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TOP SECRET

SERVICES RECONNAISSANCE DEPT.

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N.E.I. SECTION . I.A.S.D

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National Archives of Australia

NAA: A3269, H7

NEI SECTION OF IASD.

RECONNAISSANCE DEPT.

The Director of IASD's NEI Section was Lt-Commander J.J. QUERE of the Royal Netherlands Navy. In charge of NEI Wireless Telegraphy and Communications was Capt. J. JANSSEN, who arranged communications for the NEI Operational Section and for other IASD parties going into the field, notably those of the NEW GUINEA and ISLANDS Section, until the appointment of Major ISRAEL as IASD's Signals Officer.

(VX87080) Capt. G.C.M. VAN ARCKEN, AIF, was Admin. Officer. He had joined IASD as a civilian in June 1942 for operations in JAVA. A naturalised Australian of Dutch extraction, he was given the rank of temporary Captain in the AIF, and subsequently became IASD's personnel officer for the NEI Section.

On IASD HQ and training staffs were forty Australians, eighteen Dutch subjects. Operational personnel totalled eighty. Of these twenty-seven were Australian, fifty-three Dutch. With guards, orderlies, etc., IASD had in December 1942 a total strength of two hundred and three. These figures were made up after the IASD operations in NEW GUINEA had been transferred to Section "C" of AIB.

Nine operations were planned by the NEI Section. These covered HOLLANDIA, DUTCH NEW GUINEA, AMBON, JAVA, CELEBES, and the AROE Islands. Most of these were disastrous.

The NEI Section was transferred to Section "C", as the Field Intelligence Section of AIB, when the break-up of IASD occurred. Subsequently it became known as NEFIS under the command of Comdr. BROUWER, and later Col. SPOOR. Difficulties with the NEI Section were in part the cause of the disruption of IASD. Section "C" had no funds, no stores, no facilities. It had no NEI Section or personnel. Consequently Lt-Comdr. QUERE undertook field intelligence work for "C" Section. This led to uncertainty concerning the status of parties going into Dutch territory. Were they Section "A" (Special Operations) or were they Section "C"? Were they IASD or Field Intelligence parties?

When IASD was broken up, the NEI Section was passed to Field Intelligence, and SRD subsequently had no control over these operations. A primary cause of the dispute was the provision of funds between IASD and the NEI Section, which at that time was part of IASD. An equitable division was impossible, and the NEI Section received fifty percent of the IASD allotment at the behest of GHQ.

On the 14th December 1942, there were fourteen NEI personnel on Headquarters Staff at "AIRLIE". These were Lt-Comdr J.J. QUERE, Director; Capt J.J. JANSSEN, Wireless Telegraphy Research; two sub-Lieutenants in charge of NEI Naval Administration; one NEI Lieutenant in charge of Army Administration; one Sergeant clerk; one Sergeant in the wireless telegraphy workshop together with one Corporal; five NEI Privates who were wireless telegraphy mechanics and one civilian secretary, Mrs. RICHARDSON.

At DARWIN was one Lieutenant acting as NEI Liaison Officer, one Dutch civilian, H. BODE, in charge of Praus, as well as six prau-men.

At ZES CAIRNS was Capt VAN ARCKEN in charge of personnel, with an NEI Sergeant clerk. In addition there was an NEI Corporal wireless telegraphy instructor.

At that time, there were four NEI Sergeants and one NEI Private in the wireless telegraphy class at "AIRLIE". Awaiting attachment to operational parties at "AIRLIE" were three NEI Lieutenants, two NEI Sergeants and one NEI Private. To be posted were one AIF Captain, one AIF Lieutenant, one NEI Sergeant. Awaiting movement at ZES CAIRNS were four NEI Sergeants, one NEI Private, two NEI sailors and two Dutch Police, as well as six AIF ORs. Engaged in NEI operations were four NEI Lieutenants, three NEI Sergeants, two NEI Corporals and nine NEI Privates, one NEI sailor and five Dutch police, as well as one AIF Captain, three AIF Lieutenants, five AIF Sergeants, and one civilian.

Page 2/.....

It was on the 1st December, 1942, that the Field Intelligence Section of AIB took control of the parties placed in the field by IASD's NEW GUINEA and ISLANDS Section. Thus, at this time, the only IASD Party operating in the field, other than those of the NEI Section in DUTCH Territory, was the LIZARD Party in PORTUGUESE TIMOR.

Total NEI personnel, both staff and operations, with IASD at that time numbered seventy-one. Fifty-three of these were either engaged in operations, training for operations, or awaiting operational posting. In addition, Australian personnel of all ranks were engaged in NEI operations.

At that time, it was extremely difficult and often impossible to obtain transport for the insertion of IASD parties into their operational areas. With the Japanese directly threatening AUSTRALIA, and the American Forces at that time not in full strength in the SWPA, matters were extremely critical. On top of that was GHQ's inability to grant transport priorities to IASD parties.

Admiral COSTER of the R.N.N., however, had placed an old submarine at the disposal of IASD's NEI Section. This solved many difficulties. Admiral COSTER was helpful also in supplying Dutch small craft for NEI projects.

FLOUNDER - This was a long-term Int project. There were eight party members, all NEI - one Lieutenant, and NCO, one sailor and five police. Their area of operations as CERAM. Leader was Lieut H.P. NYGH, RNN. Others were Sgts MALAWAUW and PANGARIBOAN (sig), Ptes PATTIWALL, HETARIA and RERING, and LARAT MASEH and WATRATAN. The party was captured after being inserted by an American submarine from PERTH on night of 30/31 Dec 1942. Lieut NYGH's fate is not known. Reports indicate that the remainder of the party were executed by their captors. The party was to RV with a submarine on 5 May 1943. The submarine kept RV, but found no traces of the party.

AMBON - 23 A2 - This was an all-Australian party for operations in AMBON. Leader was Capt W.T. JINKINS VX44818 AIF, Lieut J.J. ELLIS WX14257, Sgt A.J. RUDWICK VX102447, Sgt A. CHEW VX45931, Cpl G. CHITTLEBOROUGH VX68297 and B.J. MAINPUTTY, and Indonesian sailor.

This operation was planned as a long-term project for Intelligence and Sabotage in AMBON.

Major JINKINS had been with Plover Force in the TENIMBAR Island previously as a member of the 2/21 Aust Inf Bn. He had been taken a prisoner of war, escaping from AMBON and returning to AUSTRALIA. He had been brought into IASD especially for this project.

Planning commenced in October 1942, and basic and party training was carried out at ZES CAIRNS.

Additional to the party members was a sub-Lieutenant BAINES RNN. He was found unsuitable and it was recommended that he be not taken, so he was returned to the RNN.

Training completed, the party was fully equipped with stores and wireless telegraphy - sufficient to last for a long period - and awaiting on movement from CAIRNS. Then the inevitable delay occurred. No transport was available. Insertion was planned by submarine, and efforts were made to have one allotted from the NEI Navy or from the US submarine section. All these efforts were unavailing. When the NEI Section was transferred to GHQ, the project was abandoned.

I.A.S.D. N.E.I. SECTION (1).

AROS 210 (21Z).

Party "A" (WALNUT).

- (1) Sheldon.
- (ii) Monsted.
- (iii)
- (a) Party "A" inserted in July '42 by Flying Boat, first came on the air on 31/7/42.
- (b) They got out in lugger in Sept. '42 after JAP landing in force and encountered difficulty at Thursday Island as they had no identification.

Party "B".

- (i) Sheldon.
- (ii) Feetum.
- (iii) McCandlish.
- (a) Rubber boats and stores inclusive were landed from Dutch Dornier in 15 Feb 43 at PENAMBOELA Island where the Dutch were already in contact with an official of the N.E.I. Admin. Service
- (b) The Party carried out a recce of the Island. The natives were hostile and infiltration was difficult. They asked for aid. 8-3-43

Party "C".

- (i) Monsted. + Plumidge
 - (ii) Dahlberg. - left Darwin in lugger to aid them, but never returned.
- Shortly afterwards, SHELDON was captured by the enemy and the remaining three members of the party wandered through the jungle until captured.

JAVA.

Between June and Dec '42, six parties were planned for JAVA under code name "TIGER".

TIGER 1.

There were three operatives - Lt. BERGMAN, Pte. OEPILATOR and Pte. SOETARNO. The only JAVA party equipped with W/T, they

Page 2/.....

B 9.40

-2-

B 8.15
114.25W
8.05
112.20

were to forward Int concerning the KENDAR airfield, CELEBES, to Australia.

The Party left in R.N.N. "K21" on 10 Nov 42 and were landed on 27 Nov 42. They were last heard on the air in Dec 42, when they were strongly suspected to be JAP controlled. Operation "STORK", planned to extract TIGER 1, was consequently cancelled.

TIGER 11.

Lt. BROCK and 2 N.E.I. Privates left in R.N.N. K21 on 10 Nov 42 and were landed near WLINGI on 30 Nov 42. The Party was lost.

TIGER 111 (MACKEREL).

Capt. G.G.M. Van Arcken (Ldr), Sgt. ISWAHJOEDI, Lt. BERGMA and Van KRIMPER, left Darwin on 28 Aug 42, landed on the South coast of JAVA on 7 Sep 42, picked up a native SCHENAU and, because of JAP strength in the area, evacuated immediately, reaching Darwin on 23 Sep 42.

TIGER 1V.

One native (de HAAS) was extracted by R.N.N. submarine from SOURABAYA.

TIGER V.

One N.E.I. Private (OENTOENG) was inserted near KENDARI. He left in R.N.N. K21 on 10 Nov 42, but returned with the sub on 16 Dec 42 without landing. *21 JAN 43, 1st was inserted on 9 Feb 43. 2ndly further was heard of.*

TIGER VI.

One Dutch NCO, Sgt. LEPOD was inserted on BANJOEWAN Island. LEPOD left in R.N.N. K21 on 21 Jan 43, and was inserted on 9 Feb 43. (Conducting Officer was Lt. Van der VEUR.)

SCHNAPPER.

LION.

- (a) An Indonesian left Darwin by prahu on 24 Jun 42 for the North Coast of the Gulf of BONE. Last contact was made with the Party on 7 Nov 42.
- (b) On 14 Dec 42, 2 Dutch NCOs were at Darwin awaiting movement to LION Party, but as it was suspected that LION had come under

Page 3/.....

JAP control, they were not despatched.

APRICOT.

- (c) A Party of 5 Indonesians left Darwin on 5 Jan 45 to ascertain the fate of LION Party. The leader was captured; the remainder evacuated by Catalina on 31 Jan 45/

WHITING (21A).

The Party members were Sgt. H.N. STAVERMAN (N.E.I.), A/Sgt. L.G. SIFFLEET (A.I.F. Sig.), H. PATTIWAEL, RAHARING and Cpl. D. TOPMAN. *(Returned to base from LEYALAN and dec 1943)*
21/44
 On 12 Jan 43, the Party was flown into BENA BENA with Capt. H.A.J. FRYOR.

Capt. FRYOR *led* accompanied the Party as far as LUMI, *(lost in escape)* where he left them on 8 Jun 43 to carry out a project of his own.

Inland from VANIMO on 4 Oct 43, the Party was *ambushed* jumped by a

JAP patrol. STAVERMAN was killed but SIFFLEET escaped. *but to base*
the remaining members retreated along route of access were captured by
 On 20 Oct 43, SIFFLEET and the others were taken by hostile *PATTIWAEL*
at natives to AITAPE and believed executed.

attached with guides & carriers along a route north of the Bivani Mts. into a area previously mapped by APC. they established a base at WOMA for drops. (near AINBAI)

helped by natives of PAB1.

Siffleet & Raharing were at base camp some days away.

M. RAHARING

at Wontipi by natives of the WAPI tribe taken to Aitape.

ARZO

23 A2. (NEI Section IASD)

(1)
This operation was planned as
~~VN 44513~~
Capt W.T. JINKINS was chosen as leader of this party - a long-term project for Intelligence and sabotage in ~~the~~ AMBON. He had been with Plover Force in the TINIMELA Is, and as a member of the 21 Aust Inf Bn had been taken a prisoner of war, escaping from AMBON and returning to AUSTRALIA. He had been brought into IASD especially for this project.

