The Japanese conquest of the Netherlands East Indies in early 1942 destroyed the commercial and maritime system that the Koninklijke Paketvaart-Maatschappij (KPM) had developed over more than half a century. Ships were sunk, captured or scuttled, port facilities and offices were lost, and thousands of employees and their families were caught behind Japanese lines.
A significant group of KPM vessels nevertheless escaped to Australia. They arrived with Dutch officers and administrators, Indonesian and Indo-European seafarers, military personnel, civilian evacuees and cargoes ranging from aircraft and industrial equipment to government records and gold.
These ships represented much more than the surviving assets of a commercial company. The Netherlands had been under German occupation since May 1940, forcing the Netherlands Government to operate from exile in London. The Japanese conquest of the Netherlands East Indies then deprived that government of most of its remaining territorial, military and economic base in Asia. Much of the Dutch and NEI army, navy and air capability had been destroyed, captured or dispersed.
The merchant ships that escaped remained beyond enemy control and could continue operating from Allied ports. They therefore became one of the most important strategic resources still available to the Netherlands Government-in-Exile. They also gave the Dutch a practical contribution to make to the wider Allied war effort at a time when their capacity to deploy conventional military forces had been severely reduced.
Among these surviving vessels were the KPM ships that reached Australia. Together with their experienced Dutch officers and predominantly Indonesian crews, they provided a ready-made transport capability that Australia and the United States urgently needed. The ships were soon incorporated into the Allied transport system and used to carry troops, equipment and supplies in support of the defence of Australia and the campaigns in New Guinea.
KPM and the defence of the Netherlands East Indies
When Japan entered the Pacific War in December 1941, KPM was operating approximately 146 vessels over more than 70 services, calling at over 400 ports. It was the second-largest Dutch steamship company and the dominant inter-island shipping enterprise in the Netherlands East Indies.[1]
Its extensive network and experienced crews made KPM an essential component of the defence and communications system of the archipelago. Its vessels transported troops, military equipment and supplies between the islands. They were also used to support Australian deployments to the region.
On 14 December 1941, approximately 1,100 members of Gull Force—including the Australian 2/21st Battalion and supporting units—departed Darwin for Ambon aboard the KPM vessels Both, Patras and Valentijn. The three transports were escorted by the cruiser HMAS Adelaide and the corvette HMAS Ballarat and arrived at Ambon on 17 December.[2]
As Japanese forces advanced, KPM ships assumed an increasingly important evacuation role. During December 1941, they transported women and children from threatened outer islands to Java, which was still regarded as relatively safe. The ships also moved military personnel, government officials, communications equipment and other essential material away from areas exposed to Japanese attack.[3]
These operations took place under rapidly deteriorating conditions. Japanese aircraft and warships controlled an increasing part of the surrounding seas, while ports, airfields and communications were being attacked. Ships often sailed with limited protection and incomplete information about the location of Japanese forces.
The KPM vessel Sloet van de Beele was sunk by Japanese aircraft on 17 February 1942 while evacuating the garrison from Billiton Island, east of Sumatra.[4] Its loss was one of many indications that the maritime escape routes were closing.
The collapse of Allied resistance
The American-British-Dutch-Australian Command, known as ABDA, was established in January 1942 to coordinate the defence of Southeast Asia. It was unable to stop the Japanese advance.
The defeat of the Allied naval force in the Battle of the Java Sea on 27–28 February removed much of the remaining protection for shipping around Java. Japanese forces began landing on the island on 1 March, and the Netherlands East Indies administration capitulated on 8 March.[5]
Dutch merchant vessels were ordered to escape wherever possible. Some sailed towards Ceylon, India or South Africa, while others attempted to reach Australia. Cilacap, on the south coast of Java, became an important evacuation port because it offered access to the Indian Ocean away from the increasingly dangerous Java Sea.
The opportunity was brief. Japanese carrier aircraft attacked Cilacap on 4 March. Between 3 and 7 March, 19 Dutch ships were lost there. Some had been damaged or abandoned, while smaller vessels lacked the range, fuel or crews required to reach safety and were consequently scuttled.[6]
Other ships were sunk or captured while attempting to escape through the waters south of Java. The converted Dutch hospital ship Op ten Noort was captured by the Japanese. In the final days of the campaign, the Dutch merchant fleet lost tens of thousands of tons of shipping in and around the Netherlands East Indies.[7]
The surviving vessels faced Japanese aircraft, warships and submarines. Their officers and crews had to navigate through contested waters without knowing whether their destination remained secure or whether Australia itself would become the next target of the Japanese advance.
