In early 1942, as Japanese forces swept through Southeast Asia, the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) stood on the front line of Allied defence. The Dutch committed significant military resources to support British-led efforts in Malaya and Singapore, especially in the air. Yet when the Japanese turned toward the NEI itself, support from the United Kingdom and the United States was thin, belated, and inadequate. This imbalance in commitment led to deep frustration not only in the Netherlands but also in Australia—and in turn helped reshape Australia’s global alliances, loosening ties to Britain and fostering a closer relationship with the United States. The Dutch and Australians, bound by shared disappointment, were brought into closer wartime cooperation.
Dutch commitment at Singapore: a costly gesture
As detailed by Jack Ford in Allies in a Bind, the Dutch made a significant—though often overlooked—contribution to the defence of Singapore and British Malaya. At the Singapore Conferences of 1941, the NEI pledged to send three squadrons of Glenn Martin bombers and one squadron of Brewster Buffalo fighters to reinforce British defences. These Dutch aircraft, drawn from the already overstretched ML-KNIL (Netherlands East Indies Army Air Force), operated in support of the RAF and the Australian forces engaged in Malaya.
This deployment was costly. Many of the Dutch planes were shot down during air raids, and the Glenn Martin crews, untrained for night operations, suffered heavily when the British abruptly shifted to night bombing. According to Major Rene van den Berg’s monograph Unchained Interests, Dutch naval forces also provided critical support in the South China Sea, with submarines operating off the Malay coast—often without adequate air cover or integration into British command structures.
When the tables turned: a lack of reciprocity
But when Japan turned its full force on the Netherlands East Indies from January 1942 onward, British and American support largely evaporated. Singapore consumed Allied reinforcements and resources until its dramatic fall on 15 February 1942, just as the NEI was under siege.
Van den Berg notes that despite the NEI being a key source of oil and a major Allied territory, the Dutch were granted minimal influence within the ABDACOM command structure. Requests for reinforcement were met with vague promises. The British and Americans were preoccupied with their own defensive priorities. The Dutch watched with growing dismay as the NEI—vital to Allied strategy and already severely weakened by their Malayan commitments—was largely left to fend for itself.
Australia’s sense of betrayal
Australia, too, felt betrayed. As Ford documents in Allies in a Bind, Australian Prime Minister John Curtin formally protested the lack of British support. He expressed to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill that Australia had committed troops to support the defence of the Netherlands East Indies, particularly in Ambon and Timor, yet Britain offered little direct help when Australia’s own northern approaches came under threat. Curtin’s famous 27 December 1941 statement—published in The Melbourne Herald—declared that “Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.” This marked a historic shift in foreign policy and public sentiment.
Curtin’s message was more than symbolic. It reflected a widespread perception within the Australian military and public that Britain had failed to honour its promises. The fall of Singapore and the absence of British reinforcements in the NEI catalysed Australia’s strategic realignment toward the United States, who had begun deploying forces into the Pacific from late 1941.
A closer Dutch–Australian relationship
The joint frustrations of the Dutch and Australians—both bearing the brunt of Japan’s aggression, both sidelined in Allied planning—brought the two countries into closer wartime collaboration. Dutch merchant vessels transported Australian troops and supplies, while Australian ports, especially Darwin and Fremantle, became lifelines for Dutch naval forces and refugee traffic from Java.
As van den Berg notes, “The Dutch had expected a degree of reciprocity” for their commitments in Malaya and Singapore. The absence of that support—not only from Britain but also from the United States—left both the Dutch and Australians to look to each other for practical cooperation. The shared experience of abandonment was, paradoxically, the seed of a more grounded alliance in the region.
Conclusion
The fall of the NEI and the frustrations surrounding Allied support offer a stark lesson in coalition politics. Dutch and Australian leaders both learned that global empires and grand alliances could not always be relied upon in moments of crisis. For Australia, this marked the start of a more independent foreign policy. For the Dutch, it was a bitter reminder of their status as a “junior ally” despite significant contributions. And in that mutual frustration, a more pragmatic and regionally focused Dutch–Australian partnership was born—one that would have lasting consequences for the post-war order in the Pacific.
References:
Van den Berg, R.W.A. (2021). Unchained Interests: American-British-Dutch-Australian Command 1942. Netherlands Staff College Monograph.
Ford, J. (2001). Allies in a Bind: Australia and the Netherlands East Indies in the Second World War. CQU Press.
See also: Curtin, J. (1941). The Melbourne Herald, 27 December 1941.