Planning commenced in October 1942, and basic and party training was carried out at ZES CAIRNS.

Additional to the party members was a Dutchman who had been allotted to the project. He was found unsuitable. It was recommended that he be not taken. The matter was taken up with the NEI authorities and the man was returned to the regular NEI Forces based on AUSTRALIA. In addition there was an INDONESIAN sailor, MANUPUTTY, B. J.

Training completed, the party was fully equipped with stores and W/T - sufficient to last for a long period - and awaiting on movement from CAIRNS. Then the inevitable delay occurred. No transport was available. Insertion was planned by submarine, and efforts were made to have one allotted from the NEI Navy or from the US submarine section. All these efforts were unavailing. And when the NEI Section was transferred to GHQ, the project was abandoned.

Signaller of the party was Cpl G. CHITTLEBOROUGH. (VX ~~44513~~ ⁶⁸²⁹⁷)

Additional to the party was Lt J. JELLIS, 2i/c. (VX ~~44513~~ ¹⁴²⁵⁷)

formerly of RAA (A.F.) Index Log.

I understand that Comdr QUERE is stationed in Melbourne. Do you think it worth while contacting him? He may be able to throw some light on the NEI Section. If so, have you any idea of how to go about locating him.

Also in Melbourne is a Mrs Penny Richardson (daughter of Col Little). She was NEI Secretary, and may remember something.

HISTORY OF SOA

BOOK II.

OPERATIONS

Chapter .

NEI SECTION

of

IASD.

NEI Section of IASD. Page 1.

An important operational section of IASD was the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES Section. Director was Lt-Commander J.J. QUERE of the NEI Naval Forces in AUSTRALIA. In charge of NEI Wireless Telegraphy and Communications was Capt J. JANSEN, who as well as arranging communications for the NEI Operational sections, also handled those of other IASD parties going into the field, notably those of the NEW GUINEA and ISLANDS Section.

(vx 870 30)
Capt G.G.M. VAN ARCKEN AIF was Personnel Officer. He had joined IASD as a civilian in JUNE 1942 for operations in JAVA. A naturalised AUSTRALIAN of DUTCH extraction, he was given the rank of temporary captain in the AIF, and subsequently became IASD's personnel officer for the NEI Section.

The importance of IASD's NEI Section can be gauged from a comparative study of the personnel numbers. ^{On IASD training staffs} At MELBOURNE HQ there were forty AUSTRALIANS ~~on the staff~~ as compared with eighteen DUTCH subjects. Operational personnel totalled eighty. Of these twenty-seven were ~~EXXIM~~ AUSTRALIAN, fifty-three DUTCH. With guards, orderlies etc, IASD had in December 1942 a total strength of two hundred and three. ^{These figures were made up after the operational IASD operations in NEW GUINEA had} Nine operations were planned by the NEI Section. These covered HOLLANDIA, DUTCH NEW GUINEA, AMBON, JAVA, CELEBES and the ARCE ISLANDS. Most of them were ~~tragic disasters~~. ^{disasters}

Little is known now of the NEI SECTION. It was transferred to Section "C", the Field Intelligence Section of AIF, when the break-up with GHQ occurred. It was difficulties with the NEI Section, in fact, that was in great measure the cause of the disruption of IASD. Section "C" had no funds, no stores, no facilities. It had no NEI Section or personnel.

*field intelligence work
for F.C. Section.*

Consequently Lt-Comdr QUERE was forced to take on this work. This led to unending friction with GHQ concerning the status of parties going into DUTCH territory. Were they Section "A" (Special Operations) or were they Section "C" ? Were they IASD or Field Intelligence parties ?

When IASD was broken up, the NEI Section was passed to field Intelligence, and SRD subsequently had no control over these operations. A primary cause of the dispute was the provision of funds between IASD and the NEI Section, which at that time was part of IASD. An equitable division was impossible, and the NEI Section received fifty percent of the IASD allotment at the behest of GHQ.

All papers relating to the NEI Section's IASD Operations went with the Section to GHQ. Consequently when the History of IASD came to be written there were no records available, and few persons available with SRD who had any knowledge of the NEI Section.

Of the nine operations, the names of the operatives who took part in only four is known. Of ~~the other operations~~ other operations little is ~~known~~ known other than the area, the number of operatives and their nationality. Whether their missions were successful or not is not known. Efforts are being made to locate the missing records, via AIB and Lt Comdr QUERE, and it is hoped that these will prove successful.

OPERATIONS

HOLLANDIA - 21 A. This party was composed of one DUTCH Sergeant, one AUSTRALIAN Sergeant and two INDONESIANS.

They were:- Sgt ^{H.N.} STAVERMAN N.E.I.

A / Sgt L.G. SIFFLEET A.I.F. (Sig)

H. Pathuwal
Raharing

PAWALI and

RAHALIN, both INDONESIANS. (D. Topman)

Early in 1943 Sgt SIFFLEET entered the territory by Naval Flying Boat to KUVANMAS on the Upper SEPIK River. The party was located generally in the AITAPE Area, NEW GUINEA. ^{remains of the party, which had been inserted a few weeks before, had been located in the borders of Dutch New Guinea by Lt H.A. J. Kuyper, H.A. H. Kuyper & B. Black, formerly members of} Function was to carry out propaganda and Fifth Column work

IASD's New Guinea Secret Party, a project which had been abandoned in Dec 1942 when control of the organisation was passed to Section 'C' of A.T.R.

amongst the KANAKAS and natives in EAST and WEST NEW GUINEA.

Supplies for five months were brought in. Arms included two LMGs, two rifles, four pistols, two hunting rifles and one automatic rifle.

In the subsequent two months aircraft sorties were made on three occasions. As requested by W/T food and medical supplies were dropped.

Communications consisted of one long ^{range} wave and one short ^{range} wave W/T set. Contact was made with HQ twice daily. In an emergency the party was to head towards the SEPIK ~~River~~ River to rejoin the AUSTRALIAN Army, first destroying all W/T equipment.

On the 12th OCTOBER 1942, Sgt SIFFLEET left SYDNEY by ship, disembarked at MORESBY, stayed there for two months, left there by Flying Boat and landed at KUVANMAS.

On arrival he headed SW to YAMBI YAMBI, where he joined Sgt STAVERMAN and the two INDONESIANS. After hiking overland and using

native canoes the party arrived at RU seven days later. A night was spent at DOMUBI, the next at SUWABAKU, the following night at KLAFLER. They remained overnight at NAMBLO, the next day arriving at another larger village where they slept that night. Next day they reached BALLA, and the following week they spent at MAI MAI, seventy kilometers SOUTH of ATTAPE. Two nights were spent at YEMERAVA and WAMIL, one night at ANGUGUNAK. Then they remained a week at LUMI. A night then was spent at ~~XXXXXXXX~~ KARAITEM and POKOPUREI. The following three nights were spent at WARUSORE, PO and FIENI. Spending the nights at other villages, they went on their way, passing through MORUEU and AIRO and DORUMO. *at all these places, they dispersed Allied propaganda, endeavouring to gain support for the native people.* Then the party halted for two months in the jungle not far from AINBAI, twenty-five kilometers SOUTH of VANIMO. It was here that the three aircraft drops were made to them.

Sgt STAVERMAN left AINBAI with PAWALI, and the two headed WEST to DUTCH NEW GUINEA to carry out an intelligence reconnaissance and to endeavour to recruit the natives to the Allied cause.

Forty-five kilometers SOUTH of HOLLANDIA, Sgt STAVERMAN learnt from the Chief of ARSO, that the JAPANESE had learnt of his party's presence, and that the enemy had organised a punitive expedition at HOLLANDIA Lof C HQ. SOUTH of NEMO Village, fifty-five kilometers SOUTH of HOLLANDIA and ten kilometers SOUTH of SKOSAI, Sgt STAVERMAN and PAWALI were surprised by an enemy ambush. STAVERMAN was killed. PAWALI escaped and made his way back to SIFFLEET. *Presumably*

Shortly afterwards SIFFLEET was taken prisoner by the JAPANESE. The enemy obtained a statement from him, gained intelligence on IASD.

NEI Section of IASD.

OPERATIONS

SCHNAPPER: This party was made up of two NEI Sergeants. Their names and mission are not known. On the ~~xxx~~ 14th DECEMBER 1942, they were at LMS DARWIN awaiting movement.

FLOUNDER: This was completely an NEI operation. There were eight party members, all NEI - one lieutenant, one corporal, one sailor and five police. Their area of operations was AMBON. Leader was Lt. NYGHE N.E.I. He, and a party of six, were ~~xxx~~ captured near the JAPANESE Post of AMAHAI on

AMBON early in 1943, shortly after being inserted by an AMERICAN submarine.

AMBON - 23 A2: This was an all-AUSTRALIAN party for operations in AMBON.

There were five operatives. Leader was Capt W.T. JINKINS A.I.F., Lt J. JELLIS
(vx 44818) (vx 45931) (vx 68297) (vx 14257)
Others were Sgt A.J. RUDWICK, Sgt A. CHEW, Cpl G. CHITTLEBOROUGH, &
Nothing further is known of this party. B. J. MANUPUTTY, an Indonesian sailor.

KANDARI 26: There were three party members for this operation, which was planned against the important town of KANDARI in the CELEBES. One was an NEI Lieutenant, the others NEI Privates. Nothing further is known.

JAVA: Two operations were planned for JAVA. These were known as "JAVA 4" and "JAVA 5". The composition of each was one NEI Lieutenant, two NEI privates. It is possible that other projects were also planned for JAVA, but of these there is no record.

MACKEREL: An attempted landing was made in Sept 42. Capt G. R. Van der Horst was of this party.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA: Known as "WISSELMEREN", an operation was planned to take place in the WISSEL Lakes area of Dutch New Guinea. Operatives were two NEI privates. Nothing further is known.

AROE ISLANDS.

On the orders of the C.O. of the 2/21 Aust Inf Bn, Lt CHAPMAN left AMBON with twenty men, prior to the complete JAPANESE occupation of the territory.

This party returned via CERAM and the KAI ISLANDS. From there the party went to the AROE Islands, where they contacted SHELDON and MONSTED, who at that time were still carrying out their civilian occupations there.

SHELDON and MONSTED made their two boats available and took the party to THURSDAY Island. From here it was believed that MONSTED returned to the AROES, while SHELDON joined IASD for this project. MONSTED subsequently returned to THURSDAY Island, where SHELDON recontacted him, and MONSTED then joined IASD as ~~xxxxxxx~~ a member of SHELDON'S Party.

^{Monsted}
(It KERR was returned ill from MERAUKE, and the remainder of the party left on the project.) Subsequently, they sent a signal asking for assistance, and MONSTED left MERAUKE to aid them. His mission was to try to save them, but he never returned. It is believed that he arrived eventually in AMBON. How he reached here is not known, but it is believed that he went over to the JAPANESE.

*It is believed that there was another
member of this party — Sgt J.H. ~~Dal~~ (?)
Dahlberg.
formerly of 2/21st Aust Inf Bn. (VX35692) J.*

A/cpl J.R. Plumridge
A/Sgt W.F. Barnfield
(w 242676)
(vx 143312)

AROE Islands - 210: This was an Australian party with five operatives.

The Leader was Capt C.R. SHELDON. He had lived in these Islands for years, and he had made numerous enemies amongst the pro-Axis natives. To choose a man without friends amongst the native population was the first blunder in this disastrous operation.

The other party members were Lt R.W. FEETUM, Lt I.A. McMILLAN KERR, (vx 20269) Sgt J. Dallberg (vx 35092) Sgt J McCANDLISH and N.P. MONSTED of Danish Nationality who was employed as a civilian operative.

Leaving towards the end of 1942, the party was stationed first in DARWIN. Lt KERR and Sgt McCANDLISH proceeded then to MERAUKE awaiting on movement to the islands. (Subsequently Lt KERR contracted black water fever and was, after some delay and indecision by the DUTCH, evacuated to AUSTRALIA.)

The remainder of the party left MERAUKE by boat - a powered and sailing vessel of about eighteen tons. Passing through the KAI Islands, they reached the AROE Group and landed on PENAMBOELAI Island. From here they sent a signal announcing their safe arrival.