A fleet largely destroyed
KPM suffered catastrophic losses during the conquest. Exact totals differ depending on whether vessels sunk elsewhere during the wider war are included, but most of the company’s pre-war fleet was lost, captured or left behind.
Historian Jonathan Ford records that KPM lost 84 of approximately 140 vessels during the Netherlands East Indies campaign. Other company histories place KPM’s total wartime losses at between 96 and 98 ships. The different figures refer to different periods and categories and should not be treated as directly interchangeable.[8]
The losses cannot be measured in ships and tonnage alone. Crew members were killed, captured or separated from their families. Many Indonesian seafarers who reached Australia did not know what had happened to relatives in occupied Java and the other islands. Those who remained in the Netherlands East Indies faced years of occupation, internment, forced labour and economic hardship.
The destruction of KPM’s network also broke the regular connections between hundreds of ports and communities. A company that had been deeply embedded in the economic and administrative life of the archipelago was suddenly deprived of most of its operating territory.
The Dutch ships reaching Australia
Despite these losses, numerous Dutch merchant vessels reached Australian ports. Not all were KPM ships: the arrivals included vessels belonging to several Dutch shipping companies, government agencies and private enterprises.
Fremantle became one of the principal destinations. So many Dutch evacuation vessels gathered there that Australian wharf labourers reportedly referred to them as the “Flying Dutchmen.” Other ships reached Darwin, Thursday Island, Sydney and Melbourne.[9]
The vessels carried an extraordinary mixture of passengers and cargo. They brought members of the Netherlands East Indies administration, naval and military personnel, aircrews, merchant seafarers, technical specialists, business representatives and civilian refugees.
Zaandam arrived at Fremantle on 6 March carrying official files, bank documents and a group of Netherlands East Indies officials led by Dr Jacob van Hoogstraten. He subsequently became one of the principal representatives of the NEI administration in Australia.[10]
Generaal Verspijck carried evacuees, while Sloterdijk transported personnel from Dutch motor torpedo boat units. Tjimanoek and Tawali brought British naval and merchant seamen and rescued 69 survivors from the British vessels MMS 51 and Anking, which had been sunk south of Java on 4 March.[11]
Other vessels carried military and industrial cargoes. Albekirk brought two locomotives and members of the ground crews of the United States 7th and 19th Bombardment Groups. Dutch ships also carried crated aircraft, machinery, textiles and other supplies originally intended for the defence and economy of the Netherlands East Indies.[12]
Gold reserves and other financial assets were transported separately to Australia for safekeeping. The liner Ruys brought ten million guilders in NEI gold reserves to Australia in January 1942. Additional bullion arrived aboard Boissevain in February and was transferred to the Commonwealth Bank.[13]
These genuine evacuations of Dutch gold should not be confused with Operation Accountant. That codename referred to a later KPM operation in which American troops were transported from Australia to New Guinea.
Escape in small vessels
Not every escape was made aboard a large merchant ship. Several small craft reached northern Australia and the remaining Dutch-controlled part of New Guinea after remarkable voyages.
In April and May 1942, Griffioen, Harmsen, Soedoe and Minjak Tanah reached Darwin. They carried civilians, personnel from the Dutch garrison at Babo in Dutch New Guinea and Australian soldiers who had escaped from Ambon. Soedoe and Minjak Tanah were small river tankers belonging to the Nederlands Nieuw-Guinee Petroleum Maatschappij, a Dutch Shell subsidiary.[14]
The small vessel Arcadia reached Thursday Island, while Gloria arrived at Merauke in southern Dutch New Guinea. These voyages formed part of the broader evacuation but should not all be described as KPM operations. They demonstrate that the escape involved naval vessels, merchant ships, company craft and small local vessels rather than a single organised fleet or convoy.
Twenty-one KPM vessels enter Allied service
Twenty-one KPM vessels that reached Australia formed the initial core of the company’s contribution to the South West Pacific Area. On 26 March 1942, the Chief Quartermaster of United States Army Forces in Australia arranged interim charters for the vessels, while the long-term conditions of their employment were still being negotiated with the Netherlands Government-in-Exile and Allied shipping authorities.[15]
The ships retained their Dutch registration and continued to be operated by their KPM officers and crews. They were generally commanded by Dutch officers and crewed predominantly by Indonesian, particularly Javanese, seafarers.
