific. If it is followed, Australia is going to be a very lonely nation."

Australia announced that she was directing the Security Council's attention to the situation in Indonesia under Article 39 of the Charter, on July 30.

Judge Appointed to Committee

In the House of Representatives earlier Mr. Joseph Chifley, the Prime Minister, announced the appointment of Justice Kirby, of the Australian Commonwealth Arbitration Court, as Australia's representative in the three-nation committee set up by the United Nations Security Council to help to

"make the peace" between the Dutch and the Republicans in Indonesia.

Mr. Chifley said he hoped the committee would meet in Singapore soon, as observance of the Security Council's "cease-fire" order not be maintained indefinitely but depended on an early start of negotiations for a lasting settlement.

Representatives from Belgium and the United States will judge on the Committee.

In Java, the six-nation consular commission investigating observance of the "cease-fire" order on behalf of the United Nations decided to fly to Jogjakarta, the Republican capital, on Friday, to spend one day hearing the "view of the Republican Government on certain aspects of the survey" it was officially announced in Batavia.

The representatives of China, the United States, Britain, France, Australia and Belgium on the commission will travel in Royal Air Force and Royal Australian Air Force Dakotas.

Want Dutch Bases Closed

Reuters correspondent reported that the Australian Trades Union Council Executive was demanding today that the Federal Government close all Dutch bases in Australia and prohibit Dutch troops from doing work usually performed by Australian civilians. They said that Dutch troops were loading vehicles and steel barges into a vessel at Geelong, which dockside employees had refused to handle under their ban on Dutch goods which would be used for war purposes in Indonesia.

Nadjamoeddin Daeng Malewa, former Prime Minister of the State of East Indonesia, who was relieved of his post last week in a purge of officials accused of corruption, arrived in Batavia by from Holland today.

He said he was returning to East Indonesia as soon as possible.

The ex-Premier recently flew to the United States to give evidence to the United Nations Security Council on the dispute between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republicans, but was not admitted to the Council.

If the situation in the NEI develops "favourable" Holland will decrease her forces there from 100,000 men to 60,000 next year, United Press reports.

This was announced here today in the 1948 budget debate.

"N. China
Daily
News"

26. 9. 48

401/3/1/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM

SECRET.

PEC:HP

O.16343/44
Sent: 26th September, 1947.
5.15 p.m.

DECRYPTER TO:

AUSTRALIAN CONSUL-GENERAL,
BATAVIA.....280.

REPEATED TO:

THE AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
THE HAGUE.....130.

IMMEDIATE.

Your 328 is disturbing as we had formed opinion that Dutch were being co-operative with respect to Committee of Three and would not use delaying tactics. We were expecting a more favourable reaction to your approach asking what their general views were. If, however, they are reluctant to make known their views, except to the Committee itself, then we must plan without the advantage of having their views. We cannot accept any delaying tactics and for your own information Dr. Evatt will raise the matter in the Security Council on Monday and urge immediate action. It should be emphasised to the Dutch authorities that, having reached this stage, nothing but damage can come from any suggestions of delay, as all members of the United Nations are watching with interest this development which, with co-operation of both parties, should lead to a satisfactory conclusion to each party and redound to the credit of the United Nations.

2. The proposal to allow a Republican liaison officer at Canberra and an Australian officer at Djokjakarta is most wise and the Dutch can be assured that such an arrangement will not in any way prejudice their interests.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS(re draft of 26/9/47)

29th September, 1947.

Handwritten notes:
→ 26/9/47
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26/9/47

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CABLEGRAM.

SECRET.

NVP:NO'N

O.16429

Sent 29th September, 1947

DECRYPTER TO:

THE AUSTRALIAN CONSUL GENERAL,
BATAVIA.282. IMMEDIATE.

1. You have every right to maintain a leading position in the drafting of the report as the Australian observers are the only ones who turned up in time and the only ones who are in a position to make full report.
2. In particular, you must ensure that we have an opportunity of seeing the report in draft form before it is finalised by the Committee. This can best be done by your asking for an adjournment for a few days, without giving the reason, toward the end of deliberations, and by your cabling day by day any further progress made. The reason is that it is important that the report should be drafted, having in mind the various relevant political factors which will determine its reception at New York.
3. One matter which should be included is a firm recommendation regarding troop withdrawals. You have paved the way for this in the previous report by stating that no immediate solution could be suggested and implying that nothing but withdrawal could be effective. You should recommend also that the Consuls continue to observe and report at their discretion, assisted by military observers, until withdrawal has been completed and until, in view of the Consuls, there is no danger of any major breaches of the peace.
4. It is noted that the previous report was transmitted to the Security Council through the State Department. It is not understood why this was so. The report is not confidential once completed and should therefore be transmitted direct to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, confirmation copy being sent, if necessary, by the representatives of each country concerned. In view of the arrangements to the Committee of Three, we do not wish the precedent to be established of transmission through the State Department.
5. Please request all Service representatives when they return to pass through Canberra on their way to Melbourne as we should like to hear their impressions, though, at the same time, we realise that they are observers acting for you and have no formal report to make to this Department or to their own.


EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (RE DRAFT 29/9/47)

29th September, 1947


WP P. 4/9/47

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Stating that the United States had joined Belgium and Australia on the Committee of Three



Concerns regarding Belgium and USA ties to the Dutch - trying to delay decisions of the Committee of Three which goes against UN desires of peace



More on difficulties getting results from America in the Committee of Three.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

MW:EGM:

DECRYPTER FROM:

AUSTRALIAN CONSUL GENERAL,
BATAVIA.

I. 15610

SC85 X/D56

Dated: 1st. October 1947

1050

Rec'd: 1st. October 1947

4. 10 P.M.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

337.

222.

TOP SECRET.

Your telegram 265 first paragraph I agree. Definite information intensified mopping up operations will occur immediately and if no immediate solution by Committee of Three probable further police action.

2. At yesterday's Mission meeting my part of joint report submitted and accepted by quorum (American and Belgian Consuls General absent). American Consul General had stated that he was not prepared to sign any joint report until American Military observers proceed to field and report. Observers arrived yesterday. Both American and Belgian Consuls General stated that they had definite information that American representative on the Committee of Three not officially appointed and there was no reason for urgency in submitting report.

5. At meeting I proposed that Security Council be approached for instructions regarding submission of joint report or delay until American Military observers submit their report. This not agreed on account of stated Russian influence and following telegram was despatched via British Foreign Office as Chairman was British Consul General begins:-
Consular Commission has now completed its investigation although reports from some Military observers have yet to come in.

Work has begun on the draft of main report which should be completed within two weeks. Ends.

4. Van Hook has stated his impressions in America were that the Security Council would not in any way be prepared to force decisions of Council and this is probably the reason for the present attitude.

5. At yesterday's meeting Belgian and American Consuls left before business concluded stating they had other business to attend. Consider in present circumstances Consular Mission will rapidly degenerate and that no agreeable joint report is probable in the near future.

5. Consider all necessary ground covered by self and officers and that delay in awaiting compilation of joint report until completion of the report by American Military observers will detract all value of our joint report. Recommend consideration following:

(a) my immediate return to Australia with officers and to proceed if required to America with all information gained

Plus 1/9/46

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

MW:EGM:

L. 19610

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(b) If required to return to Batavia possibly via Indies (Kin Service- discussed with officer) within two or three weeks for joint report purposes.

(c) Consulate to be left temporarily in the hands of Consul posted in accordance with previous recommendations or Ballard to return.

(d) If agreed procedure as follows: immediately during period of delay to return to Dilli by own plane to obtain clothes and for personal reasons. At Dilli to receive instructions from you to proceed to Canberra. At Darwin en route aeroplane to pick up Consul or Ballard and return to Batavia.

7. British, French and Chinese Consuls fully sympathise our views on delay but no positive action can be expected from France. Ende.

B.A.

1st. October 1947



DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Rec'd P.45/59/16
17 OCT 1947
File No. PRIME MINISTER,
CANBERRA.

Ref: Y.41/1/9

16 OCT 1947

Dear Madam,

I desire to refer to your letter of 23rd August, 1947, and to inform you that the policy of the Australian Government towards the situation in Indonesia is carried out in a spirit of impartiality and with one desire only; to see, as soon as possible, a peaceful settlement of the prolonged dispute in the Netherlands East Indies.

Yours faithfully,

W.P. 1947?
COPY : E.A. (P.C.)
S.&S. " "
IMMIG. " "

JOHN J. DEDMAN

J.J. Dedman
Prime Minister.
16 OCT 1947

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs.

Madam M. van Riemsdyk,
van Neckstraat II,
The Hague,
HOLLAND.

Referred, by direction in c/w your
P.45/59/16 of 30.9.47.

W. H. ...
Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department.

Australia disagrees with Committee's want for a Joint Police - see this as a way for the Dutch to get more control of Indonesia

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET.

PEG.BL.

O.17458
Dated 17th October, 1947
12.25 p.m.

DECYPHER TO -

Australian Consul General,
BATAVIA.

303. Immediate.

Your 361.

Have noted your views in paragraph 4. We note with some surprise your emphasis on the need for early establishment of Joint Police Force, and would like to know your reasons for this conclusion. Our impression has been that establishment of Joint Police Force is not only impracticable now that matters have gone so far, but might also provide Dutch in future with opportunity to extend their influence at expense of Indonesians in contravention of whatever settlement may ultimately be reached.

2. Agree with your first proposal in para. 10. We propose to use your aircraft to fly majority of party to Batavia, even if some members have to travel by civil aircraft.