The purpose of the operation was to investigate native conditions in the Aroe Islands. Their communications with IASD were by W/T via L.M.S. DARWIN.

Their second message announced that the natives were hostile and that infiltration would be difficult. They requested further assistance, but this was never granted.

The party was able to carry out a reconnaissance of the island. Shortly afterwards however Captain SHELDON was captured by the enemy.

(Plumridge
Barnfield + McCandlish from "M" unit - 3.5.43)

The W/T set and rations were seized, and the remaining ^{three}~~two~~ members of the party wandered aimlessly through the jungle.

Eventually, weak from lack of food and proper shelter, they were overpowered and taken prisoner by an armed JAPANESE patrol.

From their prisoners the enemy gathered some important intelligence concerning IASD, "Z" Special Unit, and the general secret intelligence set-up in AUSTRALIA.

Captured Japanese documents revealed that Capt Sheldon, Lt Fectum & Sgt M. Bondlink were taken prisoner. The fate of Sgt Dahlberg is not known. It is possible that he was killed when Sheldon was captured, or when the other two were ambushed.

On 14th DECEMBER 1942, there were fourteen NEI personnel on Headquarters Staff at "AIRLIE". These were Lt Comdr ^{J.J.} QUERE, Director; Capt ^{J.J.} JANSEN, W/T Research; ^{two} to Sub-lieutenants in charge of NEI Naval Administration; one NEI Lieutenant in charge of Army Administration; one sergeant clerk; one sergeant in the W/T Workshop, together with one corporal; five NEI privates who were W/T mechanics, and one civilian secretary, *Mrs Betty Richardson.*

At DARWIN was one Lieutenant acting as ~~NEI~~ NEI Liaison Officer, one Dutch civilian, H. BODE, in charge of Praus, as well as six Prau-men.

At ZES CAIRNS was Capt VAN ARCKEN in charge of personnel, with an NEI Sergeant Clerk. In addition there was an NEI Corporal W/T Instructor.

At that time there were four N.E.I. Sergeants and one N.E.I. Private in the W/T Class at "AIRLIE". Awaiting attachment to operational parties at "AIRLIE" were three N.E.I. Lieutenants, two N.E.I. Sergeants and one N.E.I. Private. To be posted were one A.I.F. Captain, one A.I.F. Lieutenant, one N.E.I. Sergeant. Awaiting movement at ZES CAIRNS were four N.E.I. Sergeants, one N.E.I. Private, two N.E.I. Sailors and two DUTCH Police, as well as six AIF ORs.

NEI SECTION OF IASD. Page 8.

Engaged in N.E.I. Operations were four N.E.I. Lieutenants, three N.E.I. Sergeants, two N.E.I. Corporals and nine N.E.I. Privates, one N.E.I. Sailor and five DUTCH Police, as well as one A.I.F. Captain, three A.I.F. Lieutenants, five A.I.F. Sergeants, and one civilian.

It was on the 1st DECEMBER 1942, that the Field Intelligence Section of AIB took control of the parties placed in the field by IASD's NEW GUINEA and ISLANDS Section. Thus, at this time, the only ~~other~~ IASD Party operating in the field, other than those of the NEI Section in DUTCH Territory, was the LIZARD Party in PORTUGUESE TIMOR.

Total N.E.I. personnel, both staff and operational, with IASD at that time numbered seventy-one. Fifty-three of these were either engaged in operations, training for operations, or awaiting operational posting. In addition, AUSTRALIAN personnel of all ranks were engaged in N.E.I. operations.

At that time it was extremely difficult and often impossible to obtain transport for the insertion of IASD parties into their operational areas. With the JAPANESE directly threatening AUSTRALIA, and the AMERICAN Forces at that time not in full strength in the SWPA, matters were extremely critical. On top of that was GHQ's inability or unwillingness to grant transport priorities to IASD parties and the inability of the hard-pressed US Navy to do so.

It may be wondered then how it was that, while so many of IASD's NEW GUINEA projects had to be abandoned because of lack of transport, at least ^{eight} ~~nine~~ of IASD's NEI Parties were able to go into the field.

NEI Section of IASD. Page 9.

The reason was that Admiral COSTER of the NEI Navy in AUSTRALIA placed an old submarine at the disposal of IASD's NEI Section. This solved many difficulties. Admiral COSTER was helpful also in supplying DUTCH small craft for NEI projects.

FLOUNDER

1. NYGH, H. P. LT

2. MALAWAN ^{Sgt.}

3. PATTIWAL ^{PTE}

4. HETARIA "

5. RERING "

6. LARAT ^{MASEH}

7. WATRATAN }

8. PANBARIBOEAN SBT TELEGRAPHIST
ng

original + 2

①

NEI SECTION of IASD

The Director of
An important operational section of IASD was the NETHERLANDS
NEI Section
EAST INDIES Section. Director was Lt-Commander J.J. QUERE of
ROYAL NETHERLANDS NAVY
the NEI Naval Forces in AUSTRALIA. In charge of NEI Wireless
Telegraphy and Communications was Capt J. JANSEN, who as well as
arranging communications for the NEI Operational Section, also
handled those of other IASD parties going into the field, notably
those of the NEW GUINEA and ISLANDS Section, *until the opportunity*
of May 1942 as IASD's Signal Officer *Admin. Officer*
Capt G.G.M. VAN ARCKEN (VX87080) AIF was personnel officer.
He had joined IASD as a civilian in June 1942 for operations in
JAVA. A naturalised Australian of Dutch extraction, he was
given the rank of temporary captain in the AIF, and subsequently
became IASD's personnel officer for the NEI Section.

The importance of IASD's NEI Section can be gauged from
a comparative study of the personnel numbers. On IASD HQ and
training staffs were forty Australians as compared with eighteen
Dutch subjects. Operational personnel totalled eighty. Of
these twenty-seven were Australian, fifty-three Dutch. With
guards, orderlies etc, IASD had in December 1942 a total strength
of two hundred and three. These figures were made up after the
IASD operations in NEW GUINEA had been transferred to Section
"C" of AIB.

Nine operations were planned by the NEI Section. These
covered HOLLANDIA, DUTCH NEW GUINEA, AMBON, JAVA, CELEBES and the
AROE Islands. Most of these were disastrous.

①
~~Little is known now of the NEI Section.~~ It was transferred to Section "C", the Field Intelligence Section of AIB, when the break-up with GHQ occurred. Subsequently it became known as NEFIS, ^{under the command of} with Comdr BROUWER, later Col SPOOR. ~~It was~~ ^{but} difficulties with the NEI Section ~~in fact,~~ ^{were} that was in great measure the cause of the disruption of IASD. Section "C" had no funds, no stores, no facilities. It had no NEI Section or personnel. Consequently Lt-Comdr QUERE ~~was forced to take on~~ ^{undertook} field intelligence work for "C" Section. This led to ~~unending~~ ^{uncertainty} friction with GHQ concerning the status of parties going into Dutch territory. Were they Section "A" (Special Operations) or were they Section "C"? Were they IASD or Field Intelligence parties?

When IASD was broken up, the NEI Section was passed to Field Intelligence, and SRD subsequently had no control over these operations. A primary cause of the dispute was the provision of funds between IASD and the NEI Section, which at that time was part of IASD. An equitable division was impossible, and the NEI Section received fifty percent of the IASD allotment at the behest of GHQ.

All papers relating to the NEI Section IASD Operations went with the Section to GHQ. (Consequently when the History of IASD came to be written there were no records available, and few persons available with SRD who had any knowledge of the NEI Section.)

Of the nine operations, the names of the operatives who took part in only four is known. Of other operations little is known other than the area, the number of operatives and their

known other than the area, the number of operatives and their nationality. Whether their missions were successful or not is not known. Efforts are being made to locate the missing records, via AIB and Lt-Comdr QUERE, and is hoped that these will prove successful.

Whiting
HOLLANDIA - 21 A This party was composed of one Dutch Sergeant, one Australian Sergeant and two Indonesians. They were Sgt H.N. STAVERMAN NEI, A/Sgt L.G. SIFFLEET AIF (Sig), H. PATTIWABL and RAHARING both Indonesians, *Cpl D. Topman*

Early in 1943 Sgt SIFFLEET entered the territory by Naval Flying Boat to KUVANMAS on the Upper SERIK River. The remainder of the party, which had been inserted a few weeks beforehand was located generally in the AITAPE Area, NEW GUINEA. They had been assisted in reaching the borders of DUTCH NEW GUINEA by Leiuts H.A.J. FRYOR, H.A. AIKEN and G. BLACK, formerly members of IASD's NEW GUINEA LOCUST Party, on project which had been abandoned in December 1942 when control of the organisations NEW GUINEA parties had passed to Section "C" of AIB.

their Function was to carry out propaganda and Fifth Column work amongst the ~~KANAKAS~~ and natives in east and west NEW GUINEA.

Supplies for five months were brought in. Arms included two LMGs, two rifles, four pistols, two ^{.22 small game} hunting rifles and one automatic rifle.

In the subsequent two months aircraft sorties were made on three occasions. As requested by W/T food and medical supplies were dropped.

Communications consisted of one long wave and one short wave wireless telegraphy set. Contact was made with HQ twice daily. In an emergency the party was to head towards the SEPIK River to rejoin the Australian Army, first destroying all W/T equipment.

On the 12th October 1942, Sgt SIFELEET left SYDNEY by ship, disembarked at MORESBY, stayed there for two months, left there by Flying Boat and landed at KUVANMAS.

On arrival he headed south-west to YAMBI YAMBI, where he joined Sgt STAVERMAN and the two Indonesians. After hiking overland and using native canoes the party arrived at RU seven days later. A night was spent at DOMUBI, the next at SUWABAKU, the following night at KLAFLE. They remained overnight at NANBLO, the next day arriving at another larger village where they slept that night. Next day they reached BALLA, and the following week they spent at MAI MAI, seventy kilometers south of AITAPE. Two nights were spent at YEMERAVA and WAMIL, one night at ANGUGUNAK. They remained a week at LUMI. A night then was spent at KARATEM and POKOPUREI. The following three nights were spent at WARUSORE, PO and FIENI. Spending the nights at other villages, they went on their way, passing through MORUEU and AIRO and DORUMO. At all these places, they dispensed Allied propaganda, endeavouring to gain support for the native peoples.

When the party halted for two months in the jungle not far from AINBAI, twenty-five kilometers south of VANIMO. It was here that the three aircraft drops were made to them.

Sgt STAVERMAN left AINBAI with ^{PATTIWAL}PAWALI, and the two

headed west to DUTCH NEW GUINEA to carry out an intelligence reconnaissance and to endeavour to recruit the natives to the Allied cause.

Forty-five kilometers south of HOLLANDIA, Sgt STAVERMAN learnt from the Chief of ARSO, that the Japanese had learnt of his party's presence, and that the enemy had organised a punitive expedition at HOLLANDIA L of C HQ. South of NEMO Village, fifty-five kilometers south of HOLLANDIA and then kilometers south of SKOSAI, Sgt STAVERMAN and PAWALI were surprised by an enemy ambush. STAVERMAN was killed. ^{PATTIWAEL} PATTIWAEL escaped and made his way back to SIFFLEET.

Shortly afterwards SIFFLEET was taken prisoner by the Japanese. The enemy obtained a statement from him, gained intelligence on IASD.

* SCHNAPPER - This party was made up of two NEI Sergeants. Their names and mission are not known. On the 14th December 1942, they were at LMS DARWIN awaiting movement.

This was a long-term int project
FLOUNDER - This was completely an NEI operation. There were eight party members, all NEI - one lieutenant, an NCO, one sailor and five police. Their area of operations was ^{CERAM} AMBON. Leader was Lieut H.P. NYGH ^{R.N.W.} NEI. Others were Sgts MALAWAUW and PANGARIBOEAN (sig), Ptes PATTIWAEL, HETARIA and RERING, and LARAT MASEA and WATRATAN. The party was captured after being inserted by an American submarine from ^{on night of 20/11/Dec 42.} PERTH. Lieut NYGH's fate is not known. Reports indicate that the remainder of the party were executed by their captors.

RV. with a sub on 5 May 43. The party was to RV but found no RV and killed them.

