Between December 1942 and June 1943, a series of small convoys transported troops, weapons, vehicles, fuel, engineering equipment and approximately 60,000 tons of supplies from Milne Bay to Oro Bay on the north coast of Papua.
The operation was known as Lilliput. Its transport fleet consisted overwhelmingly of ships belonging to the Koninklijke Paketvaart-Maatschappij. These Dutch-owned vessels, generally commanded by Dutch officers and crewed largely by Indonesian seafarers, provided a capability that Australia and the United States could not initially supply themselves.
Operation Lilliput helped sustain the Allied campaigns at Buna, Gona and Sanananda and supported the development of Oro Bay as a forward base. It turned supplies assembled in Australia into a functioning maritime lifeline reaching the New Guinea battlefront.
Australian and American official histories subsequently recognised the importance of the Dutch ships. The Australian naval history described their contribution as “invaluable” and stated that, during this critical period, they were “irreplaceable.”[1]
MacArthur’s logistical problem
Following the battles along the Kokoda Track and at Milne Bay, Allied forces began attacking the Japanese positions at Buna, Gona and Sanananda on the northern coast of Papua.
The battlefield was difficult to supply. Moving large quantities of material across the Owen Stanley Range was impossible. Papuan carriers transported food, ammunition and equipment along tracks under extraordinarily demanding conditions, but they could not carry the volume required to sustain a major offensive.
Aircraft delivered supplies to forward airfields, including Dobodura, but air transport capacity remained limited and was affected by weather, aircraft availability and the condition of the landing grounds.
A maritime supply route was essential. However, the waters between Milne Bay and the Buna area were poorly charted and obstructed by reefs. Japanese aircraft and warships remained a threat, while the north coast offered few suitable ports or unloading facilities.[2]
General Douglas MacArthur’s South West Pacific Area command also lacked sufficient landing craft and small coastal transports. Large ocean-going ships could carry cargo from Australia, but they were not necessarily suitable for the final approach through reefs and inadequately surveyed coastal waters.
The KPM fleet offered a practical solution. Its ships had been designed for inter-island service in the Netherlands East Indies. They were relatively small, manoeuvrable and accustomed to operating in areas with limited port infrastructure.
Establishing Oro Bay
Oro Bay was selected as the maritime entry point for supplying the Allied forces around Buna. It lay close enough to the battlefront to be useful but still required a difficult coastal passage from Milne Bay.
Facilities were rudimentary. Only a small number of vessels could enter and unload at one time. There were initially few roads, storage areas, cranes, tugs, firefighting appliances or salvage facilities.
The supply system therefore developed in stages. Ships carried cargo from Australian ports to Port Moresby and Milne Bay. At Milne Bay, the convoy was divided into smaller groups—usually two merchant ships accompanied by Royal Australian Navy corvettes—for the final passage to Oro Bay.
The convoys had to navigate through reefs, often at night, to reduce their exposure to Japanese aircraft. During daylight, ships unloading at Milne Bay or Oro Bay remained vulnerable to bombing and strafing.
On 20 October 1942, General Headquarters issued the operational instructions for the regular convoy system that became Operation Lilliput.[3]
The first Lilliput ships
A major convoy departed Townsville on 15 November 1942. Its merchant ships included the KPM vessels Maetsuycker, Cremer, Bontekoe, Japara, Bantam, Both and Balikpapan, together with the American ships John B. Ashe and Jesse Applegate.
The naval escorts included HMAS Arunta and the Australian corvettes HMAS Ballarat and HMAS Katoomba. The ships reached Milne Bay on 19 November.[4]
Japara, Bantam and Balikpapan were selected to test the route towards Oro Bay. Japanese air attacks and the difficult passage delayed the opening of the regular service.
Japara completed the first successful Lilliput supply voyage into Oro Bay on 18 December 1942. That voyage established the pattern for the convoys that followed.[5]
A predominantly KPM operation
Nineteen Dutch merchant ships participated in Operation Lilliput:
- Balikpapan
- Bantam
- Bontekoe
- Both
- Janssens
- Japara
- Karsik
- Maetsuycker
- Patras
- Reijnst
- ’s Jacob
- Swartenhondt
- Tasman
- Thedens
- Van den Bosch
- Van Heutsz
- Van Outhoorn
- Van Spilbergen
- Van Swoll
These ships constituted most of the 27 Dutch vessels allocated to MacArthur’s South West Pacific Area by early 1943. Only five non-Dutch merchant ships participated in the Lilliput convoys.[6]
The predominance of KPM vessels was especially pronounced during the critical opening stage from December 1942 to February 1943. Twelve Dutch ships completed 18 voyages, delivering approximately 2,400 troops and 40,000 tons of supplies to the Buna front.[7]
This does not mean that KPM operated alone. Royal Australian Navy corvettes provided most of the naval escorts, while Australian and American personnel organised cargoes, developed the ports, unloaded the ships and moved supplies towards the front.