3. Arrangements being made to replenish your liquor supply. If possible consignment will be flown up in your aircraft.

4. Do not consider necessary Australian military observers be attached to the Commission.


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
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Dutch getting antsy - the Committee of Three need to make a decision on a 'cease fire'



More about Dutch getting more support - Australia trying to be impartial



About Australia agreeing with Russia that all troops should be taken out of Indonesia

**AUSTRALIA SIDES
WITH RUSSIA
ON INDONESIA** 31

NEW YORK, Thursday.
Australia yesterday unexpectedly reversed her position to support a Russian proposal, calling for the withdrawal of all troops in Indonesia to lines held before hostilities.
Colonel Hodgson, who until now had urged approval of the Australian plan to stop fighting by having both sides withdraw five kilometres behind positions held at the time of the first cease-fire, suddenly declared for the Russian plan as his first choice.
He said that Australia now believed the only practical method of ending the hostilities was for the Security Council to insist on troops being withdrawn to original lines.
The Council adjourned the debate until to-morrow.

bab - Tunis

31 10 47.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

MN. BL.

C. 18629
Dated 6th November, 1947
3.40

DECRYPTER TO -

Australian Consul General,
BATVIA.

330.

Our 325.

The following for Judge Kirby.

We asked our United Nations Mission, New York, for clarification of last paragraph of United States resolution adopted by Security Council 1st November. Following explanation has now been received from New York:

"After defeat of Soviet and Australian resolutions we were able in the Sub-Committee to obtain most of our desiderata for strengthening the resolution so far as Council was prepared to go. We seized on last paragraph suddenly proposed by Belgium in Sub-Committee, as one which was capable of wide interpretation and which would enable a strong Consular Commission and Committee of Three to exercise pressure on the parties to reach agreement to carry out withdrawals of such a nature as would ensure breaking contract between forces and in consequence would materially assist in making effective the order for cessation of hostilities.

This was our clear object in lieu of failure of Consular Commission to suggest proposals and defeat of resolutions on complete or partial withdrawal. We know also that this was wish of United States. You can appreciate however that this interpretation could not be stated publicly as the clause may then have been jeopardised, and its withdrawal obtained by Belgium, France and the United Kingdom. As it was the United Kingdom and France were lukewarm in support of last two paragraphs.

Will appreciate that at this stage it is not desirable to seek further clarification but that it should be left to good sense of Consular Commission and Committee of Three.

Handwritten signature

E.A. (P. & U.N.)

RP
NEI - Amst Policy

7-11-47

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About the job of the Committee of Three as put by the UN

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CABLEGRAM

SECRET

MW.APH.

I. 22258/59

DECIPHER FROM -

Dated 12th November, 1947

1230

Australian Consul-General,
BATAVIA.

Recd. 13th November, 1947
8.30

407. The following document received from Judge Kirby was submitted informally to the Dutch on November 7th and is referred to in paragraph 9 of his personal telegram to Dr. Burton.

Begins - The Committee of Good Offices at this stage considers it to be desirable to state as clearly as possible what it considers to be its present responsibility regarding the Indonesian question:

There are two resolutions of the Security Council which have a bearing on the work of the Committee. The first of these is the resolution of August 25th 1947 under which the Security Council expressed its readiness, if parties so requested, to assist in the settlement through a Committee Council. This offer has been accepted by both parties and it is the Committee's conception that, pursuant to the resolution and this basic acceptance, the Committee will render all assistance possible to the parties in reaching a political settlement. In this connection, the Committee will assume any and every task devolving on it as a result of the agreement or request made by the parties from time to time. Nothing that the Committee may do will bind either party except under circumstances where two conditions are fulfilled namely:

- (1) That both parties ask that the Committee make recommendations and -
- (2) That both parties state in advance that they would regard such recommendations as binding.

The second resolution of the Security Council is that of November 1st 1947 calling upon the parties concerned forthwith to consult each other, either directly or preferably through the Committee of Good Offices, as to the means to be employed in order to give effect to the cease-fire resolution, and pending agreement, to cease any activities, or incitement to activities, which contravene that resolution and to take appropriate measures for safeguarding life and property. Under this resolution the Committee considers itself directed by the Council to offer its assistance to the parties in the absence of any direct agreement between the parties without awaiting a request by either party that the Committee should offer such assistance. This indicates that the Committee has a responsibility to take the initiative in this respect.

Far from conceiving its assistance as having a binding character, the Committee considers that its duty can be fulfilled only through agreement between the parties themselves. In the unlikely circumstances in which the parties might reject the Committee's assistance, the Committee considers its responsibility to the Security Council would be acquitted simply by reporting to the Security Council.

It is the considered opinion of the Committee that discussions by the parties concerning the implementation of the resolution regarding the cease-fire and discussion looking toward political settlement have a bearing on each other. It is the further opinion of the Committee that both discussions should be undertaken with all possible speed, as any measure of agreement

*RP
NSI - [unclear]*

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- 2 - **CABLEGRAM. SECRET.**

I.22258/59

reached in either discussion, will facilitate the reaching of agreement in the other. It is believed that any insistence that either discussion shall have reached a specified stage of agreement before other discussion is undertaken may easily result in a stalemate as to both. The Committee recognises the urgency of reaching an agreement to implement the cease-fire resolution and pending such agreement emphasises the importance of ceasing any activities or incitement to activities which contravene that resolution, and of taking appropriate measure for the safeguarding of life and property. This is a matter of days and in the Committee's view the parties should immediately undertake discussions to that end either directly or through its Good Offices. The Committee calls attention to the fact that the Government of the Republic has requested assistance of the Committee both as to the implementation of the cease-fire resolution and as to discussions looking towards a political settlement. Ofcourse, the assistance of this Committee would be immediately available to the Netherlands Government if requested.

The Committee is confident that the Netherlands Government is prepared to exchange views either directly or with the assistance of the Committee, looking towards a political settlement while the Committee of Good Offices is at the same time endeavouring to obtain an agreement implementing the cease-fire resolution.

The Committee of Good Offices would not feel justified in requesting that a ship be put at the disposal of the parties unless and until it is assured that both parties will make use of its facilities as soon as the ship is available. One of the parties has given such assurance and assurance to that effect from the Netherlands Government would be welcomed.

DEPT. OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

13-11-47

Agreement of the Committee of a complete ceasefire as of 4th August 1947

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

PEC:EGM:

O. 19171

ENGYIPHERED TO:

Sent: 15th. November 1947
11.30 P.M.

AUSTRALIAN CONSUL GENERAL,
BATAVIA.

IMMEDIATE.

349.

Personal, Kirby from Burton.

Your 412. See our 330 of 6th. November giving you text of New York cable explaining Council resolution.

In my view, no good purpose is served by seeking further interpretation. Paragraphs in question are clear and mean that any military advance whether by hostile action or peaceful penetration beyond the position at August 4th, is inconsistent with Council resolution. Cease fire order in our view meant that both sides should stand fast and cease any movement of any kind until negotiations between the two parties determine subsequent moves. You might suggest that Committee ask for stand fast in this sense in present positions so as to prevent further mopping up pending clarification of Council resolution.

I feel in arguing about interpretation, Committee is being side-tracked from the main issues. The fact is, interpretation would be unimportant if there were willingness to conform with the spirit of the resolution and if there were willingness to co-operate with the Committee on finding terms of settlement. Meaning of terms and phrases you referred to is irrelevant to the main issues and if the parties are not willing to conform, then Committee has no alternative but to report back to Council. We do not fear the use of the veto and can assure you it will not be exercised in this case in favour of the Dutch. It is true Council will not welcome reference back but world opinion still less welcomes lack of progress in negotiations.

You may quote Australian interpretation which is clear if you wish and I am communicating with the Minister as you requested but I would consider best course is to quote your own belief that the meaning and intention are clear and you will not accept further side-stepping.


Meanwhile settlement negotiations should be pursued. If there is no co-operation on this, then lack of co-operation on cease-fire is unimportant.

DR. BURTON.

18th. November 1947

Purs/sq/16

Australia's push for Dutch withdrawal in certain areas



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

I.23428
Dated 29th Nov. 1947
2240
Recd. 30th Nov. 1947
10.30 a.m.

/FF

FROM:

The Australian Consul General,
BATAVIA.

Press release Batavia 29th November 1947.

The United Nations Committee of Good Offices today adopted the following statement and transmitted it to the Special Committees established by Netherlands and Indonesian Republic to implement the Security Council's resolution of 1st November 1947.

1. The Committee of Good Offices is of the opinion that requests for investigation into allegations of violations of cease fire resolution should primarily and as a rule come from either or both of the Special Committees of parties concerned.

2. The Chairman of Representatives of the Committee of Good Offices with the two Special Committees will, nevertheless, possess discretion to take up allegations of violations of the cease fire resolution on his own initiative with either or both of Special Committees.

3. In the investigation of such allegations, Representatives of the Committee should be given the right to insist on all facts being made available to them by both parties.

4. Representatives of Committee and their Military Assistants should have the right to make observations in territories of both parties.

5. Parties should co-operate with each other under auspices of Representatives of Committee in works of rescue and in carrying out humanitarian activities.

6. In the case of situations which might lead to a violation of the cease fire resolution it is the opinion of the Committee that neither the Committee nor its Representatives should be expected to receive information under conditions which bind them to silence. It is clear that work of Committee and its Representatives in connection with the implementation of the cease fire resolution should be carried on with full co-operation of both parties and or its Representatives fully and promptly on any situation which either party may consider as necessitating movement of elements of its armed forces beyond their present advance positions and that advice should be given prior to any such movement. Because of mechanical difficulties with two aircraft made available to Committee it has been impossible to transport all Members of the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic from Jogjakarta to Batavia as previously planned. It is now hoped that they will be able to travel to Batavia early next week and that Special Committees will meet again shortly.