Their function was nevertheless transformed. Ships that had carried passengers, mail and commercial cargo between the islands of the Netherlands East Indies were placed under American operational control. They became part of the local fleet being assembled to support Allied forces in Australia and New Guinea.
Some of the Dutch ships were initially unarmed. Ten were refitted in Australia with naval guns operated by Royal Australian Navy personnel. Across the wider program, Australia converted 47 Dutch vessels into Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships.[16]
Complicated arrangements for control
The agreement under which the KPM ships were employed was complicated. The Netherlands Government-in-Exile wanted negotiations over the vessels to be conducted at government level in London. American military authorities in Australia wanted to charter them immediately through the Netherlands East Indies representatives already present in Australia.
The Allied Consultative Shipping Council, established by the Australian War Cabinet in March 1942, attempted to coordinate shipping in the South West Pacific. The Dutch were invited to appoint a representative, and KPM official Van Diense was selected. Commander Gerlof Berthy Salm, the Dutch naval liaison officer in Australia, also participated when naval matters were discussed.[17]
A final agreement was announced in June 1942. The British Ministry of War Transport formally chartered the vessels, which were then allocated through the United States War Shipping Administration to the US Army. In practice, the arrangement gave the US Army operational control while the ships remained Dutch-registered and KPM-crewed.[18]
The urgency of the military situation meant that the vessels began working before all these administrative and financial questions had been resolved.
People as well as ships
The arrival of the fleet created immediate human and administrative challenges. Dutch officers, Indonesian and Indo-European crew members, civilian evacuees and KPM employees required accommodation, pay, medical care and documentation.
Many had escaped with few possessions. Some did not know whether their families had survived or whether they would ever be able to return home. KPM’s organisation in Australia had to support these people while simultaneously preparing the ships for Allied operations.
Paketvaart House at 255 George Street in Sydney became the centre of KPM’s Australian administration. The general manager was Anton Bakker, who had joined KPM as a purser in 1912 and had been appointed assistant manager in Australia in 1922.[19]
The Netherlands East Indies Commission, established in Australia in April 1942, was given responsibility for the welfare of Netherlands merchant-marine personnel. Because of its maritime expertise and existing Australian organisation, KPM undertook much of the practical work associated with the ships and their crews.[20]
From evacuation to an Allied maritime lifeline
The arrival of the KPM vessels marked the end of one maritime system and the beginning of another. Their inter-island network in the Netherlands East Indies had been shattered, but the ships and crews that reached Australia possessed precisely the capabilities the Allies urgently required.
Australia and the United States had troops, aircraft, vehicles and supplies, but initially lacked enough suitable ships to move them through the difficult coastal waters of New Guinea. KPM’s vessels were relatively small, versatile and accustomed to operating among islands, reefs and poorly developed ports.
Within weeks, they began transporting Australian troops and military supplies towards Port Moresby and other forward areas. Their escape from the Netherlands East Indies therefore preserved not only part of a Dutch commercial fleet but a specialised maritime capability that would become indispensable to General Douglas MacArthur’s first offensive in the South West Pacific.
The question of who controlled these ships—and under what terms—is the next part of the KPM story.
Endnotes
[1] Joshua Yeong Jia Chia and Fook Weng Chan, “Koninklijke Paketvaart-Maatschappij,” Singapore Infopedia, National Library Board Singapore; Jonathan Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy in the Pacific War,” Journal of Australian Naval History, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2009, pp. 79–80.
[2] G. Hermon Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1939–1942, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1957, pp. 496 and 551; Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1957, pp. 76 and 419; Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” pp. 80–81.
[3] Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” p. 81.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1939–1942; Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust; Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” p. 81.
[6] Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” pp. 81–82.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” p. 82; H. Th. Bekker, De K.P.M. in oorlogstijd, 1939–1945, J.H. de Bussy, Amsterdam; company and vessel histories differ according to whether ships lost during the NEI campaign or throughout the entire war are counted.
[9] Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” p. 82.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” pp. 82–83.
[13] Ibid., p. 83.
[14] Ibid., p. 82.
[15] James R. Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Area 1941–1947, Transportation Unit, Historical Division, Special Staff, United States Army, 1949, pp. 320–338; Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” pp. 83–84.
[16] Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” p. 83.
[17] Ibid., pp. 83–84.
[18] Ibid., p. 84; Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation, pp. 320–338.
[19] Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” pp. 79–80.
[20] Ibid., p. 84.
