The arrival of surviving Koninklijke Paketvaart-Maatschappij (KPM) vessels in Australia during early 1942 gave the Allies access to a shipping capability they urgently needed. It also created a complicated question: who had the authority to control and deploy these Dutch ships?
The vessels remained Dutch-owned and Dutch-registered and continued to be operated by their KPM officers and predominantly Indonesian crews. However, the Netherlands itself was occupied by Germany, the Netherlands East Indies was being conquered by Japan, and the military command structure in the South West Pacific was being reorganised under the American General Douglas MacArthur.
Authority was divided among the Netherlands Government-in-Exile in London, Netherlands East Indies representatives in Australia, the British Ministry of War Transport, American shipping and military authorities, and the Australian Government. All recognised the value of the ships, but they did not necessarily agree about who should negotiate their use or determine where they should operate.
The resulting arrangements transformed KPM from a commercial shipping company into an organisation administering Dutch ships and personnel within an Allied transport system largely controlled by the United States Army.
An urgent Allied need
Australia entered 1942 with limited shipping available for military operations in the waters to its north. Ships were needed to move troops, weapons, aircraft, vehicles, engineering equipment, fuel and supplies between Australian ports and the rapidly developing bases in New Guinea.
The United States faced a similar shortage. American forces and equipment were arriving in Australia, but the United States had not yet assembled the local shipping fleet required to support operations through the island and coastal waters of the South West Pacific.
The surviving KPM vessels offered an immediate solution. Many were smaller than conventional ocean-going transports and had been designed for inter-island service. Their officers and crews were experienced in operating around reefs, shallow harbours and inadequately serviced ports.
Twenty-one KPM vessels formed the initial group made available in Australia. On 26 March 1942, the Chief Quartermaster of United States Army Forces in Australia arranged interim charters for these ships, with the long-term legal and financial terms still to be negotiated.[1]
Military necessity had moved faster than diplomacy. The ships were required immediately, but the authority of the different Dutch and Allied organisations had not yet been settled.
London and the NEI representatives in Australia
The Netherlands Government-in-Exile in London regarded the merchant fleet as a national strategic asset. It wanted negotiations over Dutch shipping to take place at government level, principally through London and Washington.
The Dutch and Netherlands East Indies officials already in Australia faced a more immediate situation. They were dealing directly with Australian and American authorities who needed the ships and wanted decisions made without delay.
A Netherlands East Indies Purchasing Commission had been established in Melbourne in January 1942. It was replaced in April by the Netherlands East Indies Commission, led by Dr Jacob van Hoogstraten. The Commission became the principal representative of the NEI administration in Australia and was responsible for matters including purchasing, finance, personnel and the welfare of merchant seafarers.[2]
KPM also had an established Australian organisation centred on Paketvaart House at 255 George Street in Sydney. Its representatives possessed the detailed operational knowledge needed to maintain the ships, organise crews and negotiate their employment.
The geographic distance from London and the urgency of the situation encouraged the NEI Commission and KPM representatives to act with a degree of independence. This was not always welcomed by the Netherlands Government-in-Exile, which was concerned that decisions affecting valuable Dutch assets were being made without sufficient central control.
The Allied Consultative Shipping Council
The Australian War Cabinet established the Allied Consultative Shipping Council on 10 March 1942 to help coordinate shipping within the South West Pacific. Its membership reflected the international character of the emerging Allied war effort.
Commander Gerlof Berthy Salm – born in Paramaribo on 11 September 1896. – became the Dutch naval liaison officer in Australia, he attended the Council’s first meeting on 16 March. The Dutch were invited to appoint a regular representative, and KPM official Van Diense was selected. Salm would continue to participate when Dutch naval matters were under discussion.[3]
At the first meeting, Salm stated that the NEI authorities would operate Dutch shipping in the region while consulting London about the chartering of the vessels. The British representative, Sir Thomas Gordon, supported the Netherlands Government-in-Exile’s position that the formal negotiations should be conducted through London.[4]
Meanwhile, representatives of the NEI Commission and KPM had already been negotiating directly with the United States Army in Australia. Van Hoogstraten and Wasserman of the NEI Commission, together with KPM representative Lammers, reached a preliminary arrangement with American military officials.[5]
The disagreement was not primarily about whether the ships should help the Allies. The Dutch had every intention of contributing them to the war effort. The dispute concerned which Dutch authority had the right to negotiate the terms and how much control the Dutch would retain after the vessels had been chartered.
Australian concerns about Dutch cooperation
The negotiations took place against the background of Dutch disappointment over the collapse of the Netherlands East Indies.
Many Dutch and NEI officials believed that Britain, the United States and Australia had failed to provide the reinforcements necessary to defend the colony. Australian officials worried that this resentment might make the Dutch less willing to cooperate over the use of their surviving ships.
On 17 April 1942, the Australian Department of External Affairs prepared a paper entitled “Proposed Measures to offset Dutch Resentment at Allied Failure to Send Reinforcements.” It recommended cooperation over the control of shipping evacuated from the NEI, avoiding unnecessary disputes about charter conditions and giving the Dutch some representation in the management of shipping in Australian waters.[6]
This illustrates the significance of the fleet. Access to the Dutch ships was not merely a commercial matter. It had become part of the wider diplomatic relationship between Australia, the Netherlands Government-in-Exile and the displaced NEI administration.
The question of the cargoes
Before all the ships could be fully employed, their existing cargoes had to be unloaded, identified and distributed. Some carried material intended for the defence or economy of the Netherlands East Indies but had reached only as far as Australia when Java surrendered.
Among the cargoes were crated military aircraft, machinery, textiles, yarn and railway equipment. Australia’s own wartime economy was experiencing shortages, and the Australian Government wanted to identify goods that could be redirected to local military or industrial use.