2
AMBON - 23 A2 - This was an all-Australian party for operations in AMBON. Leader was Capt W.T. JINKINS VX44818 AIF, Lieut J.J. ELLIS WX14257, Sgt A.J. RUDWICK VX102447, Sgt A. CHEW VX45931, Cpl G. CHITTLEBOROUGH VX68297 and B.J. MANUPUTTY, an Indonesian sailor.

This operations was planned as a long-term project for Intelligence and Sabotage in AMBON.

Major JINKINS had been with Plover Force in the TINIMBAR Is, ^{Prisoners} and as a member of the 21 Aust Inf Bn ^{had} been taken a prisoner of war, escaping from AMBON and returning to AUSTRALIA. He had been brought into IASD especially for this project.

Planning commenced in October 1942, and basic and party training was carried out at ZES CAIRNS.

Additional to the party members was a ^{S/Lt SAINTS RNN} ~~Dutchman~~ who had been allotted to the project. He was found unsuitable, and it was recommended that he be not taken. The matter was taken up with the NEI authorities and the ^{He} man was returned to the ^{RNN} regular NEI Forces based on AUSTRALIA. ~~In xxxxxxxx xxxxx xxx xx~~

Training completed, the party was fully equipped with stores and wireless telegraphy - sufficient to last for a long period - and awaiting on movement from CAIRNS. Then the inevitable delay occurred. No transport was available. Insertion was planned by submarine, and efforts were made to have one allotted from the NEI Navy or from the US submarine section. All these efforts were unavailing. And when the NEI Section was transferred to GHQ, the project was abandoned.

Tiger I
KENDARI 26 - There were three party members ~~for~~ this operation, which was planned against the airfield at the town of KENDARI in the CELEBES. One was an NEI Lieutenant, the others NEI privates. *Sgt 42. - Party lost. "Strike" cancelled.*

Tiger II
JAVA - Two operations were planned for JAVA. These were known as "JAVA 4" and "JAVA 5". The composition of each was one NEI Lieutenant, two NEI privates. It is possible that other projects were also planned for JAVA, but of these there is no record.

Tiger III
MACKEREL - An attempted submarine landing on the JAVA coast was made in September 1942. Capt G.M. VAN ARCKEN was ^{leader} member of this party.

Tiger IV
DUTCH NEW GUINEA - An operation was planned to take place in the WISSEL Lakes area of DUTCH NEW GUINEA. Operatives were two NEI Privates.

212
AROE Islands - 210 - This was an Australian party with six operatives. The purpose was to investigate native conditions in the AROE Islands. Their communications with IASD were by wireless telegraphy via L.M.S. DARWIN.

X
The leader was Cap C.R. SHELDON NX130227. He had lived ^{When the Pacific War broke out there was a revolt of pro-Axis natives} in these Islands for years, ~~and~~ he had made numerous enemies amongst the ^{SAT} ~~pro-Axis~~ natives. To choose a man without friends amongst the native population was the first blunder in this disastrous operation. The other members were Lieut R.W. FEETUM VX90387, Lieut I.A. McMILLAN-KERR VX90392, Sgt J. McCANDLISH VX80269, Sgt J.H. DAHLBERG VX35092 and N.P. MONSTED of Danish Nationality who was employed as a civilian operative.

Leaving towards the end of 1942, the party was stationed first in DARWIN. Lieut KERR and ~~Sgt McCANDLISH~~ proceeded then to MERAUKE awaiting on movement to the islands. Subsequently Lieut KERR was returned ill from MERAUKE and the remainder of the party, less MONSTED, left MERAUKE by boat - a powered and sailing Dutch vessel of about eighteen tons. Passing through the KAI Islands, they reached the AROE Group and landed on PENANBOELAI Island. From here they sent a signal announcing their safe arrival.

Their second message announced that the natives were hostile and the infiltration would be difficult. They requested further assistance, and MONSTED left ^{Darwin} MERAUKE to aid them. His mission was to try and save them but he never returned.

The party was able to carry out a reconnaissance of the island. Shortly afterwards however Capt SHELDON was captured by the enemy. The wireless telegraphy set and rations were seized, and the remaining three members of the party wandered aimlessly through the jungle.

Eventually, weak from lack of food and proper shelter, they were overpowered and taken prisoner by an armed Japanese patrol.

From their prisoners the enemy gathered some important intelligence concerning IASD, "Z" Special Unit, and the general secret intelligence set-up in AUSTRALIA. Captured Japanese documents revealed that Capt SHELDON, Lieut FETUM and Sgt McCANDLISH were taken prisoner. /The fate of Sgt DAHLBERG is not known. It is possible that he was killed when Capt SHELDON was captured, or when the other two were ambushed./

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On 14th December 1942, there were fourteen NEI personnel on Headquarters Staff at "AIRLIE". These were ~~xxxx~~ Lt-Comdr J.J. QUERE, Director; Capt J.J. JANSEN, Wireless Telegraphy Research; two sub-Lieutenants in charge of NEI Naval Administration; one NEI Lieutenant in charge of Army Administration; one sergeant clerk; one sergeant in the wireless telegraphy workshop together with one corporal; five NEI privates who were wireless telegraphy mechanics; and one civilian secretary, Mrs. Penny RICHARDSON.

At DARWIN was one Lieutenant acting as NEI Liaison Officer, one Dutch civilian, H. BODE, in charge of Praus, as well as six Prau-men.

At ZES CAIRNS was Capt VAN ARCKEN in charge of personnel, with an NEI Sergeant Clerk. In addition there was an NEI Corporal wireless telegraphy instructor.

At that time there were four NEI Sergeants and one NEI private in the wireless telegraphy class at "AIRLIE". Awaiting attachment to operational parties at "AIRLIE" were three NEI Lieutenants, two NEI Sergeants and one NEI private. To be posted were one AIF Captain, one AIF Lieutenant, one NEI Sergeant. Awaiting movement at ZES CAIRNS were four NEI Sergeants, one NEI Private, two NEI Sailors and two Dutch Police, as well as six AIF ORs. Engaged in NEI Operations were four NEI Lieutenants, three NEI Sergeants, two NEI Corporals and nine NEI Privates, one NEI Sailor and five Dutch Police, as well as one AIF Captain, three AIF Lieutenants, five AIF Sergeants, and one civilian.

It was on the 1st December 1942, that the Field Intelligence Section of AIB took control of the parties placed in the field by IASD's NEW GUINEA and ISLANDS Section. Thus, at this time, the

only IASD Party operating in the field, other than those of the NEI Section in DUTCH Territory, was the LIZARD Party in PORTUGUESE TIMOR.

Total NEI Personnel, both staff and operational, with IASD at that time numbered seventy-one. Fifty-three of these were either engaged in operations, training for operations, or awaiting operational posting. In addition, Australian personnel of all ranks were engaged in NEI operations.

At that time it was extremely difficult and often impossible to obtain transport for the insertion of IASD parties into their operational areas. With the Japanese directly threatening AUSTRALIA, and the American Forces at that time not in full strength in the SWPA, matters were extremely critical. On top of that was GHQ's inability or ~~unwillingness~~ to grant transport priorities to IASD parties ~~(and the inability of the hard-pressed US Navy to do so.)~~

It may be wondered then how it was that, while so many of IASD's NEW GUINEA projects had to be abandoned because of lack of transport, at least eight of IASD's NEI Parties were able to go into the field.

R.N.N., however, had
The reason was that Admiral COSTER of the ~~NEI Navy in~~ AUSTRALIA placed an old submarine at the disposal of IASD's NEI Section. This solved many difficulties. Admiral COSTER was helpful also in supplying Dutch small craft for NEI projects.

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MACKEREL ?

HMS "K 21" left at 2215 hours on 28 Aug 42, returned 1200 hours on 23 Sep 42.

Party

Capt G.G.M. Van ARCKEN
Sgt ISWAHJOEDI
SCHENAU (joined party 7 Sep 42)
Lt BERGMA
Van KRIMPER

"K 21" left at 1500 hours on 10 Nov 42, returned 0935 hours on 16 Dec 42.

Party

Lt BROCKX (Until 27 Nov 42)
ORNTOENG
Lt BERGMA (Until 30 Nov 42)
SOEPILATOR "
SOETARNO "
SADIMOER " 27 Nov 42

"K 21" left 21 Jan 43, returned 22 Feb 43.

Party

Lt Van der VEUR
Sgt LAPOD (Until 9 Feb 43)
ORNTOENG

NEI SECTION OF IASD.

The Director of IASD's NEI Section was Lt-Commander J.J. QUERE of the Royal Netherlands Navy. In charge of NEI Wireless Telegraphy and Communications was Capt. J. JANSSEN, who arranged communications for the NEI Operational Section and for other IASD parties going into the field, notably those of the NEW GUINEA and ISLANDS Section, until the appointment of Major ISRAEL as IASD's Signals Officer.

(VX87080) Capt. G.G.M. VAN ARCKEN, AIF, was Admin. Officer. He had joined IASD as a civilian in June 1942 for operations in JAVA. A naturalised Australian of Dutch extraction, he was given the rank of temporary Captain in the AIF, and subsequently became IASD's personnel officer for the NEI Section.

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The NEI Section was transferred to Section "C", as the Field Intelligence Section of AIF, when the break-up of IASD occurred. Subsequently it became known as NEFIS under the command of Comdr. BROUWER, and later Col. SPOOR. Difficulties with the NEI Section were in part the cause of the disruption of IASD. Section "C" had no funds, no stores, no facilities. It had no NEI Section or personnel. Consequently Lt-Comdr. QUERE undertook field intelligence work for "C" Section. This led to uncertainty concerning the status of parties going into Dutch territory. Were they Section "A" (Special Operations) or were they Section "C"? Were they IASD or Field Intelligence parties?

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Page 2/.....

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Planning commenced in October 1942, and basic and party training was carried out at ZES CAIRNS.

Additional to the party members was a sub-Lieutenant BAINTS RNN. He was found unsuitable and it was recommended that he be not taken, so he was returned to the RNN.

Training completed, the party was fully equipped with stores and wireless telegraphy - sufficient to last for a long period - and awaiting on movement from CAIRNS. Then the inevitable delay occurred. No transport was available. Insertion was planned by submarine, and efforts were made to have one allotted from the NEI Navy or from the US submarine section. All these efforts were unavailing. When the NEI Section was transferred to GHQ, the project was abandoned.

WHITING.

Sgt STAVERMAN, A/Sgt SIFFLEET,
H. PATTIWAEL, RAHARING +
Cpl D. TOPMAN.

On 21 Jan 43, The party was
flown into Bema Bema with Capt
FRYER + The other members of LOCUST
Party, whose instructions were to lead the
Dutch party until it was obvious that that party
could get to the Dutch territory.
On 1 Feb 43 TOPMAN was returned
to Aust from LEYALUM.

Capt FRYER led the party as far as
LUMI, near Aitape, where he left them on
23 Jan 43 to carry out a project of
his own. He had dispatched them with
guides + carriers along a route North of
the BIWANI Mts into an area
previously mapped by A.P.C. They
established a base at WOMA (near
~~Aitape~~) for supply drops.
AINBAI

Inland from VANIMO on 4 Oct 43,
the party was ambushed by a Jap
patrol, led by Malay-speaking
• natives of PAGI. STAVERMAN
was killed, but PATTIWAEEL
(some say med. officer & surgeon SIFFLEET + RAHARIN4)
escaped back to base; SIFFLEET
destroyed the W/T set & the three
remaining members retreated along the
• route of access & were captured
breachlessly at WANTIPI by
natives of the WAPI tribe & taken
to AITAPE, where they were
accounted.

Reasons for disaster:—

(a) Over-confident.

(b) Too trusting of the natives.

They believed the natives were on their side, & hence made no efforts to deceive — was to the point of retreating along their mark of access.

(c) Destruction of WIT ret.

Had Siffleet not destroyed the ret, FROGER would have been able to arrange a safe R.V. to evacuate the party.

(d) Base camp at WOMA in exposed position. A hidden WIT base about five miles from use as a retreat & to do more for transmitting at night would have benefitted the party.