A. Min & Dept of E.A. (attn)

30th November 1947

*RP
NEI
and
L*

Copies to

- Secretariat
- AS (P)
- F
- ME
- A
- LC
- PI
- Pa
- S
- EH
- Adm

**New Zealand Bans
"Indonesia Calling"**

(A.A.P.-Reuters)

WELLINGTON, Wed
A direct refusal to release the film "Indonesia Calling" for public exhibition, has been made by the Prime Minister (Mr. Fraser) in answer to a protest by the Auckland branch of the Carpenters' Union which was placed before him by the National Council of the N.Z. Federation of Labour.

Mr. Fraser said the release of "Indonesia Calling," which represented a very tendentious viewpoint on a complex and delicate question, is considered unjustifiable on the ground that it is likely to cause ill feeling between this country and a friendly nation.

He added that the film constituted the advocacy of an undemocratic principle of a minority group arguing its right to conduct foreign relations of a nation whereas these could only be the responsibility of the Government elected of the people.

Bart Tannis
Pues / sq / 11.12.47

31/12/47 on the Dutch making a plan that Indonesia become a 'United States of Indonesia' - Dutch will have more control over the sates where more Dutch are present?

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

0.21583.

Sent: 31/12/47.
9. p.m.

P.M./JD.

DECYFHER TO:

AUSTRALIAN CONSUL-GENERAL,
BATAVIA.

IMMEDIATE.

412.

For Kirby.

1. Dutch have now decided to pursue plan of United States of Indonesia making Republic one amongst many States (See cable K.32). This means decisions taken by United States of Indonesia in respect of foreign relations and also domestic policy will be decisions dictated by Dutch through their influence on separate states majority of which are Dutch established. Republic will have achieved no independence even possibly in local affairs within Republic.

2. Dutch claim they are acting on principle of self-determination, and that political units so far established have been result of spontaneous movements.

3. It would seem to us the duty of Committee of Three to verify Dutch claims in view of Republic contradictions. Two questions need investigation: (a) whether economic power is being used to assist in setting up economic units or whether movements are, in fact, spontaneous; and (b) whether the means of giving expression to self-determination are satisfactory, and, if not, what kind of supervision is required and by what body.

4. If Dutch claims regarding present spontaneous movements towards organisation, and regarding the need for Dutch troops to protect native populations against Republic are valid, they can have no objection to withdrawal of troops along lines of plan put forward, leaving large area free of troops from both sides. In fact, withdrawal of troops and lifting of all restrictions on movements of goods within Indonesia should be accomplished before any attempt is made to give effect to self-determination. There can be no self-determination when the peoples concerned are under the military and economic control of those from whom they might wish to be freed.

5. It is suggested that you might make these points in public if you think that course desirable, but at least record your view for the information of the Security Council.

E.A.

2/1/48.

Post 15/1/48

Australia's want for peace in Indonesia

Pustog/16

6th January, 1948.

Dear Sir,


With reference to your letter of 11th December, enclosing copies of letters from the New South Wales Branch and the Adelong sub-Branch of the Returned Sailors', Soldiers' and Airmen's Imperial League of Australia, I am directed to make it clear that the Australian Government's attitude towards the Netherlands-Indonesian dispute is determined solely by Australia's vital interest in the restoration and preservation of stable conditions throughout the East Indies. It is the Government's view that, having regard to the delicate and complex situation which has developed in Indonesia, permanent stability can be achieved only through a settlement which takes account both of the interests of the Dutch and the legitimate aspirations of Indonesian nationalism. It is considered that the early conclusion of such a settlement offers the best means of strengthening the hand of moderate elements throughout Indonesia and of preventing a recrudescence of violence and extremism.

Yours faithfully,

Secretary.

J. C. Neagle, Esq.,
General Secretary,
The Returned Sailors', Soldiers' and
Airmen's Imperial League of Australia,
127 Collins Street,
MELBOURNE, Vic.

9th January 1948. On what the Dutch want in regards to a truce. The third page suggests that if Indonesia does agree - they must say to the UN that it was because of military pressure put on them by the Dutch.



CABLEGRAM.

SECRET.

-2-

I.504/5/3

powers and functions, nor how far the Interim Government will be under the direction of the Netherlands representative (Van Mook) or the Triumvirate (which will probably consist of Van Mook, Neher and Van Vredenburg). Any settlement satisfactory to Indonesian freedom and Republican aspirations seems to me improbable while Van Vredenburg retains some initiative in the formulation of policy.

7. Van Zeeveld is most anxious that the Republic accept the Netherlands ultimatum which undoubtedly has the backing of the Prime Minister Beel and his Cabinet Minister who were visiting Indonesia recently. He has strongly advised the Republic to that effect and myself at an informal meeting. He has also agreed privately with Graham and myself that if the Republic accepts he will give a personal pledge to work with other Committee members to put pressure on both parties:

(a) To agree to have a United Nations agency observe conditions here from the time the Committee ceases its task until sovereignty is handed over;

(b) To ensure free legislation of the provisions of Annex 1, which is also included in Dutch proposals implemented;

(c) That the Dutch cease the formation of new states except by democratic process (see paragraph 6 of this telegram);

(d) To have more specific and full provisions regarding United Nations observation of demilitarised zones in the truce agreement;

(e) That once the Republic has accepted the cease fire and publicly disowned sabotage intimidation, etc., it cannot be held responsible for any incident occurring on the Dutch side of the Van Mook line.

8. Graham has been on the fence but has been slowly turning towards advising the Republic to accept. To seem clear that his State Department advisers have been informing him that little hope can be placed in the Security Council to help the Republic. In the event of a Republican refusal I would expect Graham to support the greater part of my viewpoint, but in his present wobbly state it would be a mistake to pin over much faith in this.

9. I personally, have left it to the Republic to make their own decision but have leaned towards rejection by assisting them with a draft reply to be ready in that event. The reply would cover obvious points of the argument and would ask the Security Council to adopt one of two courses.

(a) To set out the terms either military or political, or both, upon which hostilities should cease;

(b) To delegate to the Committee the power so to act.

10. I shall also suggest that they might express indignation and surprise at the recent developments; that whereas they compromised to accept the Christmas suggestions of the Committee with delay, without condition and without the ultimatum of Dutch intimidation. They might therefore have expected that pressure would be placed on the Netherlands to accept but

/instead.....

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET.

-3-

I.504/5/5

instead the Netherlands have not only refused to make any compromise at all but have submitted their own unilateral and inflexible suggestions as an ultimatum and have gone to the extreme of suggesting it would be delinquent to even ask for time to consider this ultimatum, however, there is a real risk that I might be the only member to support the Republic in this.

11. In the event of the Republic deciding to accept the Dutch proposals I would suggest to them that they do so in a strong worded letter to the Committee emphasizing that acceptance had been forced upon them under greatest military and economic duress. This acceptance could then be used in Security Council debates in an endeavour to obtain as much as possible for the Republic.

12. Whether the Republic accept or reject the Dutch proposals, Van Zeeland considers that the three members of the Committee should fly to New York and report to the Security Council in person. They would be at liberty to express their personal views. I believe in view of Van Zeeland's intentions it is very important I should also be present at the discussions to express as strong as possible our point of view irrespective of the Republic reply. Please advise if this is approved so that I can on Sunday inform the Republic.

13. It is apparent that Van Zeeland has his speech or speeches already prepared; in the event of Republic refusal he proposes to state that the Dutch Military action has been justified in the light of Republic guerilla activities, he also states that the French have told him that they will use the Veto when they consider necessary, for example, if the Security Council instructs the Dutch to comply with a cease fire order. However, I am sure that the Dutch will not immediately resort to Military action but will state that they have retaken "Liberty of action" which would mean accepting no longer good offices of the Committee.

14. The decision before the Republic this week end is a critical one. On present indications they will reject the ultimatum on the basis of my suggested reply and also on the following grounds -

(a) The unsatisfactory nature of the proposals which, in the absence of confidence in the good intentions of Dutch, offer them no real safeguards for the future.

(b) Possible difficulty of obtaining full support within the Republic for such wide concessions to Netherlands (this might be overcome)

(c) The strong feeling that an agreement on the ceasefire would seriously weaken the influence of the Security Council which in the present Republic opinion remains by far the strongest sanction on the Netherlands aggression in Indonesia. This course clearly puts the responsibility and hope of obtaining something better for the Republic on the Security Council. While I have taken the line that it would be futile for the Committee to consider Security Council impotent, I also realise the danger of expecting too much.

15. As I personally have not the slightest idea whether
/the.....

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

-4-

I.504/5/3

Security Council will have the guts or even the desire to order the Dutch to withdraw to 4th August lines or impose political conditions on the present lines. I would welcome the advantage of your opinions as asked for in paragraph 1 before I leave for Djokjakarta on Sunday morning.

Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.

Ø word mutilated.

(Ø Portion in brackets as received)

10th January, 1948.

Australia asking the Dutch for a thanks, considering how much they did to save Dutch life etc. during both WWII and the war with the Indonesian Republic (or Australia's impartiality during it)



COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CANBERRA. A.C.T.

23rd January, 1948.

Dear Mr. Teppema,

I wish to refer to your letter of 17th January in which you draw my attention to the settlement recently arrived at in Indonesia and to the present hold-up in the shipment of goods to Indonesia.

It concerns me that, right throughout the negotiations since we raised the matter in the Security Council, and even now that the Committee of Good Offices has been able to effect a settlement, no recognition has been given by you or by your Government to the part we have played, even though it is clear that without our intervention losses of Dutch lives and property would have been far greater. You show your concern for improving Netherlands-Australian relations, but nothing could do more to improve these both in Australia and in the Netherlands than a forthright statement from your Government of appreciation of the work of the Committee of Good Offices and, in particular, of the straight-forward action of the Australian Government in referring the matter to the Security Council and by great expenditure of man-power and money in assisting in a settlement.