Operation Lilliput was an Allied undertaking whose transport component depended heavily upon Dutch-owned ships and their multinational crews.
Tanks for the Buna front
One of the most important early voyages involved Karsik. The vessel had previously operated as a train ferry in the Netherlands East Indies and possessed features that made it suitable for carrying and unloading heavy equipment.
Australian and American forces at Buna needed tanks to attack the strongly constructed Japanese defensive positions. Conventional attempts to deliver tanks had encountered serious difficulties because suitable landing craft were unavailable.
Karsik departed Port Moresby on 8 December 1942 carrying four M3 Stuart light tanks of the Australian 2/6th Armoured Regiment. Escorted by HMAS Lithgow, it reached Oro Bay on 11 December.[8]
The successful voyage demonstrated that tanks could be delivered through the coastal route. Karsik and Japara subsequently carried another four tanks to Oro Bay. These vehicles supported Australian attacks against the Japanese positions later in December.
The tank voyages preceded the regular Lilliput service but formed an important part of establishing the maritime route. Their significance will be treated more fully in the separate history of Karsik.
Dangerous voyages and exposed ports
Operation Lilliput placed merchant ships and their crews in a combat environment. The vessels were not designed to withstand bombing, and many carried ammunition, aviation fuel and other highly combustible cargoes.
The New Guinea ports offered little protection. Ships could be attacked while navigating the coastal route, approaching harbour or unloading alongside improvised jetties.
On 9 January 1943, Japanese dive-bombers attacked Van Heutsz at Oro Bay. A bomb struck the ship’s third hold, which contained aviation fuel and ammunition. The ship’s electrician and quartermaster were killed, together with an American soldier.[9]
Van Heutsz survived, but the attack demonstrated the risks faced by every ship entering the forward area.
The loss of ’s Jacob
The crews worked under sustained physical and psychological pressure. They navigated reefs at night, remained at action stations during air warnings and helped unload cargo as quickly as possible. Sleep was limited, and a delay at a jetty could leave a ship exposed to the next Japanese raid.
The loss of ’s Jacob affected more than the ship and its crew. Every vessel removed from service reduced the capacity of a supply system already dependent upon a limited number of suitable transports.
On 18 March 1943, nine Japanese bombers attacked ’s Jacob near Oro Bay. The vessel was sunk, and the first mate and several other people were killed. Many passengers were wounded.[10]
Karsik was attacked in the same area but escaped damage.
The destruction of Bantam
On 28 March, Japanese bombers attacked shipping at Oro Bay. Bantam and the American vessel Masaya were lost.
Bantam received several direct hits while unloading. Seven crew members were killed, and others were wounded, including the captain. Despite fires and escaping steam, the surviving crew attempted to control the damage and move the vessel away from the jetty.
The ship was grounded and became a total loss. Wounded survivors were later transported to the Princess Juliana Hospital in Sydney aboard Van Outhoorn.[11]
Attempts were subsequently made to salvage Bantam. The vessel was eventually raised and towed to Sydney, but the cost of restoring it to service was considered prohibitive.
Van Heemskerk and Van Outhoorn
On 14 April 1943, Japanese bombers attacked ships at Milne Bay, including Van Heemskerk, Van Outhoorn, Balikpapan and the British vessel Gorgon.
Van Heemskerk was unloading when the raid began. American soldiers and a jeep-mounted machine gun were hoisted aboard to strengthen its anti-aircraft defence. The ship was struck, caught fire and was eventually beached before exploding.
Two American soldiers were killed, while other American personnel and KPM crew members were wounded.[12]
Van Outhoorn suffered damaging near misses. Eight crew members were killed, while other crew members and American soldiers were wounded. Balikpapan survived and claimed two attacking aircraft.
The loss and damage sustained during little more than a month caused serious concern among KPM officials and the Dutch authorities.
KPM protests against the conditions
KPM maintenance superintendent Hermanus Koning inspected the damaged Van Outhoorn at Oro Bay on 29 April 1943. His report condemned the lack of basic facilities available to ships operating in New Guinea.