SIFFLEET

— a photograph of

- SIFFLEET's execution,
taken by a Jap, was
captured in Hollandia.
It was featured in LIFE.

- GS Int, LHQ, would be
able to supply a

copy

NOMINAL ROLL

Lieut-Comdr J.J. QUERE - Director.

Capt J.J. JANSSEN - W/T and Communications.

WOLFE

Der BOER

Lt W.L. VAN DER VEUS

Lt A. de JONG

Capt F. VAN DER VEEN

S/Lt A.C. BERENDSEN

LT TER POORTEN

Seaman BAERT

Sgt BEEREN

ISWAHJOEDI WIRJOMIHARDJO RADEN

VX 87080 Capt G.G.M. VAN ARCKEN - Personnel Officer

Van AAREM

F. BUMAN

SCHENAU

W. BERGSMA

J. VAN KRIMPEN

Lt H.P. NYGH

J. TAPILATU

B.J. MANUPUTTY

VX 130237 Capt C.R. SHELDON

N.P. MONSTED

VX 80269 Sgt J. McCANDLISH

VX 35092 Sgt J.H. DAHLBERG

NOLANA ACHMED

J.F. BASTIAANS

BLOCK

POENCETEN

BRINK

D.J. BUS DE VALEPNE

B. BROEX

R. TH. HEES

J.A. BRANDON

IASD'S NEISECTION. NOMINAL ROLL. 2.

B. BELLANI

Groeneveld

H. LUMINGKEWAS

Lt JONG

KABOEROEAN

LAPDD

A. LUMINGKEWAS

TAMBAJONG

K. MEYNDERTS

ETJE

OVERWEEL

WIAGIAWARI

RAHARING

de PLOEG

PRINS

SGT H.N. STAVERMAN

SWART

Lt J. TAHIJA

PANGARIBOEAN

TOL

PATTIWAEL (MARSH) (N 4914)

RAHANNA

J. ZWALF

HETHARIA

LARAT MASEH

MALAWAIN

~~MAT TAMA TIWEN~~

RERING

~~WATNATAE~~ WATRATAN

PATTIWAEL H. (Police Officer)

SADIMOEN

~~xxxxxx~~ R. GOUT

F. de KOK

SOETANNO

D.J. TOPMAN

*Majr Berts (NEFIS III)
Catt Van de Veer.*

OENTOENG

K.G. MICHELSEN

DAVIDS

TAZELAAR

PITOI

RAJAAN

JEJANAAU

SABAT

ABDULMALIK

KAWENGIAN. L.

KOEKOEH

B.H.A. BERRHITOE

G. de LANG

VX44818 Capt W.T. JINKINS

VX44257 Lt J.J. ELLIS

VX102447 Sgt A.J. RUDWICK

VX68297 Cpl G. CHITTLEBOROUGH

VX45931 Sgt A. CHEW

K. De PRIMLEE

N. LANCELOT

TJOKROHARDJA

W. WATTIMURY

Seaman E.W.L. IDZARDHI

Sgt/Maj N. VRYENS

Sgt K.V. NUISSENBURG

Brig L. NOUKES

Pte SOEPARDI

Pte SRINOJO

Sgt D.L. SCHNAM

Sgt PONDEN

LENGKONG

DEY

LATUHERU

PARIAMI

TJOEKA

BAINTS

SECTEUR RECONNAISSANCE DEPT.

SAKOEM (Jay Inf I.)

Sgt II PEJOH

Sgt L.G. SIFFLEET

LOMPOLIOW (Men Inf I)

PATTIWAEI (Men Sold)

SUNDELANGI (Men Sold)

BERE MAAL (Tim Sold)

Brig BROUWER

Brig ARROO

Sgt BRODIL

REINTJENS, P.F. (Mil Sold)

MANUKILEJ (Amb Corps)

KOELILKOE (Tim Inf)

Sgt MAIGNET

Sgt SIMON

Sgt BRUYN

GEVELHOF (Inf I)

W.G. REINTJES (Eus fus)

LEWAHEBESS

TEHURUPUN

SOEWARNO

MILOEN

SOEJITNOH

* BRANDELER VAN DER, J.H.R. (Capt)

A.J. ABDOO (Pte)

Lt L. de HAAN BIERENS

Sgt G.J. KRALEENBOS

Admiral COSTER.

Mr VAN DER PLAS

Dr VAN MOCK



TELEPHONES:
LA 1537-8

SERVICES RECONNAISSANCE DEPARTMENT

39 *Adland Street*

South Yarra
S.E. 1

No. H/73

9 May 194⁵

Mr. G.C.M. Van Arcken,
553 St Kilda Rd,
MELBOURNE.

Dear Mr Van Arcken,

This letter is to introduce Sgt D.J. Fennessy, who last year was appointed Official Historian to ~~my~~ ^{this} organisation.

Sgt Fennessy is endeavouring to bring the records up-to-date from our earliest beginnings in Colonel Mott's time.

As a great deal of material on all aspects of IASD's NEI Section is not now available and as you were Personnel Officer for the Section, it is thought that you may possibly be able to help Sgt Fennessy to reconstruct the details of those past events.

In order that you may feel free to discuss these matters with Sgt Fennessy, you are hereby exonerated from all security obligations for the purposes of his interview with you.

With kindest regards

Yours faithfully,

A. E. Goldhamer

Lieut-Colonel.

HISTORY OF SOA

BOOK II.

OPERATIONS

Chapter

NEI SECTION

of

IASD.

NEI Section of IASD. Page 1.

An important operational section of IASD was the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES Section. Director was Lt-Commander J.J. QUEKE of the NEI Naval Forces in AUSTRALIA. In charge of NEI Wireless Telegraphy and Communications was Capt J. JANSSEN, who as well as arranging communications for the NEI Operational sections, also handled those of other ISD parties going into the field, notably those of the NEW GUINEA and ISLANDS Section.

Capt G.C.M. VAN ARCKEN AIF was Personnel Officer. He had joined IASD as a civilian in JUNE 1942 for operations in JAVA. A naturalised AUSTRALIAN of DUTCH extraction, he was given the rank of temporary captain in the AIF, and subsequently became IASD's personnel officer for the NEI Section.

The importance of IASD's NEI Section can be gauged from a comparative study of the personnel numbers. At MELBOURNE HQ there were forty AUSTRALIANS on the staff as compared with eighteen DUTCH subjects. Operational personnel totalled eighty. Of these twenty-seven were ~~XXXX~~ AUSTRALIAN, fifty-three DUTCH. With guards, orderlies etc, IASD had in December 1942 a total strength of two hundred and three.

Nine operations were planned by the NEI Section. These covered HOLLANDIA, DUTCH NEW GUINEA, AMBON, JAVA, CELEBES and the AROE ISLANDS. Most of them were tragic disasters.

Little is known now of the NEI SECTION. It was transferred to Section "C", the Field Intelligence Section of AIF, when the break-up with GHQ occurred. It was difficulties with the NEI Section, in fact, that was in great measure the cause of the disruption of IASD. Section "C" had no funds, no stores, no facilities. It had no NEI Section or personnel.

Consequently Lt-Comdr QUERE was forced to take on this work. This led to unending friction with GHQ concerning the status of parties going into DUTCH territory. Were the Section "A" (Special Operations) or were they Section "C" ? Were they IASD or Field Intelligence parties ?

When IASD was broken up, the NEI Section was passed to Field Intelligence, and SRD subsequently had no control over these operations. A primary cause of the dispute was the provision of funds between IASD and the NEI Section, which at that time was part of IASD. An equitable division was impossible, and the NEI Section received fifty percent of the IASD allotment at the behest of GHQ.

All papers relating to the NEI Section's IASD Operations went with the Section to GHQ. Consequently when the History of IASD came to be written there were no records available, and few persons available with SRD who had any knowledge of the NEI Section.

Of the nine operations, the names of the operatives who took part in only four is known. Of ~~thxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ other operations little is ~~xxxx~~ known other than the area, the number of operatives and their nationality. Whether their missions were successful or not is not known. Efforts are being made to locate the missing records, via AIB and Lt Comdr QUERE, and is hoped that these will prove successful.

OPERATIONS

HOLLANDIA - 21 A. This party was composed of one DUTCH Sergeant, one AUSTRALIAN Sergeant and two INDONESIANS.

They were:- Sgt STAVERMAN N.R.I.

Sgt L.C. SIFFLETT A.I.F.

PANALI and

RAHALIN, both INDONESIANS.

Early in 1943 Sgt SIFFLETT entered the territory by Naval Flying Boat to KUVANMAS on the Upper SEPIK River. The party was located generally in the AITAPE Area, NEW GUINEA.

Function was to carry out propaganda and Fifth Column work amongst the KANAKAS and natives in EAST and WEST NEW GUINEA.

Supplies for five months were brought in. Arms included two LMGs, two rifles, four pistols, two hunting rifles and one automatic rifle.

In the subsequent two months aircraft sorties were made on three occasions. As requested by W/T food and medical supplies were dropped.

Communications consisted of one long wave and one short wave W/T set. Contact was made with HQ twice daily. In an emergency the party was to head towards the SEPIK ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ River to rejoin the AUSTRALIAN Army, first destroying all W/T equipment.

On the 12th OCTOBER 1942, Sgt SIFFLETT left SYDNEY by ship, disembarked at MORESBY, stayed there for two months, left there by Flying Boat and landed at KUVANMAS.

On arrival he headed SW to YAMBI YAMBI, where he joined Sgt STAVERMAN and the two INDONESIANS. After hiking overland and using

native canoes the party arrived at KU seven days later. A night was spent at DOMUEI, the next at SOWABAKU, the following night at KLAFLER. They remained overnight at NAMBLO, the next day arriving at another larger village where they slept that night. Next day they reached BALLA, and the following week they spent at MAI MAI, seventy kilometers SOUTH of AITAPE. Two nights were spent at YEMERAVA and WAMIL, one night at ANGUGUNAK. Then they remained a week at LUMI. A night then was spent at KENAKERE KARAITEN and POKOPUREI. The following three nights were spent at WARUSORE, PO and FIRM. Spending the night at other villages, they went on their way, passing through MORUWU and AIRO and DORUMO.

Then the party halted for two months in the jungle not far from AINBAI, twenty-five kilometers SOUTH of VANIMO. It was here that the three aircraft drops were made to them.

Sgt STAVERMAN left AINBAI with PAWALI, and the two headed WEST to DUTCH NEW GUINEA to carry out an intelligence reconnaissance and to endeavour to recruit the natives to the Allied cause.

Forty-five kilometers SOUTH of HOLLANDIA, Sgt STAVERMAN learnt from the Chief of ARSO, that the JAPANESE had learnt of his party's presence, and that the enemy had organised a punitive expedition at HOLLANDIA Lof C HQ. SOUTH of NEMO Village, fifty-five kilometers SOUTH of HOLLANDIA and ten kilometers SOUTH of SKCSAI, Sgt STAVERMAN and PAWALI were surprised by and enemy ambush. STAVERMAN was killed. PAWALI escaped and made his way back to SIFFLEET.

Shortly afterwards SIFFLEET was taken prisoner by the JAPANESE. The enemy obtained a statement from him, gained intelligence on IASD.

NEI Section of IASD.

OPERATIONS

SCRAPPER: This party was made up of two NEI Sergeants. Their names and mission are not known. On the ~~14th~~ 14th DECEMBER 1942, they were at LMS DARWIN awaiting movement.

FLUNDER: This was completely an NEI operation. There were eight party members all NEI - one lieutenant, one corporal, one sailor and five police. Their area of operations was AMBON. Leader was Lt NYOME N.E.I. He, and a party of six, were ~~not~~ captured near the JAPANESE Post of AMAHAI on AMBON early in 1943, shortly after being inserted by an AMERICAN submarine.

AMBON - 23 A2: This was an all-AUSTRALIAN party for operations in AMBON. There were five operatives. Leader was Capt W.T. JENKINS A.I.F. Others were Sgt A.J. RUDWICK, Sgt A. CHEW, Cpl G. CHITTLEBOROUGH. Nothing further is known of this party.

KANDARI 26: There were three party members for this operation, which was planned against the important town of KANDARI in the CELEBES. One was an NEI Lieutenant, the others NEI Privates. Nothing further is known.