At the same time, I am aware that a final settlement is as yet a long way off, and questions of trade and external relations generally are not yet determined. I hope that these questions will soon be resolved. As the present arrangement with the Republic is so satisfactory to the Netherlands, it is our hope that the Netherlands Government, in the interests of a long-term settlement, will act generously with respect to the outstanding problems.

With regard to trade, we are, of course, not only interested in removing any ban, but we are interested also in commencing free flow of trade between Australia and the Netherlands East Indies. However, as we have always said, the commencement of trade depends upon the settlement in the Netherlands East Indies, and, as yet, questions of trade have not been discussed. As soon as there is an arrangement or understanding on this and related questions, I have no doubt that trade beneficial to both countries will commence.

Yours sincerely,

(H. V. Evatt)
Minister for External Affairs.

His Excellency Mr. P. E. Teppema,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
Royal Netherlands Legation,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Mr. Teppema - hand

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

HP/PM.

O.1179.

Sent: 27th January, 1948.
4.15.

DECYPHER TO -

The Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

80. SECRET. IMPORTANT.

INDONESIA.

Judge Kirby is proceeding shortly by air to New York, where together with his two colleagues on the Committee of Good Offices, he will report to the Security Council on events leading up to conclusion of truce agreement between Netherland authorities and Indonesian Republic last week.

2. We fully agree with Judge Kirby's view (which is shared by his colleagues) that Committee must remain in Indonesia to supervise the implementation of the truce settlement and the establishment of neutral zones, to assist the parties to reach a settlement on immediate political and economic questions, and to ensure that the Indonesian peoples are given absolute freedom from coercion in determining by plebiscite their future relationship with the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands Crown. It is our fear that unless the Committee is allowed to continue in being, the Republican position may be made so untenable that the negotiations will again break down.

3. In this connection, it may be necessary for the Republic to be assured that it will be in a position to control its own external trade and to strengthen its economic position by the acquisition of foreign exchange. The Dutch may oppose any such idea and may try to insist that all exportable products from Indonesian owned properties within the Republican area shall be handled by themselves for their own purposes. We consider that this would be most unwise from the point of view of a final settlement satisfactory to the Dutch and there is nothing in the terms accepted last week by the Republic which would preclude its exercising direct control over the proceeds of its own exportable goods. The Dutch have attained almost all their political desiderata thus far and we believe they could well afford to adopt a liberal attitude in this matter. If they do not do so we greatly fear that the forthcoming discussions will break down and the effect of the present truce agreement will be nullified in circumstances in which world public opinion would be in full support of the Republican position.

4. You should put these considerations before the United States Government and point out to them that any influence they may be able to exercise within or outside the Security Council towards ensuring a satisfactory settlement of immediate economic issues would be helpful.

E.A. (P46/59/8 Pt. 15)

26th January, 1948.

Secy	✓
AS (P)	✓
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CABLEGRAM

SECRET.

EGM/FF

0.2036
Dated 12th Feb. 1948
2.50 p.m.

DECYPHER TO:

The Australian Delegation,
United Nations Assembly,
NEW YORK.

245/59/16

79 Immediate for Kirby.

Your UN 106 and 109.

Whilst we fully appreciate the importance of gaining the maximum possible support from the United States, we are not happy at your suggested bargain with the Americans.

2. The State Department's attitude as set forth in your 106, paragraph 2, is broadly what we would have expected and up to a point it can be regarded as satisfactory. Evidence of their willingness to bring pressure to bear on the Dutch to agree to a settlement along the lines of the Renville principles is welcomed. At the same time some of the fundamental questions at issue were not apparently discussed in your talks with the State Department.

*LB
NEI
and policy*

3. We have been assuming that whilst the unconditional acceptance of the Committee's principles by both sides provide an agreed basis for an ultimate settlement in Indonesia, the position of the Republic in the interim period would remain precarious unless it could be properly safeguarded; and that it is on the question of these safeguards that the negotiations for settlement may break down. The Republicans are still insisting, for example, on controlling their own trade and maintaining their own representatives abroad. The first of these conditions seems to us to be the fundamental issue in dispute. The Dutch are unlikely to agree to it, and the State Department is at present unsympathetic according to reports from Washington.

4. It does not seem to us that the Committee's visit of New York will have accomplished its real purpose in controversial issues such as trade are not fully discussed. We agree that an open wrangle in the Security Council should be avoided if possible. At the same time we do not think it would be fair to leave the Security Council in ignorance of the real obstacles that still remain in the way of a settlement. The assurances which you believe can be obtained from the Americans in return for the suppression of controversial issues in the Council, while they could be useful in the forthcoming talks at Batavia, do not appear to us to bear any direct relationship to the fundamental points under dispute. You will be better able to judge their real value, but they seem scarcely worth the cost of avoiding difficult questions at this stage. We think these latter might be discussed frankly with the Americans.

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5. A further important consideration is that we think on reflection that an agreement of the sort suggested resembles too closely in some respects the kind of procedure we have been objecting to in negotiations elsewhere and is, in a sense, a by-passing of United Nations organs. If the Americans are anxious as they appear to assist in reaching a satisfactory settlement they should be prepared

CABLEGRAM.

SECRET.

2. 0.2036

to act on the lines of their suggested assurances without any thought of a quid pro quo. If there is to be any arrangement it should be between the Dutch and the Committee of Good Offices, and not between the Australian and United States Governments. It should be made clear to the United States Government that we cannot accept a procedure involving private understandings between our two Governments involving other Governments. We would nevertheless hope that the Americans could immediately exercise their influence in the direction of agreement between the Dutch and the Committee of Good Offices on points listed in your paragraph 4 (c) before their Committee reports to the Security Council. Failing such agreement, the Australian representative who will be attending the Security Council, in addition to yourself as a member of the Committee, must be free to raise fundamental questions in the Security Council.

E.A.

13th February 1948.

August 1947: Australia goes to the UN Security Council demanding a 'cease-fire' be enforced in Indonesia between the Republic and the Dutch

Commonwealth Offices,
SYDNEY.

12th February, 1948.

E. Worrell, Esq.,
Hon. Secretary,
Barton Federal Electoral Council,
19 Brighton Parade,
BRIGHTON-LE-SANDS.

Dear Mr. Worrell,

Many thanks for your letter of the 26th ultimo conveying a resolution carried by the Barton Federal Electoral Council in which congratulations are conveyed to the Commonwealth Government and Mr. Justice Kirby upon Australia's part in bringing to an end the hostilities in Indonesia.

The initiative of the Commonwealth Government in taking the matter to the Security Council of the United Nations and having a Good Offices Committee set up has been more than amply justified in the prevention of further loss of life in Indonesia.


It is not too early to express satisfaction at the results. In July of last year, talks between the Dutch and Indonesians broke down and fighting commenced. Australia last August took the initiative and referred the matter to the Security Council, and asked for an immediate "cease-fire" order and the setting-up of a commission of mediation or arbitration. By such action through the United Nations, many thousands of Dutch and Indonesian lives were saved, and the situation which must have grown steadily worse and spread to other areas is now on the way to peaceful settlement.

The Good Offices Commission comprised an Australian, Mr. Justice Kirby, an American and a Belgian, and these members were active for some months and have helped in reaching a settlement. They are now reporting the result of their efforts to the Security Council in New York City.

I am particularly pleased to receive the resolution from Barton Council and to know that they join with me in welcoming the progress already made in Indonesia where Australia

-1-

A letter which explores all of the problems so far with the dealings with the Indonesian Republic and the Dutch - much of this is economic, but also about trying to avoid anti-western ideas in Indonesia which will end international cooperation



are past-masters at white-anting themselves, and completely ruthless in their methods. I myself expect to see a gradual disappearance of all the leading Indonesian figures whom we have come to work with; those who remain will probably develop a general anti-Western bitterness which will include us as well as the Dutch and the British. This is, of course, the aspect which concerns me most personally. I feel that our only hope for the future is to avoid the development of anti-Western sentiment in South-East Asia, and to encourage a South-East Asian solidarity which will include Australia. There is, however, as little gratitude in international as in domestic politics; disappointed Indonesian republicans will almost inevitably forget what we have done for them, and the next thing will be a line-up with India.

4. This was the point of our drawing your attention to Sjahrir's statement on his Australian visit. Please don't think he is merely seeking to avoid embarrassment for you. Unfortunately he has done a lot of talking since his return, and he has made it clear that he thinks more should have been made of him in Australia. He has made this known not only to Massey and myself (to our embarrassment) but to others here: it has come back to us through press representatives like Roy Macartney and through the Killearn people. You might like to know that he spoke with real liking of yourself personally; but it didn't go for the Government. You see, then, if even Sjahrir can behave like this, it doesn't augur very well for his colleagues.

5. When the Dutch-dominated United States of Indonesia is in being, it promises to have close economic ties with the United Kingdom and Malaya. The Secretary of Economic Affairs, Singapore, has recently concluded a draft commercial agreement with the Netherlands Indies Government, which will govern trade between Indonesia and Singapore "if and when". The agreement is part of a wider United Kingdom-Netherlands commercial treaty at present under negotiation, and the sub-treaty I'm speaking of has been approved in advance by the United Kingdom and Netherlands Governments. The draft is still confidential and we don't know its details: the Governor of Singapore tells Massey, however, that it will ignore the Republic and direct all trading between Indonesia and Singapore into Dutch channels.

/The

The main interest of this is of course the proof it offers that in future the Republic will have itself no say in commercial matters, which will all be controlled by the Dutch-dominated United States administration. Is it too cynical to expect that, with the tight line-up in Europe between the U.K. and the Netherlands, and in view of Bevin's latest suggestions that these powers should carry their solidarity into the colonial field, there will not be trade discrimination against Australia, and in favour of the U.K?