There were inadequate firefighting appliances, salvage pumps and tugs. Koning argued that the absence of suitable assistance had contributed to the loss of Bantam. KPM was also concerned that merchant ships were sometimes sent towards Oro Bay without adequate air protection.[13]
A formal protest was lodged with the Allied naval authorities. Some voyages were temporarily interrupted, and the captain and officers of Bontekoe initially refused to take the ship beyond Milne Bay.
This was not simply a refusal to accept wartime danger. KPM argued that its ships and crews were being exposed unnecessarily because the forward ports lacked reasonable protective and salvage arrangements.
The Allies could not easily replace the KPM vessels. Additional air cover was provided, and the dispute was resolved. Bontekoe resumed voyages to Oro Bay.
The episode demonstrates that the ships’ importance gave KPM some leverage even though the company no longer exercised operational control over its fleet.
The full achievement of Lilliput
Operation Lilliput continued until June 1943. In total, it comprised 39 convoys conducted in 40 separate stages. The ships delivered 3,802 reinforcements and approximately 60,000 tons of supplies, most of it carried aboard Dutch vessels.[14]
The figures convey the scale of the operation but not the full significance of the maritime connection. Food, ammunition, fuel, vehicles and engineering equipment reached the battlefront because ships and crews repeatedly travelled through waters exposed to Japanese attack.
The KPM vessels helped make Oro Bay a functioning Allied base. This supported not only the Buna–Gona campaign but the continuing Allied advance along the northern coast of New Guinea.
As American and Australian shipping capacity expanded, the relative importance of KPM’s ships gradually declined. Purpose-built landing craft and larger numbers of Allied transports became available. That later development does not diminish the importance of the KPM fleet during the period when no comparable replacement was available.
Official recognition
Australian and American official histories recognised the role of the Dutch merchant ships.
The Australian naval history concluded that the transport side of Operation Lilliput was composed almost entirely of Dutch vessels. It described their contribution as “invaluable” and stated that they were “irreplaceable” during the operation.[15]
The United States Army’s official history identified the merchant marine—particularly KPM—as the most important Netherlands East Indies contribution to the South West Pacific Area. It emphasised the company’s role in supplying and reinforcing isolated Allied positions.[16]
This recognition belonged to the people as well as the vessels. KPM’s Dutch officers and Indonesian seafarers operated the ships, while Australian naval crews escorted them and Allied personnel developed and unloaded the forward ports.
An indispensable early contribution
Operation Lilliput demonstrated how a commercial inter-island fleet could become a strategic military asset.
KPM could not replace the combat formations, aircraft or warships deployed by Australia and the United States. What it provided was the maritime connection that allowed these forces to be sustained in an exceptionally difficult operational environment.
The ships converted Allied resources assembled in Australia into supplies delivered to the Papua battlefront. During the critical opening stage of the New Guinea campaign, that capability was disproportionate to the size of the surviving KPM fleet.
The next article examines Operation Accountant, in which Bontekoe, Karsik and Van Heemskerk transported approximately 3,200 American troops directly from Australia to Oro Bay.
Endnotes
[1] G. Hermon Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1942–1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1968, p. 283.
[2] Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, 1957; Jonathan Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy in the Pacific War,” Journal of Australian Naval History, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2009, pp. 86–87.
[3] Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1942–1945, pp. 262–269.
[4] Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” p. 87.
[5] Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1942–1945, p. 262.
[6] Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” pp. 87–88; Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1942–1945, p. 269.
[7] Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1942–1945, pp. 268–269.
[8] Lida Mayo, The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, 1968; Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” pp. 88–89.
[9] National Archives of Australia, MP1587/1, 319C, “Bombing of Van Heutsz 1943”; Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” p. 87.
[10] National Archives of Australia, MP1587/1, 482W, reports concerning ’s Jacob; Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” pp. 87–88.
[11] National Archives of Australia, MP1587/1, 156E and 476W, reports concerning the loss of Bantam and Masaya; Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” p. 88.
[12] National Archives of Australia, MP1587/1, 156G, reports concerning Van Heemskerk; Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” p. 88.
[13] National Archives of Australia, MP1587/1, 156G, KPM report on conditions at Milne Bay and Oro Bay, 29 April 1943; Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” pp. 88–89.
[14] Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1942–1945, p. 269.
[15] Ibid., p. 283.
[16] Milner, Victory in Papua, p. 26.