The NEI Commission negotiated with the Australian Government over their disposal. Eighteen Vought-Sikorsky Kingfisher aircraft, 31 Douglas Boston light bombers and 17 Brewster Buffalo fighters were among the aircraft in Dutch cargoes that were purchased and allocated to the Royal Australian Air Force.[7]
Other assets could not simply be absorbed by Australia. Gold reserves carried out of the Netherlands East Indies had been placed in Australian custody for safekeeping but remained Dutch or NEI property.
The unloading process was sometimes delayed by shortages of labour and industrial disputes on the Australian waterfront. Until their existing cargoes had been removed, vessels could not be released for new military assignments.
A complicated chartering arrangement
A final agreement over the KPM vessels was announced at a meeting of the Allied Consultative Shipping Council on 10 June 1942.
The arrangement involved several layers of authority:
- the Dutch remained the owners of the ships;
- the British Ministry of War Transport formally chartered them;
- the United States War Shipping Administration allocated them to the South West Pacific;
- the United States Army exercised operational control; and
- KPM continued to provide the officers, crews and practical ship-management organisation.[8]
This structure allowed the Allies to use the vessels while recognising Dutch ownership and avoiding a direct transfer of the fleet to the United States.
The ships were sometimes described as United States Army transports, but this did not make them American vessels. They continued to fly the Dutch flag, remained Dutch-registered and were staffed by their existing KPM personnel.
The distinction is important. Their wartime service was simultaneously a Dutch and Indonesian contribution and part of an American-controlled Allied logistics system.
KPM’s altered position
The charter arrangements fundamentally changed KPM’s role. The company had lost most of its commercial network and no longer determined how its ships would be employed. Operational orders came from the United States Army and the wider Allied command structure.
KPM attempted to maintain some influence. Its representative Lammers sought the creation of a KPM liaison position on MacArthur’s staff. Although that proposal was not accepted, the Allied Consultative Shipping Council recognised that the company’s organisation and expertise remained essential.
The Council recommended that KPM act as the managing agent for Dutch vessels chartered to the US Army. This responsibility extended beyond ships originally owned by KPM.[9]
KPM therefore retained important practical functions. It organised officers and crews, dealt with maintenance and repairs, managed personnel matters and served as an intermediary between the shipowners, Dutch authorities and Allied military organisations.
Jonathan Ford concluded that, with the US Army controlling all KPM vessels operating in the South West Pacific, the company had minimal authority over its former commercial assets. In Australia, KPM increasingly operated as an administrative arm of the NEI Commission rather than as an independent shipping enterprise.[10]
Arming and adapting the ships
The ships also had to be prepared for military service. Some arrived in Australia without adequate defensive armament. Ten Dutch vessels were refitted with naval guns operated by Royal Australian Navy ratings. In total, Australia equipped 47 Dutch vessels as Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships.[11]
Military transport also required changes to accommodation, communications, cargo handling and safety equipment. Ships designed to carry commercial cargo and limited numbers of passengers were now expected to transport troops, ammunition, fuel and vehicles into waters exposed to Japanese attack.
Responsibility for the ships remained divided. The US Army issued operational orders, KPM personnel operated the vessels, Australian facilities undertook repairs and modifications, and Dutch and NEI authorities remained responsible for many aspects of crew welfare.
This complicated division of authority could create delays and disputes, particularly when ships required repairs or when KPM believed they were being exposed to unreasonable risks.
Control of the crews
Operational control of a vessel did not automatically resolve responsibility for its crew. The ships depended heavily on Indonesian, particularly Javanese, seafarers, while senior officers and engineers were generally Dutch.
The Netherlands East Indies Commission regarded the seafarers as personnel subject to Dutch and NEI authority. Australian trade unions, however, became involved in disputes over their pay and working conditions. American authorities were principally concerned with ensuring that the ships remained operational.
Questions of racial inequality (White Australia Policy) , military discipline, employment rights and political authority consequently became entangled with the urgent demand for shipping.
These issues warrant a separate article because the KPM fleet could not have operated without its Indonesian and Indo-European personnel. The history of the ships’ control is incomplete without examining the experiences and treatment of their crews.
Dutch ships in an American-led war
The chartering arrangement illustrates how Allied cooperation operated in practice. It was not a simple transfer of ships from one ally to another. It involved negotiations between governments, military commands, shipping authorities and a displaced colonial administration.
Each participant had different priorities. The Netherlands Government-in-Exile wanted to protect Dutch ownership and political authority. NEI representatives in Australia needed to respond quickly to the collapse of their territory. Australia wanted additional shipping and access to urgently needed cargoes. Britain controlled much of the Allied merchant-shipping system, while the United States Army required immediate operational command.
The resulting compromise was administratively cumbersome, but it placed the ships where they were most urgently needed. KPM’s vessels and crews became a major part of the local transport fleet supporting MacArthur’s command.
Their first important collective operation under this new system would demonstrate their value. In May 1942, four Dutch merchant ships sailed from Sydney carrying thousands of Australian troops towards Port Moresby in Convoy ZK8.
Endnotes
[1] James R. Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Area 1941–1947, Transportation Unit, Historical Division, Special Staff, United States Army, 1949, pp. 320–338; Jonathan Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy in the Pacific War,” Journal of Australian Naval History, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2009, pp. 83–84.
[2] Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” pp. 82–84.
[3] Ibid., p. 84.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] National Archives of Australia, Department of External Affairs, “Proposed Measures to offset Dutch Resentment at Allied Failure to Send Reinforcements,” 17 April 1942, cited in Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” p. 83.
[7] Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” p. 83.
[8] Ibid., pp. 83–84; Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation, pp. 320–338.
[9] Ford, “The Netherlands Merchant Navy,” p. 84.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid., p. 83.