Yours sincerely,

Francis Lumsden

Copy of an Article posted in the New York Times 4th April 1948: "There is the Pacific Also" - about the Pacific War during WWII

Copy of Article published in New York Times Magazine, April 4th, 1948.

401/3/1/1

THERE IS THE PACIFIC ALSO

Mr. Evatt says a peace settlement in that area cannot wait until the economy of Europe is reconstructed.

By Herbert V. Evatt

The eyes of the peoples of America and of the world at large were dramatically turned to the Pacific at the end of 1941 by the outbreak of war with Japan. But in one sense even the war was only one more demonstration of the importance which the Pacific area has acquired in recent decades as a result of deep-rooted changes throughout the world.

The people of the West Coast of America have never under-estimated the importance of the Pacific region, of which they are a part. They showed their interest at the end of the first World War when the Versailles conference was meeting. They showed similar awareness of the menace of Japan before and throughout the war years. The voice of the West Coast is increasing in influence as its population and industry continue to grow, and its great resources await development. The Pacific directly affects the welfare, economy and safety of the West Coast, and whatever affects the West Coast affects America as a whole.

On the other hand, the people of the East Coast of America have never fully appreciated the importance of the Pacific, lying as it does on the other side of a broad continent. During the war, great difficulty was experienced by General MacArthur, the Australian Government, and other interested Governments and groups in persuading various high commands that the war in the Pacific could not be left on one side to be dealt with after the European war was ended.

We now know that the policy of "Beat Hitler First" could have had disastrous consequences by giving Japan time to consolidate her gains and establish herself firmly in the area. Fortunately, it did not prevail without being modified. It was modified to permit of sufficient supplies, especially aircraft, being disposed to the Pacific front in order to halt Japan's great southward thrust and then to take the offensive. This modification of the "Beat Hitler First" strategy was largely due to the efforts of General MacArthur, and the Australian and other Pacific Governments, to the Pacific War Council, and ultimately to the personal intervention of President Roosevelt himself.

Similarly today, any policy of postponing action in the Pacific and delaying the Pacific peace settlement until the European economy has been reconstructed, and the German peace settlement concluded, could mean disaster for the world. We must grapple now with the problems of the Pacific as well as Europe. We must attempt to anticipate and remove future sources of tension and unrest, because the future of the whole world is linked to events in the Pacific no less than those in Europe.

The Pacific can no longer be regarded as a vast ocean ringed by remote, strange and powerless nations. Today aircraft can fly from San Francisco to Sydney in forty hours, and to Asia in even less time. One of the countries with a long Pacific coastline is the richest and most powerful nation in the world - the United States of America. In the Northwest is the next most powerful country, Russia, not only reestablishing but expanding the position held by her in this area before the Japanese aggression of 1905. Another country is Japan which, despite limited resources, waged war for nearly four years against a massive coalition. Yet another is China, our recent ally, with a population of over four hundred million, torn by internal dissent and warfare, with her international borders the subject of dispute and uncertainty, and with all these factors holding back her economic and political development.

In the South Pacific are Australia and New Zealand, young democracies rapidly growing in power and influence, having proved themselves in two world wars to be valiant and indispensable allies of the

United States and Britain, in redressing the world balance in favour of liberty against international fascism and gangsterism.

The Pacific is therefore one of the key regions of the world today. It contains territories of not only the great powers - the United States, United Kingdom and Russia - but countries that within a comparatively short period may become almost equally great in world affairs. Enormous populations exist in this region, bigger than in any other part of the world. Great resources await fuller development - rubber, tin, coal, iron and other vital materials. Today we see Asia awakening and shaking off some of the lethargy and indifference that have held her back.

The biggest factor for change in the Far East is the rise of nationalism accompanied by growing industrialization of those regions Asia has had for centuries a high degree of civilisation, particularly in China, India and Japan. It has differed in nature rather than in quality from Western civilization. The impact of the West tended at first in most Eastern countries to bring about their commercial and political subjugation, though not always loss of sovereignty. But with the passage of time, the desire for self-government or complete independence has increasingly asserted itself.

The Japanese during the war facilitated and stimulated this desire by spreading the doctrine of "Asia for the Asiatics," and by removing and cruelly humiliating the European governors of the dependent territories. Their conduct clearly showed that the Japanese would have imposed a yoke far more severe than any that might be removed, but their teachings have to some extent survived their defeat. Nationalism and a desire for self-government are great forces today throughout the Far East.

Japan itself is a striking example of nationalism reinforced by industrialization. Japan was never subjugated by any European power. She set out deliberately under a group of extremely able leaders in the reign of the Emperor Meiji to transform herself in a short period from a feudal kingdom into a great modern industrial nation. Materially, this task was successful. But democracy, respect for the rights of the individual, and a desire to live in peace, never obtained much hold in Japan. Japan began a career of imperialist expansion, which included attacks on China at the end of the last century and, on several occasions since, attacks on Russia in 1905 and after the first World War, and the aggression of the last fifteen years. It will be very important to insure that the other rising countries of Asia will not be tempted to follow a similar path of aggression.

The legitimate desire for self-government on the part of dependent people should be accepted and, as far as possible, satisfied. The main responsibility here lies upon the governing powers. In their own interest, they should take the initiative in transferring political responsibility as rapidly as possible without waiting to be forced by pressure inside or outside the dependent areas. A great example has been offered by America and Britain. America has granted complete independence to the Philippines, and Britain has, by a triumph of patient statesmanship rarely equaled in history, given independence to the peoples of India and Burma.

In the Netherlands Indies and Indo-China considerable bloodshed and bitterness have occurred in clashes between the governing power and the native inhabitants. The best solution, for the time being at least, would be some arrangement which would give complete or considerable self-government to the native populations while permitting continued Dutch and French participation in the political and economic development of these regions.

A complete severance of relations would be to the interest of no one, depriving the region of the capital investment, experience and backing of an advanced European state, and drastically changing the economic and political relations of the governing power. But it require

real statesmanship for a governing power to be willing to make concessions, and for the dependent peoples to moderate the absoluteness of their demands to accord with the realities of their present stage of development.

We should not allow our sympathy for the dependent peoples to blind us to the real achievements of the colonial powers, in material development, in bringing peace to the region, and in instilling some conception of the rights of the individual. In very many cases the present desire for freedom is itself a product of Western tradition, thought and teaching.

Nor should we forget that independence and democracy are not always the same thing. The removal of Western domination will not necessarily eliminate struggles for power between the various nations interested in, and situated in, this area. Moreover the nationalist movement sometimes contains Fascist and totalitarian elements, whose attainment of power would endanger sound political development and even peace. Independence will not remove all the problems of Asia and the Pacific; in some cases it will merely give them a new shape.

Economic well-being is essential to stable and peaceful relations in the political field. Standards of living in southern and eastern Asia are pitifully low; adequate food and clothing are scarce; and industrial development, except in Japan, has scarcely begun. In the interests of peace and humanity, all these nations must be given full opportunity to develop their resources and raise their standards of human welfare.

The populations of these countries, already high in proportion to area, are continuing to grow rapidly, and, if standards of living also rise, the demand for food and other commodities will greatly increase. If sweeping changes threatening the security of their neighbours and their own peace are to be avoided, these countries must be enabled to find an outlet for their energies and full opportunities for economic development either at home or in peaceful cooperation with other countries.

This will involve improved methods of agriculture, opening up of new pastoral and agricultural land (particularly in Manchuria and adjacent territory), industrial expansion in all countries where adequate raw materials are to be found, investment of foreign capital, expansion of world trade with the Far East, and an increase in education and in industrial and other skills in this region.

It would be desirable for the Japanese reparations program, and indeed for the whole future development of the Japanese economy, to be related to the entire program for the reconstruction and development of Asia and the Far East. Recently a number of leading men have referred to Japan as "the workshop of Asia." It is true, of course, that Japan has reached a stage of industrial development considerably higher than her neighbours and that her people are highly skilled. It would be foolish not to take advantage of that skill and capacity. But what is needed is not one workshop in Asia, but many - not only Japan, but China, India, the Soviet Far East, the Philippines and other areas, to varying degrees depending on the availability of supplies of raw materials.

The Japanese should be allowed to share, but should also be expected to contribute to, reasonable standards of living in the Far East. It would be short-sighted to set out deliberately to depress Japanese standards, except for limitations on particular lines of activity imposed in the interest of the security of the rest of the Pacific against a recurrence of Japanese aggression. Mass unemployment, malnutrition and economic instability in one country in the end tend to spread to other countries. Moreover, it will be difficult to foster democracy in Japan if its people are starving.

But it would be unjust for the Japanese to obtain privileges and benefits denied to the countries she has devastated. The Japanese

should not be given any preference over these countries in imports of food and raw materials.

The Japanese peace settlement is urgently needed so that the present phase of military occupation, so ably conducted under the leadership of General MacArthur, can be replaced by a treaty which will re-define Japan's obligations and establish a more permanent basis for the political and economic future of Japan and the Far East. An early and just peace settlement is an essential foundation for sound development in the Far East and for the work of the United Nations.

First principle of the settlement should be the security of all countries of the Far East and the Pacific from a recurrence of Japanese aggression. General MacArthur and the American and British Commonwealth forces under his command have already virtually completed the physical disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, and the peace treaty should explicitly forbid any armed forces or munitions industries being maintained by her in future. Perhaps the most important single factor in curbing future Japanese territorial aggression is the taking from Japan of all her former territories except the four main islands and such minor islands as are determined, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration.

