The history of No. 18 (Netherlands East Indies) Squadron RAAF is often told as one of Allied cooperation and operational success. Yet in its early period in Australia, the squadron experienced a profound internal crisis that culminated in one of the most controversial legal cases involving Dutch forces in exile during World War II.
Stranded in Australia
Following the fall of Java in March 1942, Dutch airmen who had reached Australia found themselves in an uncertain and deeply frustrating situation. Based at locations including Archerfield in Brisbane, they were waiting to be reorganised, re-equipped and deployed.
For many of these men, the situation was deeply traumatic. Trained to fight, they were unable to act due to shortages of aircraft, equipment and organisational delays. At the same time, their families remained behind in the Netherlands East Indies, often in Japanese internment camps or under occupation. The inability to assist or rescue them created intense emotional strain.
Declining morale and leadership tensions
By late 1942, morale within the squadron had deteriorated significantly. Later investigations identified several contributing factors:
- prolonged inactivity
- weak and inconsistent leadership
- poor coordination between Dutch command and Allied authorities in Australia
- unequal treatment, particularly regarding the evacuation of families
These conditions created frustration, resentment and a growing sense of injustice among the airmen.
The attempted return to Java
Against this background, a small group of airmen became involved in discussions about returning to the Netherlands East Indies. Their aim appears to have been personal rather than military: to reach their families, who were believed to be in danger.
What began as discussion developed into something more serious. Evidence indicates that there was intent and possibly initial preparation to take an aircraft and fly back to Java.
Arrests and the charge of treason
In November 1942, three members of the squadron — W.J. Burck, E.H.J. de Lyon and H. Kelder — were arrested.
The case quickly escalated. Rather than being treated as a disciplinary matter, the men were formally charged with treason. They were accused of planning to take a B-25 Mitchell bomber and fly it to Java, allegedly to surrender to the Japanese.
This interpretation represented a significant escalation from what appears to have been an emotionally driven attempt to reach their families. It also reflected the strict wartime expectations placed on Dutch forces operating in exile.
Trial and imprisonment
In June 1943, the accused were transferred from Australia to Colombo in Ceylon, where they were tried before a Dutch military court.
Following the trial, they were imprisoned aboard the Dutch vessel Plancius, which functioned as a detention facility. This unusual arrangement highlights the complexities of jurisdiction and logistics for Dutch forces operating outside their homeland.
The case also became politically sensitive. Dutch authorities were concerned about the potential reaction in Australia, particularly if details of the arrests and charges became public.
A case shaped by circumstances
Post-war investigations concluded that the incident could not be understood in isolation. It was closely linked to:
- low morale within the squadron
- lack of operational activity
- failures in leadership and organisation
- the psychological strain of separation from family
In this light, the actions of the accused were increasingly seen as the result of extreme circumstances rather than deliberate disloyalty.
Hagers and internal support
Contemporary perspectives within the squadron further complicate the picture. The war diary of pilot Guus Hagers provides rare insight into the internal dynamics of the unit.
Hagers’ writings reflect widespread frustration and disillusionment among the airmen. Significantly, he also expressed support for the accused in correspondence, indicating that not all members of the squadron accepted the official interpretation of the case. For many, the incident was seen as a consequence of desperation rather than treason.
Post-war outcomes and Royal Decrees
The case did not end with the war. Its consequences extended well into the post-war period and were eventually addressed at the highest level of the Dutch state.
Official records show that the sentences were reviewed by Royal Decree:
- On 8 September 1951, a Royal Decree reduced the sentence of De Lyon to ten years, effective from 24 September 1943.
- On 23 April 1952, Royal Decree no. 77 reduced the sentences of Burck and Kelder to ten years, also effective from 24 September 1943. Burck was additionally discharged from military service.
These decisions demonstrate that the case remained legally active nearly a decade after the original arrests.
Importantly, full rehabilitation was not granted. The reductions in sentence did not amount to exoneration, leaving the men without complete legal or moral vindication.
A broader perspective
The treason case within 18 (NEI) Squadron offers a powerful insight into the human dimension of war. It highlights the gap between formal military expectations and the realities faced by those in exile.
For the Dutch airmen in Australia, the war was not only fought in the air. It was also experienced through uncertainty, frustration and the emotional burden of separation from loved ones.
Understanding this episode adds depth to the broader history of Dutch forces in Australia and provides a more nuanced perspective on Allied cooperation during World War II.
Paul Budde (April 2026)
Sources
De Militaire Luchtvaart van het KNIL in de jaren 1942-1945
Dr. Jack Ford Allies in a Bind – Australia and the Netherlands East Indies in the Second World War