JAVA: Two operations were planned for JAVA. These were known as "JAVA 4" and "JAVA 5". The composition of each was one NEI Lieutenant, two NEI privates. It is possible that other projects were also planned for JAVA, but of these there is no record.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA: Known as "WISSELMEREN", an operation was planned to take place in the WISSEL Lakes area of Dutch New Guinea. Operatives were two NEI privates. Nothing further is known.

AROE Islands - 210: This was an Australian party with five operatives. The Leader was Capt C.R. SHELDON. He had lived in these Islands for years, and he had made numerous enemies amongst the pro-Axis natives. To choose a man without friends amongst the native population was the first blunder in this disastrous operation.

The other party members were Lt R.W. FREEMAN, Lt I.A. McMILLAN KERR, Sgt J McCANDLISH and N.P. MONSTED of Danish Nationality who was employed as a civilian operative.

Leaving towards the end of 1942, the party was stationed first in DARWIN. Lt KERR and Sgt McCANDLISH proceeded then to MERAUKE awaiting on movement to the islands. Subsequently Lt KERR contracted black water fever and was, after some delay and indecision by the DUTCH, evacuated to AUSTRALIA.

The remainder of the party left MERAUKE by boat - a powered and sailing vessel of about eighteen tons. Passing through the KAI Islands, they reached the AROE Group and landed on PENAMPONGLAI Island. From here they sent a signal announcing their safe arrival.

The purpose of the operation was to investigate native conditions in the Aroe Islands. Their communications with IASD were by W/T via L.M.S. DARWIN.

Their second message announced that the natives were hostile and that infiltration would be difficult. They requested further assistance, but this was never granted.

The party was able to carry out a reconnaissance of the island. Shortly afterwards however Captain SHELDON was captured by the enemy.

The W/T set and rations were seized, and the remaining three members of the party wandered aimlessly through the jungle.

Eventually, weak from lack of food and proper shelter, they were overpowered and taken prisoner by an armed JAPANESE patrol.

From their prisoners the enemy gathered some important intelligence concerning IASD, "Z" Special Unit, and the general secret intelligence set-up in AUSTRALIA.

On 14th DECEMBER 1942, there were fourteen NEI personnel on Headquarters Staff at "AIRLIE". These were Lt Comdr QUERE, Director; Capt JANSEN, W/T Research; 10 Sub-lieutenants in charge of NEI Naval Administration; one NEI Lieutenant in charge of Army Administration; one sergeant clerk; one sergeant in the W/T Workshop, together with one corporal; five NEI privates who were W/T mechanics, and one civilian secretary.

At DARWIN was one Lieutenant acting as NEI NEI Liaison Officer, one Dutch civilian, H. BOER, in charge of Prons, as well as six Prau-men.

At ZES CAIRNS was Capt VAN ARCHEVEN in charge of personnel, with an NEI Sergeant Clerk. In addition there was an NEI Corporal W/T Instructor.

At that time there were four N.E.I. Sergeants and one N.E.I. Private in the W/T Class at "AIRLIE". Awaiting attachment to operational parties at "AIRLIE" were three N.E.I. Lieutenants, two N.E.I. Sergeants and one N.E.I. Private. To be posted were one A.I.F. Captain, one A.I.F. Lieutenant, one N.E.I. Sergeant. Awaiting movement at ZES CAIRNS were four N.E.I. Sergeants, one N.E.I. Private, two N.E.I. Sailors and two DUTCH Police, as well as six AIF ORs.

Engaged in N.E.I. Operations were four N.E.I. Lieutenants, three N.E.I. Sergeants, two N.E.I. Corporals and nine N.E.I. Privates, one N.E.I. Sailor and five DUTCH Police, as well as one A.I.F. Captain, three A.I.F. Lieutenants, five A.I.F. Sergeants, and one civilian.

It was on the 1st DECEMBER 1942, that the Field Intelligence Section of AIB took control of the parties placed in the field by IASD's NEW GUINEA and ISLANDS Section. This, at this time, the only ~~xxxxx~~ IASD Party operating in the field, other than those of the NEI Section in DUTCH Territory, was the LIZARD Party in PORTUGUESE TIMOR.

Total N.E.I. personnel, both staff and operational, with IASD at that time numbered seventy-one. Fifty-three of these were either engaged in operations, training for operations, or awaiting operational posting. In addition, AUSTRALIAN personnel of all ranks were engaged in N.E.I. operations.

At that time it was extremely difficult and often impossible to obtain transport for the insertion of IASD parties into their operational areas. With the JAPANESE directly threatening AUSTRALIA, and the AMERICAN Forces at that time not in full strength in the SWPA, matters were extremely critical. On top of that was GHQ's inability or unwillingness to grant transport priorities to IASD parties and the inability of the hard-pressed US Navy to do so.

It may be wondered then how it was that, while so many of IASD's NEW GUINEA projects had to be abandoned because of lack of transport, at least nine of IASD's NEI Parties were able to go into the field.

NEI Section of IASD. Page 9.

The reason was that Admiral COSTER of the NEI Navy in AUSTRALIA placed an old submarine at the disposal of IASD's NEI Section. This solved many difficulties. Admiral COSTER was helpful also in supplying DUTCH small craft for NEI projects.

TOP SECRET

Western Base

9th May, 1945

To : War Diary Historian
From : Major W.L. Jenkins, MBE
Subject: War Diary Data

Complying with your request when last in Melbourne for information regarding I.S.D.

Attached is the copy of the AMBON Project for which I and my party mentioned were brought into the unit I.S.D.

Use what is necessary and return the copy to Major Budge.

It should not be necessary to write any details regarding this plan but only outlines and dates.

This plan is now U.S. but should not be discussed or made known to any other person other than Major Budge.

W.L. Jenkins
Major

Project 23 - (A-2) Ambush.

Planned in Oct 1942, The first draft plan for this project was drawn up on 20.10.42.

Personnel were listed tentatively as Maj Jenkins (Ldr), Baints (a Dutch name S/Lt), Sgt A. Bides, S/Lt B Littlebrough, & one Indonesian native. Sgts Rudenish & Dahlberg were to be held in reserve.

Intention was to organize 5th column activity in preparation for allied attack, & to carry out sabotage against military installations, stores, equipment & personnel.

Entry was planned to take place at either Nakor or Seri.

Stores & equipment & limits, ^{on a basis of the equipment of 4 men for 3 months} were to be drawn up by Maj Jenkins in conjunction with Lt/Lieut. A. L. Oldham & Maj A. R. Hawkey. Food stores were to be packed so that they could easily be divided into one lot for one month, & one lot for 2 months, making 3 months in all. All stores were to be assembled at Mullu, including 4th stores.

Estimated time of departure was early in Dec 42.

One I.S.D. & one A.T.R.F. left with me, the
the others. Sig procedures were to be arranged by
Lt Col. T. J. Quares & Maj. S. S. Jones. Until
until the war was over. Cpl. Chittibong, the party's
signaller, was to go on in the field.

• Lt Col. Adair was to arrange code.
NEI files & other things, & Top guidelines, if
available, were to be taken.

The party with the exception of Maj. Tinkins &
Cpl. Chittibong, were to proceed to Cairns on
21.10.42. Maj. Tinkins was to follow on 22.10.42.

• The success of the enterprise depended upon the ability
of the leader to achieve the maximum support from the native
population in forming a fifth column. Therefore a complete
knowledge of the Indian habits & living in regard to its
habits was necessary. Maj. T. did not possess this
knowledge. Therefore it was ^{essential} necessary to include in the party a
Malay speaking ^{British} Indian who had the knowledge, ~~was~~

Maj. T. had - for knowledge of the area's native customs, &
of Top. facts & the habits living in a POW in that area.
He had reliable native contacts, but very little knowledge of
Dutch habits.

(3)
S/Lt Barnes did not have the necessary exp'ts,
but had no previous experience in the area. It was
recommended that he be replaced by a more suitable man.

Lt J. J. Ellis had no expert technical knowledge
of explosives + field craft, was reliable + determined.

Pte Chao was dark complexioned, flat nose, + had
often been mistaken for a native. He has been POW
with Japans in the area, + had a good knowledge of
the local life + customs, was a good Malay speaker,
determined + reliable.

Sgt Redburn had a good knowledge of explosives +
field craft, a determined + energetic worker, a working
knowledge of Morse + signal procedure. He had had no
previous experience of natives in the type of country.

Pte Dodd Dalling - fair knowledge of explosives. Had
served in Middle East, but not in the NE I.

Pte Mataponti - a native of PERU or CERAM.
In 20 years had visited Celebes 5 times. He last
visited in 1938, + so he had very little local knowledge.
He was a good swimmer, spoke Dutch, Malay + English.
He had had 20 years naval experience.

In addition, a native with good local knowledge & contacts in the area was required. The native could be added in 2 ways. ~~1st~~ A native with these qualifications & already in the area could be selected. Or Lt H.P. Nyffe, leader of another party going into Antm, could send natives to meet for Fry, & one of them could be included in the party either after a period of Fry or also included immediately in the party.

Thus the party need 80 + more members, sufficient to permit continued watch on the WIT station & still allow free movement, remaining small enough to avoid detection.

TOP SECRET

G/8/85

11th May 1945

To : ~~War Diary~~ Historian
From : C.O., S.R.D., Western Base

Subject: War Diary Data

Herewith for information copy of a report submitted
by Major W.L. Jenkins.

Admiral

Encl

SECRET

G/8/83

10th May, 1945

FILE

To : G 2 Ops (Rear)

From : C.O., S.R.D., Western Base

Subject: Project 23 A - 2

In accordance with arrangements made between you and Major Jenkins whilst the latter was in Melbourne recently, herewith documents concerning the abovementioned project.

Edwin Hanna
ma

Encl

SECRET

Western Base

8th May, 1945

To : Major Budge, G 2 Ops (Rear)

From : Major W.L. Jenkins, MBE

Subject : Project 23 A-2

Attached find copy of abovementioned project compiled by me in 1942.

I have recently learned that no knowledge is available of the days of 1 S.D. and I therefore forward this precis for your edification and action if still feasible. Any project anticipated in this area would be gladly carried out by myself and members of my party with local knowledge.

A copy of this project has been forwarded to the War Diary Historian and will be returned to you after use.

W.L. Jenkins
Major 31

APPRECIATION OF PROJECT 23. A - 2.--

At Cairns

9 Nov 42

by 274

This appreciation has been made after careful consideration and discussion with 108 and 207.

OBJECT : - To ensure the most effective action by A - 2 party and any anti-Japanese element in AMBOINA.

INFORMATION Enemy. Japanese garrison of 1500 naval personnel of which main body is believed to be in the vicinity of the town on the SOUTH portion of the Island.

- (a) Japanese soldiers believed to be living with native women in several important villages.
- (b) Japanese occupation believed to be limited to island of Amboina and one or two coastal villages on Deram only. NO actual occupation on Haroekoe, Saparoea, Bulu, these areas area visited by by patrols.
- (c) Native coast watchers have been forced to carry on with this task or reprisals taken against families.
- (d) Many former Govt servants have taken up former vocation.
- (e) Boeganese natives are formed into bands to hunt and capture Europeans and Anti-Jap personnel on a per head basis dead or alive.
- (f) Boeganese natives (former coolies and servants to Christian natives) are now in charge of Christian native labor gangs.
- (g) Mohammedan natives have been given responsible positions.
- (h) Ambon harbour is used extensively for both ships of war and merchant vessels. All ships take on water at wharves.
- (i) Aerodrome at Laha has been increased in size, 'drome at Liang believed to be finished and in use.
- (j) Seaplane base at Halong still in use.
- (k) At least one W/T station in town of Ambon and one at Laha.
- (l) Japanese using normal water and electric supply of town.
- (m) NO definite information to confirm the rumour that POW's have been removed from island. Last definite information was - increased vigilance on POW camp.
- (n) A POW Camp has been established at Boela North coast of Ceram.

CONCLUSIONS FROM INTELLIGENCE SUPPLIED.