The second principle of the settlement should be the positive aim of encouraging democracy and democratic institutions in Japan. This is a long-term task, and it would be naive to expect a complete transformation of Japan over-night. The immediate task, which has been tackled vigorously by the Supreme Commander, has been to uproot the anti-democratic and militaristic groups, and to begin laying the foundations of democratic reform. The consolidation of these reforms must occur during later years.

The United Nations last February awarded the United States a trusteeship over the former Japanese-mandated islands - the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Islands. When the peace treaty is made, it would seem reasonable, and in the interests of international peace and security in the Pacific, if the United States were also given control of the other island bases south of Japan which will be taken from her under the Potsdam agreement, viz., the Ryukyus, Volcanos and Bonins.

There is another area in the Pacific which is attracting less public attention today because it is not the arena for spectacular clashes of rival international interests, though it is only a short while since American, Australian and New Zealand servicemen were fighting and dying there - the South Sea Islands. At the beginning of 1947 the Governments of Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States established a South Pacific Commission to be a consultative and advisory body on the economic and social development, and the welfare and advancement of the peoples of the non-self-governing territories of the South Pacific.

It would be foolish to claim to have charted the course for the future in complete detail and with certainty. Many important questions remain clouded in doubt, particularly the political future of China and its provinces. But some lines of action are clearly indicated for the United States, my own country, Australia, and other peace-loving powers to follow.

(1) The peace settlement with Japan should be drawn up as soon as possible, by democratic methods and by all the nations which made a direct contribution toward winning the Pacific War. It should provide for a period of international supervision to prevent military resurgence. Supervision should continue until Japan gives satisfactory proof that she is genuinely desirous and capable of conducting herself in a peaceful and democratic manner.

(2) The U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East should take prompt and vigorous action designed to raise standards of welfare and the level of production throughout southern and eastern Asia

and the Pacific, and to promote economic stability in that region.

(3) The young and rising countries should be welcomed as they achieve nationhood, and should be given material and other assistance in their economic, social and political development, and in assuming international responsibilities.

(4) An effort should be made by all peoples to understand the problems and the different civilisations of the Far East. Though they differ in culture, Eastern and Western countries can and must live and work together on the basis of equality and friendship, and not merely mutual forbearance and tolerance.

(5) The principles of the United Nations Charter should be the foundation and guide for international policy and action in the Pacific, and elsewhere.

The United States made the biggest contribution toward winning the Pacific war, and is making the biggest contribution to the occupation of Japan. She assumed the leadership of the Pacific Allies in the war, and they look to her today for leadership in making and keeping the peace. She has already given generously in economic and other aid to the peoples of Europe and Asia since the war ended.

My own country, Australia, fought under American leadership throughout the Pacific war and bore her full share of the burdens and responsibilities in attaining victory, as well as the brunt of the fighting in many vital sectors. Under United States leadership Australia is equally prepared to accept her due share of the burdens and responsibilities of maintaining peace and contributing to the raising of standards of human welfare throughout the Pacific region.

A programme of the nature outlined would contribute to the peace and prosperity, not only of the Pacific, but of the entire world. Today any international friction or unrest in one region threatens the peace of every other nation by disturbing the complex political and commercial relations that link all countries together. Asia and the Pacific are a key region because it is here that some of the major changes are occurring and it is here that important new powers are coming into prominence in world affairs.

Independence and industrialization in Asia will together tend to end the political dominance of Europe over these regions, but there is still a vital role to be played by European countries and by countries with European civilization, like Australia and America. They can continue to give economic and other assistance, recognize the principles of equality and justice as the basis of their political relations, and so help to bring about peaceful change and development in these regions in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

...oOo...

Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

N.E.I. POLICY DEFENDED
The Minister for External Affairs (Dr. Evatt) emphatically denied Australia had suffered because of her attempts to settle the Indonesian dispute. *Q18*
He also declared that the Government did not support or approve of the Australian wharf labourers' ban on Dutch ships trading to the Far East and agreed to a request by Mr. Abbott (New England) to investigate the possibility of having the union lift the ban.
He agreed also if this failed he would consider a suggestion by Mr. Abbott to have the union de-registered.
Dr. Evatt replied that Australia had done her best, after months of argument, to settle the dispute which she had referred to the United Nations. Contrary to losing friendship of either party, Dr. Evatt declared that Australia had been thanked for her efforts by both the Dutch and the Indonesians.

401/3/1/1

Bank Tunica
29. 4. 48
←

More about the concern of the Dutch weakening the Republics hold economically

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. O.V. **SECRET.**

Dated 20th May, 1948
1645 hours.

/JSH

DECYPHER TO:

THE AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
THE HAGUE NUMBER 38.

Repeated to:

THE AUSTRALIAN CONSUL-GENERAL,
BATAVIA NUMBER 131.

IMMEDIATE.

It is now becoming clear that the Prime Minister's approach referred to in our 29 has been rejected by the Dutch. Meanwhile negotiations at Batavia are dragging on with little prospect of settlement, and we are concerned at progressive weakening of Republic under Dutch pressure in absence of such settlement.

2. It is still apparent that the Dutch are doing all in their power to fragment Republic and to prevent coalescence of Republican areas into a single State when the United States of Indonesia is created.

3. In pursuance of this aim the Dutch are conducting systematic campaign to destroy Republic economically. They have not yet shown any willingness to free channels of internal trade. It is clear that Republican requests for medical supplies, clothing and much needed equipment are being refused by the Dutch, who furthermore will not allow Republican areas to import from abroad through regular channels. To prevent Republicans making their own arrangements to import direct to their areas, the Dutch are maintaining a tight naval blockade which extends even to inter-island trade. They are thus making unjustified and ruthless use of their trade regulations as a weapon to starve Republic into surrender to their demands.

4. The time has come when, in justice to the Republic, we must consider taking direct steps on our own account to help the Republic economically. We propose to send post-war relief supplies to the Republic as well as to several other countries in South East Asia, and if the Dutch continue their present tactics we are contemplating making arrangements to carry on direct trade with the Republic, even at risk of conflict with Dutch blockade measures. Before proceeding any further, we wish you to make the position known to the Netherlands Government, and to emphasize our dissatisfaction with progress of Batavia negotiations.

MIN. & DEP'T OF E.A.

21st May, 1948.

60/3/1/2

About the wharf bans placed by labourers - does not directly aid the Indonesians, but inhibits the Dutch who are trying to get supplies over. The Dutch no longer register that there is a Indonesian Republican Government.

COPY.

401/3/1/1

Mr. Garrett.

As suggested by the Prime Minister, I have spoken to Teppema, and he is sending a message to Batavia, but he indicated quite clearly that, if the ban were not removed on Dutch goods going to Indonesia, there would not be consent from Batavia on relief supplies going to Indonesia generally.

While it is clear that the maintenance of the ban does not assist the Republicans, it is equally clear from his replies to questions that the relaxation of the ban will work in favour of only the Dutch-occupied area, and therefore the Government can be readily accused of discrimination in favour of one party to a dispute against the other party.

This position is all the more apparent as a result of Australia's de facto recognition of the Republican Government and therefore a right to trade direct with the Republican Government. So far we have refrained from doing this, hoping for agreement between the two parties.

Teppema also said that he had informed the Prime Minister that it was impossible for a joint statement of Republican and Dutch authorities to be made, as was the case before the ban was previously lifted, as the Dutch do not now recognise the existence of a Republican Government and therefore do not admit that there is any authority which could be party to a joint statement.

The only conclusion that can be reached is that the Dutch authorities have absolutely no intention of allowing either relief goods or goods in the course of normal transaction to enter Republican territories until they have reached the agreement they seek through the Committee of Good Offices.

JWB

24th May, 1948.

encl 401/3/9/2/1

Australia now pleads with the UK to do something about the Dutch decisions against the Indonesian Republicans

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO:

Australian Delegation,
United Nations,
NEW YORK.

SECRET

Indonesia.

We have telegraphed C.R.O. appealing ^{to} the United Kingdom Government to take an early opportunity of urging the Netherlands, in its own interest and in the interest of the United Kingdom and Australia, to take a more far sighted and generous view of the entire Indonesian problem.

2. We have expressed alarm at the present deadlock on major political and economic issues in dispute and have stressed the harsh and unyielding attitude of the Dutch throughout negotiations, pointing out that the latest Dutch tactic is to present the Republic with unacceptable demands on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and is designed to reduce the Republic to a rump state on level with undefined number of other small states and to prevent at all costs the coalescence of Republican areas into a single substantial State within the United States of Indonesia.

3. We have drawn the attention of U.K. to the use by the Dutch of every kind of economic pressure available to them to weaken the Republic and to wean from it the allegiance of individual Indonesians. We have also detailed the severe Dutch restrictions on internal trade within Indonesia and the external trade of the Republic. On these latter points please see telegram No. 125 of 18th May to and telegram K119 from Australian Consul-General, Batavia, both of which are being sent to you saving-gram.

Distribution: E.A.
403/3A/1 Part 16.
25th May, 1948.
KK.IR.

*201
-and
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Thanks by the Indonesian Government to Australia

C O P Y

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
JOGJAKARTA

JOGJAKARTA, June 2, 1948.

Sir,

The message conveyed by your Goodwill Mission fills us with gratitude and faith. On the one hand we are grateful for your intimate understanding as to the needs of our country and the people of Indonesia in this time of incessant trials, expounded so by the assistance assured to us by your mission on the other hand by this deed of good will we become more confident that cordial relations between two countries can always take place and be maintained, as long as true and mutual understanding exists between the two countries.

Those in charge are now busy selecting the species and quantities of relief goods needed and a detailed list will be presented to your Government by Dr. Oesman Sastroamidjojo, our representative in Canberra. Under the present conditions however I deem it necessary to request you to set apart the portion intended for the Republic and send it separately and directly to the address of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, such to avoid complications.

Looking forward to your favourable decision in this matter I submit on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to you once again my deepfelt gratitude, and may this deed of goodwill for the years to come blossom forth into a real and broader understanding between the Australian and Indonesian people.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest consideration
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(H.A. SALIM)

Rt. Hon. Herbert V. Evatt,
Minister for External Affairs,
Commonwealth of Australia.

CANBERRA. A.C.T.

401/3/1/1

DUTCH ASK: WHAT IS AUSTRALIA UP TO IN INDONESIA?

They See 'Canberra Perfidy' In A 'Clever Young Man'

From ROBERT J. GILMORE, Herald Special Correspondent

BATAVIA, Thursday.—Canberra's Indonesian peace-making has earned Australia more Dutch ill-will — along with Indonesian goodwill — than the never-to-be-forgotten Dutch shipping ban.

Flying to Batavia from Singapore in a KLM (Dutch) Constellation, Hollanders from Amsterdam who spot an Australian airline tag on your brief case walk up and ask "What is Australia up to in Indonesia?"

ON reaching Batavia, a traveller from Australia hears the same question, and plenty more.

It all began in July last year, when Dutch troops advanced against the ragged armies of the Indonesian Republic. The Dutch were heading for Jogjakarta, the Republican capital, when, on Australia's motion, the Security Council of the United Nations ordered both sides to cease fire.

Although there was no real truce for five more months, Australia's action saved the Republic from either extinction or being driven underground. Had it not been for Australia, Holland might be ruling all Indonesia today.

The bitterly resentful Dutch

say White Australia welched on "her only white neighbors between Darwin and Asia."

They say Australia had no more right to intervene in a "purely internal Dutch police action" than Holland has the right to intervene in Britain's and France's current wars in Malaya and Indo-China, or any future incident in Australia or New Guinea.

In addition to prompting the cease-fire, Australia angered the Dutch by accepting the nomination as the Indonesian Republic's friend on the Security Council's "Committee of Good Offices in the Indonesian dispute."

Holland nominated Belgium, her neighbor in Europe and fellow colonial power. Holland and the Indonesian Republic both accepted the United States as the third party.

'Shabby Treatment Of War-time Ally'

TO the Dutch, Australia's sponsoring of the Republican cause in the Good Offices Committee is incompatible with her White Australia policy, incompatible with her role as a colonial power in New Guinea, shabby treatment of a wartime ally and—it's a dangerous boomerang game.

To Australian External Affairs Department officers in South-east Asia, the Evatt policy in Indonesia is a deft blend of the idealistic, opportunistic and far-sighted.

Dr. Evatt's men say "Australia will have the Dutch as neighbors in the Indies for maybe another quarter of a century. We'll have the Indonesians as neighbors for ever. Our conduct at the Security Council and since in the Good Offices Committee, will earn Australia honorable mention on Page One of the Indonesian history book."

'PERFIDY'

The Dutch see the embodiment of Canberra perfidy in one of Dr. Evatt's most clever young men—32-year-old Sir Thomas Kingston Critchley. Although relatively unknown in Australia, he is one of the best-known men in Indonesia today.

A Bachelor of Economics at Sydney University, Mr Critchley is chief of the External Affairs Department's economics relations section. But he's been away from his Canberra desk since last October trying to make peace between Hollanders and the Indonesian Republic.

As Australian delegate on the Good Offices Committee, Critchley is ex-officio foreign watchdog for the Indonesian Republic.

He performs an Evatt assignment with obvious relish. But he no doubt would have a hard time making a similar job with the Americans.

anti-Dutch. One senses that he thinks that an abrupt ending of Holland's connection with Indonesia could be perilous for Australia.

One senses that he would like to see the Hollanders around—as advisers and tutors, though, and not as rulers—for another quarter of a century at least.

Unhappily there is little to show for peace-making in Indonesia beyond the truce agreement reached aboard the American attack transport *Renville* in Batavia Harbor on January 17. The subsequent "peace" has been increasingly fragile.

DUTCH CHALLENGE

When, after the truce, the Security Council ordered the Good Offices Committee to continue to work in Indonesia, the council failed to secure even the semblance of authority for the committee. Its function falls short of arbitration, and the Dutch challenge its right even to mediate.

Incidents Expected

The Dutch security service expects widespread "incidents" in Java and Sumatra throughout the impending Wilhelmina jubilee and the Juliana coronation festivities.

The half-hearted Australian-inspired intervention in Indonesia in the name of the United Nations certainly has not brought peace.

THE ALTERNATIVE

In the Security Council the Indonesian delegate, Lambertus Palar, has urged that if the Council won't give the Good Offices Committee more power, the "only alternative is to do for Indonesia what the Council did for Palestine—send a mediator."

Foreign well-wishers of the United Nations have to save the name of the

Feb. 26. 8. 48

Newspaper article highlighting that the Dutch and Australia had had very good relations during WWII

Dutch Should Be Our Friends

IT is surely time that Australia's relations with the Dutch in Indonesia were clarified, and put on a more satisfactory basis. In a dispatch published yesterday, The Herald's special correspondent, Robert Gilmore, painted an unhappy picture of distrust and irritation, all the more regrettable when it is remembered that the Dutch were our Allies in the recent war and fought with us in the Pacific. That they cherish a suspicion of Canberra methods is, perhaps, not surprising. The Federal Government's failure to face up to the wharf laborers' tactics in holding up Dutch cargoes naturally mystified and offended the Dutch, who had no intimate knowledge of Australian politics.

More recently our general policy as expressed in our activities in the Security Council has been regarded by the Dutch as favoring the Indonesian Republic and playing into the hands of a highly nationalistic and extremist movement.

The role of peacemaker is frequently a thankless one. It is right that we should do our utmost to ensure a peaceful settlement of the acute difference in Indonesia; and it may be that establishment of a United States of Indonesia, working harmoniously within the Netherlands Kingdom, will eventually be the way out.

But, in working to bring about a settlement of present problems, Australia should be on her guard against falling into a position of a partisan, supporting extremist elements. It should not be impossible to secure happier relations with the Dutch without abandoning the policy of mediation. Perhaps a visit of some of our ministers to Indonesia might be a start towards better understanding of the Dutch problems there.

Melb Herald

27. 8. 48

**INDONESIA A
SAFEGUARD**

**Relations With
Australia**

SINGAPORE, Nov. 4
(A.A.P.-Reuter). — Australia
should remember that a well-
organised Indonesia would
help safeguard Australia's secu-
rity, Dr. van Mook said to-day.

Indonesia, a rich country with
plenty of land, would never be
an aggressor, he added. A dis-
organised Indonesia might be a
stepping stone for others.

Dr. van Mook, former Lieuten-
ant Governor-General of the
Netherlands East Indies, in Bata-
via last night handed over his
powers to the new High Com-
missioner, Dr. Louis Beel. He is
on his way back to Holland.

Australia had no foreign policy
regarding Indonesia apart from
personal ambitions and ideas, he
said.

Australia had the simple idea
that to identify herself with Asian
movements would win Asian
friendship and safeguard her
security.

This fear of Asian aggression,
plus Left-wing urging, resulted in
impulsive actions, such as the ban
on Dutch shipping.

But there was not just one
mass of Asians. Every country's
problems were different.

401/3/1/1

SM Huald
5/11

Criticisms on the US and UK stance

401/3/1/1

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO

Australian Delegation to United Nations
PARIS

No. -

Secret.

Personal. Evatt from Burton.

We have always maintained there could be no solution to Indonesian problem unless United Kingdom was prepared to press Dutch acceptance of reasonable proposals. We have frequently been informed that United Kingdom has pressed Dutch. The instruction to the United Kingdom delegation at Lapstone was not to vote against Dutch or India and Pakistan and this confirms what we have always said was the case, that is while there might be pressure Dutch are encouraged to believe that when they are put on the spot before the Security Council or elsewhere United Kingdom will help them. In the present circumstance United Kingdom policy cannot be justified if matter comes to public attention. Dutch are insisting on disbandment of Republican Army while maintaining strong Dutch army prior to political settlement. This demand is on all fours with police action as it aims to leave Republic without last hope of self-defence. Meanwhile 35 million persons are being blockaded and deprived of goods essential to life.

It is commonly reported now that failure of Good Offices Committee is due to United States and United Kingdom refusal to do more than urge the Dutch and to take any overt action such as voting. We have endeavoured up to date to avoid embarrassment to western countries but stage is reached when we cannot afford in relation to other countries in the area to allow matter to drift further. Troops are being

M.M. [Signature]

increased in Batavia and there are no signs of any real intention on the part of the Dutch to come to a reasonable settlement.

* I think it would be most helpful if at this critical stage you could once again impress upon United Kingdom and U.S.A. the way Indonesian situation is drifting. Moreover, it is most irritating to find that Australia's vital interests in a rapidly changing South East Asia do not appear to be receiving the same active consideration which we ourselves at all times have given the particular problems which the United Kingdom Government faces in Europe. The Lapstone instruction which places good relations with the Dutch above good relations with four British Dominions who are unanimous amongst themselves and who are vitally concerned in the matter is hardly conducive to British Commonwealth co-operation.

No distribution.

8th December, 1948.
JWB:PJW

On Australia, Russia, and NZ's vote for Indonesia's independence

51112
**Australia's
Vote
Explained**

CANBERRA, Thursday.— The Government instructed Australia's delegate, Dr. H. C. Coombs, to vote for the admission of the Indonesian Republic as an associate member of ECAFE, said the Prime Minister, Mr. Chifley, to-day.

He was replying in the House of Representatives to Mr. P. C. Spender (Lib., N.S.W.).