The garrison on island would appear to be sufficient for the purpose of garrison, maintenance of both aerodromes, sea plane base, W/T stations, harbour, etc. The practice of one or more Jap soldiers living with the native women ensures a good intelligence service in the surrounding villages. Mention of patrols around the coast and surrounding islands would appear to be by float plane or MLC with 20 or 30 men at the most. Native coast watchers forced to work under threat to families may be difficult to corrupt. Boeganese natives appear to be Pro-Jap, also may be difficult to corrupt. Mohammedans appear to be working for personal gains, these natives had Anti-Dutch ideas prior to the Jap occupation, conditions may have changed these ideas, probably person paying the most money, will win their support, further first hand information would be required about this class of native.

The treatment toward Christian natives appears the worst and it therefore can be assumed that some reliable contacts may be possible amongst this class. The employment of half caste personnel in their former civil positions appears that these people have been forced to take these positions with similar threats to families etc., As these people were classed as Datchmen they have much more to lose than any of the remainder of the population, they have shown a tendency to help the Allies when the opportunity arose, it therefore could safely be assumed that these people will form a reliable source of information if they can be assured of complete secrecy and even may be willing to help physically.

The remainder of information regarding enemy installations shipping etc. offers a very good target for an energative S.O. party.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECT

1. The object of this operation can be divided into two distinct sections each of which can be considered as a separate entirety or jointly.
 - (A) A carefully organized fifth column activity in preparation for an allied attack.
 - (B) Sabotage against military installations stores, equipment and personnel.
2. Should para B be accepted as the object of this party the results, in consideration of the targets offering (submitted by 274 and to 107), should be fairly great but would be achievable only over a limited period because of reprisal measures which may be taken against the native population, the knowledge to the enemy of the suspected existence of a party will also prevent native co-operation and will increase the vigilance of the Japs in this and other areas. This should not affect the initial landing, hiding etc, of the party but will seriously affect any subsequent party attempting to operate in this area. This may also cause complications to A - 1 party. A task of this type to be a success, without jeopardizing any later parties or parties already established, should be made by a separate commando party raised and trained for the purpose and should NOT have to rely upon local support or hiding.
3. Task A is of an entirely different nature and probably the most important factor governing its complete success after landing and establishing a base, is the time factor.

The native population in this area are NOT very far sighted and it is estimated that they will take between 5 to 6 months to work up to a peak into a powerful fifth column organization with a spirit to resist continually, the willingness to revolt, guide and assist an attacking Allied force.

It is also estimated that the period of enthusiasm will NOT be able to be maintained for a longer period than eight weeks after this peak has been reached. Therefore the time of commencing should be closely considered together with the policy of SWP.

The start time for the task 'A' should therefore be 5 or 6 months prior to the estimated time of an Allied attack in this area and as much as possible should NOT exceed a total period of 8 months.

Initial preparations for task 'A' in this area will need to be based generally on the lines necessary for resistance in the Allied offensive, therefore certain knowledge of the proposed plan, time, type and nature of this operation will need to be made known to the leader of the party prior to leaving and implemented by periodical Sitreps and forecasts.

Organization of task 'A' will also necessarily have to be in complete accord with the Govt policy of the Dutch colonies.

Therefore the inclusion in the party of a man capable of advice and a good organizing ability is essential. This will be further dealt with in the discussion of Composition of party.

4. TASK 'A' & 'B' - Should the sub headings of the object be considered jointly, results from Task 'B' would be entirely governed by the operation and progress of task 'A'.

As Task 'B' considered independantly will only produce a certain result over a limited period. The results produced whilst operating together with Task 'A' over a much longer period and only used against major targets until such time as a complete S.O. could take place just prior to an Allied attack, would serve as a much more valuable weapon against the enemy and also help to achieve task 'A' in comparison to an operation carried ou entirely on the lines of Task 'B' which may prevent any subsequent operations off this nature in this and other areas.

Therefore the object of this party should be read as a complete object with priorities as to task governed by the leader after consideration with the Dutch member.

AREA OF INITIAL OPERATIONS

5. The nature of this enterprise is such that NO knowledge of its operational base be known to any native, outside of the party or previously recommended as a guide or assistant from some reliable source, this being so it is necessary to make sure the initial landing, hide outs W/T station etc., in unoccupied areas and undetected by natives or Japs.

The areas open to choose from are :

- (a) SOUTH portion of the island of AMBOINA
- (b) NORTH portion of the island of AMBOINA
- (c) Island of CERAM
- (d) Island of HAROEKOE
- (e) Island of SAPAROEIA

(a) Has an area of approx 35 sq miles and a population of approx 8,000 of which 1500 are Japs. There are a number of places in the hills of this area where it is possible to hide out indefinitely but any one of these points is less than 3 hours walk from the town of Ambon. An undetected landing on the coast of this area would be very difficult to achieve owing to the closeness of villages around the coast line, also possible coast watchers.

On the other hand this area offers the most practicable targets and operations will be mostly carried out from this area. It is therefore necessary to obtain the native co-operation and trust prior to using this area as a base, unless later intelligence information proves this available from the initial stages. Consequently this cannot be the original landing and hide out area.

(b) This area is approx three times as large as (a) and is much more mountainous type of area, has many more areas suitable for hide outs, the coast line is NOT as thickly populated and therefore more suitable for landing and hiding. On the other hand to carry out operations on or near the town it will be necessary to cross the bay. This is a decided disadvantage but NOT as great as disadvantages of travel across water as offered in areas (c), (d), and (e).

(c) This area is many more times greater than either (a) or (b) it has a much less population per sq mile than any other area in the vicinity, it therefore offers most scope for undetected landing and greater security for W/T station and hide outs.

The distances to travel by sea to reach either (a) or (b) from (c) are rather great, this may prove a decided disadvantage to the party and would delay the commencement of operations appreciably. Working from this area may cause a miss on a major target and also increases the risk of detection whilst in transit over large distance. The importance of establishing the party prior to beginning operations would give this area a decided advantage over (a) but NOT (b).

(d) This island is rather small, is NOT as far from (a) or (b) as (c), but does NOT appear to offer the advantages of (b) or (c). Reconnaissance would be necessary to confirm this belief.

(e) This island is a little larger than (d) but almost as far away from (a) or (b) as (c) and appears to be in a very suitable category as (d).
Recce is again necessary to confirm this belief.

6.

As each of these summaries is made from a map and very little first hand knowledge of a recent origin, nor is any available, it is essential that a recce is made for a possible landing area and also for alternate hide out areas prior to attempting an entry. As there will be a party already established and operating in the area which will have a good knowledge of the area, native feeling, possible native contacts and enemy activity in the area. The services of this party should be availed of to carry out the necessary recces and give a report on suggested landing places for the A - 2 party. This will have a decided advantage in the saving of time, may save the new party from detection and avoid causing possible alarm or suspicion and will also assist in the success of the initial stages of the enterprise. Therefore the selection of a suitable and alternate landing area, suggested hide out and W/T station areas in (a) (b) (c) (d) or (e) respectively, and NOT given until opportunity has allowed recce to be made on (a) (b) and (c) at least, should be left in the hands of 207 after being given the necessary details of requirements. As the establishment of this party (A - 1) will take some time and the first anticipated report some weeks after establishment, the departure of A 2 party should be delayed accordingly even to the extent of allowing a minimum period of operation in the area of 5 months.

COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY :-

7.

The success of this enterprise depends upon the ability of the leader to achieve the maximum support from the native population in forming a fifth column. Therefore a complete knowledge of the Dutch Govt's policy in regards to its colonies is necessary. This knowledge is NOT possessed by the leader. Therefore the inclusion of a Dutch man with this knowledge and the ability to speak Malay is essential. On the other hand a Dutchman who has NO knowledge of native habits, customs and beliefs in the area, nor an immediate local knowledge would be a decided disadvantage to the party. It is therefore considered essential that a Dutchman with the above qualifications should be included. An added advantage to a man of this type would be a dark complexion, flat nose, the ability to walk around in front of both Japs and natives, in native dress and avoid detection. A command of the local native tongue used in this particular area, NOT necessarily Malay.

This type of man is procurable and should be made available to help achieve the maximum of success. An enterprise of this type requires a great deal of determination and a spirit that remains high under the worst of conditions. It is necessary that each member has these qualifications.

No 1

The leader has a fair knowledge of the area, native customs, has a knowledge of Jap troops and habits having been a POW in their hands in this area, has several native contacts who can be relied upon, has very little knowledge of the Dutch policy (only that acquired from Dutch civil servants whilst travelling through Dutch territory) this may be improved with tuition from some source.

- No 2 Sub Lieut BAINTS - This man has NOT the necessary requirements as shown above, has NOT had any experience in this area and should be replaced by a more suitable member.
- No 3 Lieut ELLIS - Has an expert technical knowledge of explosives, field craft, etc., is very reliable and has the necessary determination.
- No 4 Pte CHEW - Has a very dark complexion, flat nose, has been mistaken for a native on more than one occasion was a POW with the leader, has as good a local knowledge of the topography, customs and can speak the language fairly well, has also the determination required.
- No 5 Sgt RUDWICK - Has a very good knowledge of explosives field craft etc., is very determined and a very energetic worker, has a fair knowledge of Morse and signals etc. he has NOT had any previous experience of natives or the type of country.
- No 6 Pte DAHLBERG - Has a fair knowledge of explosives has seen action in the Middle East, is very determined has had NO experience in N E I.
- No 7 Native MATAPOUTI - Is a native of PERU on CERAM, has only visited home 5 times in the past 20 yrs was last in PERU in 1938, therefore would have very little local knowledge. On the other hand he is a very good swimmer, speaks Dutch as well as his native language also speaks English fairly well, is a very reliable, has had 20 yrs experience in the navy has now acquired a knowledge of explosives, would be quite capable of entering enemy held territory without detection, he fits in very well with the remainder of the party.
- No 8 A native with a good local knowledge and possible contacts in the area would be a decided advantage to the party. This could be achieved in two ways.
 (a) The Selection of a native with these qualifications already in Australia.
 (b) The inclusion in the party of one or two natives selected and sent to Aust by 207 to be trained and made familiar with the party and training, or the inclusion immediately on arrival in the area of these natives selected by 207.

The total number of members of the party should be large enough to allow continued watch on W/T station and still allow free movement, possible exchange of personnel, should be sufficient to carry out two tasks at the same time with little trouble and yet to be small enough to avoid detection. Therefore the number anticipated to carry out the object is estimated at 8 or 9 all ranks, and should consist of the following :-

- No 1 The leader. Capt JINKINS
 No 2 A suitable Dutchman. NOT BAINTS.
 No 3 Lieut ELLIS.
 No 4 Pte CHEW
 No 5 Sgt RUDWICK.
 No 7 Native MATAPOUTI.
 No 8 Native ?
 No 6 Pte DAHLBERG or Native.

An essential detail of this party will be the availability of a reliable reserve, one with a knowledge of what is required and also known to the members of the party.

No 6 Pte DAHLBERG has the necessary qualifications for this requirement and should be kept as a reserve for this party. But without any knowledge of operation or area of operation.

Should any further increase in the number of the personnel of this party be considered necessary Pte Dahlberg should be selected and another reserve member trained for the position of reserve member.

SECURITY

In the past security measures have NOT been adhered to as desired. This project has possibilities of developing into a large enterprise. At least nine persons outside of the party and only one other member beside the leader know of the area of operation. It will therefore be necessary to take adequate steps to make sure that date and mode of departure, actual destination and any other details are known to as few persons as possible. This could be done by moving party away from school area on completion of training and leave.

MAINTENANCE

FIELD This will be carried out by the party members. The addition of an Alsatian bitch to help in this direction to ensure protection at night and prevent natives prying into hide out areas, would be of invaluable assistance. I therefore recommend that a dog of this type be included.

REAR This enterprise will be entirely dependant upon supplies and support being available at all times during operations. This could be assisted greatly by the establishment of one or two persons being joined on to the maintenance unit of the enterprise and could include the reserve member.