Mr. Spender had asked who instructed Dr. Coombs to vote against the strongly-expressed views of the United States and the Netherlands, and apparently against the views of the United Kingdom, but in full support of Russia.

Mr. Chifley said Cabinet made the decision earlier this week after having the very complex situation explained in the minutest detail.

Earlier in the week it had been very difficult to find out what other nations proposed to do.

When the Dutch said they would walk out if certain resolutions were carried, other nations did not know what to do.

Finally, the New Zealand delegation moved the resolution to admit Indonesia, and had Australian support.

Only the United States and the Netherlands opposed it.

RUSSIAN VOTE

Mr. T. W. White (Lib., Vic.): No European nation supported it except Russia.

Mr. Chifley: Does the honourable gentleman suggest we should not give some thought to the views of the Dominions of India and Pakistan, who are members of the British Commonwealth?

Mr. Chifley added that New Zealand, which moved the resolution, was regarded as the Dominion with the most British outlook of the whole British Commonwealth.

Mr. Chifley said Britain abstained from voting. She did not vote against the resolution.

He had been closely in touch with all developments at ECAFE and knew four or five days ago what might happen, including the fact that some of the major European nations were not able to make up their minds about it.

Mr. Spender asked Mr. Chifley about an article in the "Montreal Star," of Canada. This criticised the Australian UNO vote in Paris against a Canadian resolution seeking to appoint a Palestine Commission, which was supported by the United States and Britain.

Mr. Chifley said the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Dr. H. V. Evatt, was in Paris, and questions that arose were left to his decision, subject to his carrying out the general policy of the Australian Government.

"The mere fact that Britain or the United States or someone else holds certain views is no reason why we should just fall in with them," Mr. Chifley said.

Mr. Howard Beale (Lib., N.S.W.): Don't you think solidarity is important?

INDEPENDENT VIEWS

Mr. Chifley: This country has its own independent views.

He said that Australia worked in the greatest co-operation with Britain and the United States on fundamental matters, particularly those associated with world peace, and with Britain on economic matters.

"But we are not people who go round and find what others think and say 'Yes' to that," Mr. Chifley declared.

"I am not going to be a Minister in any Government subscribing to such a policy. We are entitled to our point of view."


"The matter Mr. Spender has raised is not of world-shaking importance."

401/3/1/1

S. H. H. H. H.

10. 12. 48

20th December 1948: Termination of Truce by UK and Dutch saying that Indonesia broke it first. It says that Dutch are revising notions on police action against the Republic.



This document outlines the Dutch as the 'aggressor' party

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

401/3/1/1

CABLEGRAM.

JO:MD

0.17880/1/2/3/4.

DECYPHER TO.

Dated 20th December, 1948.
3.55 p.m.

THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

1012.

HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,
LONDON.

4971.

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER,
NEW DELHI.

332.

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER,
OTTAWA.

318.

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER,
WELLINGTON.

326.

IMMEDIATE. CONFIDENTIAL.

Following the Netherlands Government's decision to authorise the Crown representative in Indonesia to take measures to restore order throughout the whole of Indonesia, Dutch troops at midnight on Saturday began full-scale armed offensive against the Republic and are reported to be on the outskirts of Djokjakarta.

2. In view of this clear act of aggression, carried out in defiance of the Security Council's orders and contrary to Article 10 of the Renville truce agreement, we have associated ourselves with the United States Government in asking for an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation. The Dutch purpose is clearly to clean up the Republic in a few days and present the Security Council with a fait accompli. They apparently hope to do this by occupying strategic points, capturing all influential Republican leaders and incorporating Republican areas in an Indonesian Federation in accordance with their own plans.

3. If this should in fact happen, we recognise that the practical approach might be for the Security Council to accept the fact of Dutch dominance of the whole of Indonesia and to do everything possible to have the programme for a representative United States of Indonesia, including the Republic, satisfactorily completed. However, apart from the fact that we are far from convinced that the Dutch will accomplish their

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purpose quickly or easily, there are strong political reasons for not accepting a fait accompli, at any rate in the first instance.

4. With this in mind, we have instructed our representative on the Security Council to put forward the following proposals :

(1) An immediate "Cease Fire" by the Dutch as the aggressor party without regard to the clear likelihood that guerrilla activities by the Republicans cannot be stopped immediately.

(2) Immediate withdrawal of Dutch troops behind the status quo lines.

(3) No punitive action to be taken by the Dutch against any individual, and United Nations military observers to have the right to interview prisoners and ensure no reprisals or executions.

5. We consider that the Security Council should issue instructions along these lines as the first immediate step, and that Council should at the same time agree on some form of sanction or other measure designed to secure their enforcement. Council's next step might be determined in the light of consultation among governments directly interested in a satisfactory settlement of the Indonesian dispute. As a beginning we have been considering ways by which Council could order -

(a) The holding of elections within two months under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices to establish representative assembly for the whole of Indonesia with full legislative power on the lines set forth in the Cochran proposals;

(b) The continuation of the Committee of Good Offices until the establishment of complete sovereignty in Indonesia not later than 30th June, 1948.

6. We are also considering what additional enforcement measures the Council might take to compel the Dutch to comply with its orders.

7. Please discuss with Government to which you are accredited.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (403/3/1/1)

21st December, 1948.

Cabinet meeting in Canberra about Australia's stance - still calling for cease fire by Dutch and that they return to their previously marked territories

401/3/1/1

FOR PRESS

Statement by the Prime Minister

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES - POLICY, CABINET DECISION

Cabinet discussed today the Indonesian situation. It will be recalled that Australia raised the question in the Security Council originally in July, 1947, under Chapter 7 of the Charter under which the Security Council has power not only to order cessation of hostilities but to enforce that order by means not involving force, for example, economic or other sanctions.

The Good Offices Committee has reported to the Security Council that the Netherlands have violated both the order to cease fire and the order to negotiate. The Security Council must now therefore decide what action it should take to ensure its instructions are carried out.

Cabinet endorsed action taken associating Australia with the United States in raising the matter at an urgent meeting of the Security Council at Paris. Australia will call for an immediate cease fire, the return of Dutch forces to previous demarcation lines, and action by the military observers on the Committee of Good Offices to prevent reprisals or executions. Meanwhile, the Australian representatives at Paris are instructed to discuss with other members of the Security Council, particularly Britain and the United States, what further steps should be taken to bring about a permanent solution of the dispute, for example, whether the Security Council should order an immediate election with a view to establishing a legislature along the lines proposed by members of the Committee of Good Offices; whether the full sovereignty ultimately envisaged by the Dutch should not be granted with much less delay than the Dutch contemplate; whether in the event of continuous disputes the United Nations should not consider a trusteeship arrangement.

No. 580

CANBERRA,
21st December 1948

The UN department calls for Dutch cease-fire

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. 401/3/1/1
para 6

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DECYPHER FROM I.20434
1845

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY December 27, 1948

WASHINGTON. 3.25pm

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MOST IMMEDIATE.

1317. SECRET.

Indonesia.

Your 1033.

Ambassador saw Director U.N. Office State Department today and urged effort to make effective U.N. call for cease fire and release of leaders. He stressed points in your 1033 and pointed out effect on opinion in South East Asia if U.S., which had sought withdrawal of Dutch forces, now allowed the Dutch to defy Security Council.

2. Rusk said while Dutch action played into Communists' hands the U.S. could not use E.C.A. aid as a means of pressure in such situation. U.S. had to work with United Kingdom and France and could not carry the whole burden of supporting U.N. decisions alone. Approaches were being made to London and Paris but there did not seem much prospect that any further steps could be taken in the Security Council tomorrow.

3. Rusk then said U.S. had been considering possibility that the Dutch might agree to withdraw their forces to December 18th positions on condition that question of Security Council jurisdiction be referred to the International Court.

4. We said we had no instructions on this proposal, but pointed out the following difficulties which immediately came to mind.

- (a) It might be taken to imply that the Council had some doubts as to the validity of its previous decisions. (Rusk said the United States had no such doubt and would make this clear. They would probably file a brief with the International Court supporting its jurisdiction.)
- (b) The Soviet Union had in the past opposed reference of questions of jurisdiction of U.N. organs to the International Court and might veto such a proposal now.
- (c) Attempts would undoubtedly be made to water the proposal down. If the Netherlands withdrew to December 18 positions and Republican Government reinstated there might be an opportunity for negotiations while the Court was considering the case. This would not be so if while the case was being heard, the Netherlands remained in occupation of Republican territory or refused to negotiate. The Dutch had asked for reference to the Court as a delaying tactic. (Rusk made it clear that Dutch agreement to withdraw would be a condition precedent.)
- (d) It was difficult to foresee all the implications if the Court embarked on a general discussion of the scope of Article 2 (7). (Rusk said that the opinion should be sought strictly on the question of Security Council action on the Indonesian question.)
- (e) There was no certainty that the Dutch would agree to the

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proposal. To suggest it and to have it rejected might only encourage them further in their defiance of the Council.

5. So far as we could judge the United States had not thought out this idea in detail and may not have discussed it even with the U.K. and France. We would appreciate your comments.

6. The Ambassador pointed out that the most obvious and direct step which could be taken was suspension of economic and financial assistance. Failure of the U.S. to play this card would not be understood by the people of South East Asia. Rusk asked whether the Australian Government had "played similar cards". We said that our situations were not parallel, but that if the United States wished to support action we would be glad to advise the Australian Government. Rusk hastened to disclaim any suggestion that the United States was even considering suspension of E.C.A. aid. We would appreciate advice and to any action taken or contemplated in Australia e.g., termination of post-U.N.R.R.A. relief.

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ACTING MIN AND DEPT E.A.
December. 27, 1948

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