The setting up of a task force, such as 3 Flying Fortresses, B 17 E, to operate over this and surrounding areas as targets are available and necessary. This would enable aerial demonstrations to be given for all parties operating, within range of base, in the N.E.I. (Hudsons are NOT suitable for this purpose)

PLAN AND FORECAST OF EVENTS

from APPRECIATION OF PROJECT 23 A-2

by 274

CAIRNS. 9 NOV 42

1. Finish school syllabus.
2. Commence and complete Party No 1 syllabus by 30 Nov 42.
Party will then be ready and capable of carrying out any type of task or operation, provided all personnel of party have been assembled and trained together for at least three days.
3. Commence and complete Party No 2 syllabus by 15 Dec, 42.
This period will be devoted to practice landings, hardening up exercises, treks, hide outs, etc. The party can be sent on leave during or after this period.
4. Leave to all members of the party according to the time available which will be governed by the start time.
5. Commence Party final preparations. This will take a period of at least seven days. It depends largely upon the information received from 207. The period is to be devoted to rehearsals of actual landings, the study of maps of the area, possible tasks, customs and conditions as known to the leader whilst in the area, by the complete party only. Information as to destination, time of departure mode of conveyance etc. will NOT be divulged to any member of the party until after expiration of leave period and final preparations have been commenced. This period should be spent away from school area, preferably without knowledge of students. All intelligence information reports from 207 etc will be required for this period.
6. Embarkation for operational area. X day
This will depend upon available craft, loading and landing difficulties quantity of stores and equipment, which may be partially overcome by moving stores and personal to a suitable rendezvous instead of moving the craft to this area.
7. Disembarkation: Landing of stores and dispersal of same pending preparation of hide outs, W/T station etc. X ± 4 days.
8. Preparation of hide outs W/T station will depend on area selected, may require native assistance from contacts supplied by 207.
9. Preparation of convalescent hide out and alternate withdrawal areas.
10. Reconnaissance of target areas. This period will be spent familiarizing members with whole area and attempts to contact known friendly natives. X ± 21 days.
11. Further preparations and plans for 5th Column organization, assessing reliability of natives and information. X ± 28 days.
12. Party should be prepared to commence operations in any sphere, taking advantage of major targets, contacting further operatives, native soldiery, etc.
13. Foundations to organization should be laid and fair knowledge of reliable sources of information known by the end of X ± 2 months.

14. Results should be noticeable, if convenient a move to a fwd base should be made, possibly change hide out areas and W/T station. A good knowledge of Japanese organization in the area should now be available. Govt contacts and partisans should now be established. Food, arms, ammo, explosives, maintenance stores and supplies should be required by the end of X ± 3 months.
15. Organization should have expanded to most large villages and there should be full co-operation and support from most small villages in the area. Local soldiery should have been formed into patrols for recruiting purposes. Native resistance increased by X ± 4 months.
16. During the following month steady increase in all directions should be maintained. Care to convince any doubtful persons who may be inclined to tell the enemy must be taken. Air activity in the form of bombing raids should help this. The feeling throughout island should now be obvious to Japs and will be most difficult to overcome to avoid counter measures.
17. The following month will be spent in bringing plan to its peak, at the end of this month population should be ready to revolt, assist in all ways necessary to hinder enemy during Allied attack. Guides local irregulars, will be armed and instructed, guiding flares for ships and planes arranged. The possible inclusion in the party, at this stage, of a L.O. from A.H.Q. may be necessary, with all details required for attack, maps etc. Distribution of arms to P.O.W's. X ± 6 months.
18. Any period after this will be spent maintaining morale of natives, (Allied air attacks about this time will help considerably) improving details of revolts, riots, S.O's etc. This period should be kept as short as possible and should NOT exceed 8 months after X day.
19. Information on the Allied plan of attack in this area, details, proposed time of operation etc will need to be made available to the leader of the party prior to departure and progess reports, Sitreps, forecasts of events etc. made known to him at regular intervals after occupation.

POSSIBLE TARGETS FOR DEMOLITION

1. Water supply from hills to town; Damaged at source or vicinity would cause at least one weeks water shortage. This line supplies all ships arriving in harbour with water from a direct pipe line to the wharf.
2. Oil supply from tanks in hills at rear of town also fed by pipe line direct to wharves. (Main wharf and coal wharf). This supplies most ships arriving at 'A'.
3. Wireless Stations. At least one in town itself and two others out of the town. Seaplane base and land plane base.
4. Possible D.F. Station. Previous raids have appeared to have been notified.
5. Wireless or Telephone comm from coast watching stns. to town and Air bases.
6. Vessels in harbour. (a) Warships. (b) Merchant vessels.
7. Sea plane base and hangers, jetty and refuelling barges.
8. Land planes and drome installations. Wireless stn.
9. Land defences. Coastal batteries, A/A batteries.
10. ADM HQs in town and elsewhere.
11. Personnel.

Degree of priority is required on these targets in consideration with policy of SWP as to whether this force is to remain intact and avoid drawing crabs and possible patrol activity or complete destruction from start.

Project 23 - (A - 2)

Personnel:

Jenkins, No 1
Baints
Ellis
Chew
Chittelborough
1 Native

Rudwick
Dahlberg

Place of Entry: Nakoe or Seri

Stores & Equipment: Lists will be drawn up by the Leader in conjunction with 118 and 113 and based on 7 men for 3 months. Food stores to be packed so that they can be easily divided ~~into~~ into one lot for one month and one lot for two months, making three months in all. All stores to be assembled at Melbourne, including operational stores.

Date of Departure: Beginning of December.

W/T Equipment: One I.S.D. set and one A.T.R. 4 will be taken.
Signal procedure to be arranged by 109 and 119. Signaller to remain in Melbourne meantime.

Codes: To be arranged by 118.

Money: N.E.I. paper and silver and a small quantity of Japanese Guilders, if available.

Move to Cairns: The above party, with the exception of the Leader and the Signaller, will proceed to Cairns on 21st October. The Leader will proceed by 'plane to Cairns not later than 24th October.

Copy to: 118
109
113

File

20.10.42

CERAM

Population in W part (up to 129') very difficult to handle..

Centre part (129' - 130') not so difficult.

Eastern part very easy to handle; very afraid.

PIROE	- Christian, few anti Dutch
KAIRATOE	Christian
HONITETU	"
RIRING	"
KAMARIAN	"
RUMAKAI	" (loyal to Dutch Govt)
LATU	" independent
TUMALEHU	"
HUALOOI	"
ELPAPUTI	" Regent, Mores Lateriuw, very loyal and pro-Dutch.
SAHULAHU	"
LIANG	"
AWAHYE	" (= Waija)
WARAKA	"
MARARIKI	" Woman Regent disloyal; population loyal
AMAHEI	" Regent disloyal
SEPA	Moh. Regent disloyal

SUMMARY OF STRENGTHS OF STAFFS, OPERATORS ETC.

<u>Staffs: Australian etc.</u>	40
" N.E.I.	13
<u>Operational: includes unallotted</u>	27
" N.E.I. " "	53
<u>Guards, Orderlies etc.</u>	65
	203

SECRET IS RECONNAISSANCE DEP

SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL AT INTER-ALLIED SERVICES DEPARTMENT ESTABLISHMENTS

(N.E.I. personnel shown in red)

Station etc.	Officers	O.R.s	Civil	Totals	Grand Totals	Remarks
<u>AIPLIE</u> Staff	8	6	5	19		1 Country Section
" Guards etc		22		22		
" <u>N.E.I. Staff</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>14</u>	55	
<u>CAIRNS</u> Staff	4	7		11		
" Unallotted - Admin.	1			1		Hospital
" Guards etc.		22		22		
" <u>N.E.I. Staff</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>3</u>	37	
<u>DARWIN</u> Staff	3	6		9		
" Guards etc.		21		21		
" <u>N.E.I. Staff</u>	<u>1</u>			<u>1</u>	31	
<u>OPERATIONAL</u>						
Parties (Aust.)	9	8	1	18		
" <u>(N.E.I.)</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>21</u>		<u>25</u>		
" Awaiting Attachment		7		7		Signals Cairns
" " <u>(N.E.I.)</u>		<u>9</u>		<u>9</u>		Cairns
" " " "	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>5</u>		Airlie
" <u>Telegraph Class</u>		<u>5</u>		<u>5</u>		"
" <u>Pran-men</u>			<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>		Darwin
" Awaiting attachment	2	<u>1</u>		<u>3</u>	80	Hospital etc.
	41	148	14	203	203	

(N.E.I. personnel in red)

Station	R a n k s													Remarks
	LtCol	Maj	LtCdr	Capt	Lieut	W/Ol	Serjt	Corpl	Pte	Sail -or	Pol- ice	Prau -men	Civil -ians	
(a)														
<u>AIRLIE</u> (Services)	1													Director
		3												1 D/Dr.
			1											1 Admin & Pers
				1										1 Ordnance
				1										<u>Director</u>
					3									Sigs & Cipher
														<u>W/T Research</u>
														Naval Officers
														1 Finance
														1 Intell.
														1 Ord.
					2									<u>Naval S/Lts</u>
					1									<u>Admin.</u>
							2							<u>(Army) Admin.</u>
														1 Office
									1					1 W/T Wkshop
									2					<u>W/T Wkshop</u>
														1 Ord
										4				1 MT Drv & Ord
														1 Ord.
										5				3 W/T Mechs
														<u>W/T Mechs</u>
													5	4 Secretaries
														1 Country Sec.
													1	<u>Secretary N.E.I.</u>
TOTALS	1	3	1	2	6		2	3	9				6	GRAND TOTAL 33

G.H.Q., S.W.P.A. S/Memo dated 14/12/42 - re para. 2 (a)

Location	Capt.	Lieut.	Sgt.	Cpl.	Pte.	Civil		Totals
DARWIN:	2						O.C.	
		1					Assistant	2
		<u>1</u>					Administration	
			2				<u>M.S.I. Liaison</u>	2
				1			Orderly	
					3		Signals	2
							Administration	1
							Signals	3
						<u>1</u>	<u>In charge of Praus</u>	
						<u>6</u>	<u>Prau-men</u>	7
	2	2	2	1	3	7		17

Location	Capt.	Lieut.	W/Ol.	Sgt.	Cpl.	Pte.		Totals
CAIRNS:	3						1 Administration	
							1 Intelligence	
							1 Demolition (Attached)	3
	<u>1</u>						<u>1 Personnel</u>	1
		1					1 Signals	1
			1				1 Ordnance	1
				4			1 Orderly Room	
							1 Demolition	
							2 Signals	4
				<u>1</u>			<u>1 N.E.I. assist.</u>	1
					<u>1</u>		<u>1 " Instr. (Sigs)</u>	1
					1		1 Signals	1
		1				1	1 "	1
							1 in Hospital	1
	4	2	1	5	2	1		15

GUARDS ETC.

Location	Sgt.	Cpl.	Pte.		Totals
AIRLIE:		2		Guards	2)
			12	8 Guards	)
				2 Floor Orderlies	)
	5			2 Cleaning Orderlies	12) Do not belong to
		1		Cipher)	I.S.D.
			2	Orderly)	or
			1	Telephonist) A.W.A.S.	"Z" Special Unit
			1	Typist)	8)
	5	3	14		22
CAIRNS:	2			Guards	2
			20	Guards	
				General Duties	
				Cooks	
				M.T.Drivers	20
	2		20		22
DARWIN:		2		Guards	2
			19	Guards	
				General Duties	
				Cooks	
				M.T.Drivers	19
		2	19		21

OPERATIONAL

	Capt.	Lieut.	Sgt.	Cpl.	Pte.	Sail -or	Pol- ice	Civil	Totals
AIRLIE : Teleg. Class Awaiting attachment			<u>4</u>		<u>1</u>				11
CAIRNS : Awaiting movement			<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6 & 1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>		16
HOLLANDIA : 21A			<u>1 & 1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>		<u>1</u>		5
SCHNAPPER : -			<u>2</u>						2 In Darwin
AMBOEN : Dutch (Wannes) Aust. 33A2	1	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>		<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>		8 5
CELEBES : Pandani 26		<u>1</u>			<u>2</u>				3
JAVA : I 14		<u>1</u>			<u>2</u>				3
II 5		<u>1</u>			<u>2</u>				3
WISSELMEEREN :					<u>2</u>				2
ARAO : 210	1	2	1					1	5
TIMOR : 24	1	3	2	1					7
To be posted	1	1	<u>1</u>						3
S & W. (Lumbaka)	4	14	21	4	18	3	8	1	73